Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 19.djvu/210

Rh 200 PLATO self (i.e., Plato?) had once been fascinated by natural philosophy, and had sought to give a physical account of everything. Then, hearing out of Anaxagoras that mind was the disposer of all, he had hoped to learn not only how tilings were, but also why. But he found Anaxagoras forsaking his own first principle and jumbling causes with conditions. (&quot;The cause why Socrates sits here is not a certain disposition of joints and sinews, but that he has thought best to undergo his sentence, else the joints and sinews would have been ere this, by Crito s advice, on the way to Thessaly.&quot;) Physical science never thinks of a power which orders everything for good, but expects to find another Atlas to sustain the world more strong and lasting than the reason of the best. Socrates had turned from such philosophers and found for him self a way, not to gaze directly on the universal reason, but to seek an image of it in the world of mind, wherein are reflected the ideas, as, for example, the idea of beauty, through partaking of which beautiful things are beautiful. Assuming the existence of the ideas, he felt his way from hypothesis to hypothesis. Xow the participation of objects in ideas is in some cases essential and inseparable. Snow is essentially cold, fire hot, three odd, two even. And things thus essentially opposite are exclusive of each other s attributes. (When it was said above that opposites come from opposites, not opposite things were meant, but opposite states or conditions of one thing. ) Snow cannot admit heat, nor fire cold; for they are inseparable vehicles of heat and cold respectively. The soul is the inseparable vehicle of life, and therefore, by parity of reasoning, the soul cannot admit of death, but is immortal and imperishable. 3. What follows is in the true sense mythological, and is admitted by Socrates to be uncertain. &quot;Howbeit, since the soul is proved to be immortal, men ought to charm their spirits with such tales.&quot; The earth, a globe self-balanced in the midst of space, has many mansions for the soul, 1 some higher and brighter, some lower and darker than our present habitation. We who dwell about the Mediterranean Sea are like frogs at the bottom of a pool. In some higher place, under the true heaven, our souls may dwell hereafter, and see not only colours and forms in their ideal purity but truth and justice as they are. In the Phsedo, more than elsewhere, Plato preaches withdrawal from the world. The Delian solemnity is to Socrates and his friends a period of &quot; retreat, &quot; in which their eyes are turned from earthly things to dwell on the eternal. The theory of ideas here assumes its most transcendental aspect, and it is from portions of this dialogue and of the Phsedrus and Timeeus that the popular conception of Platonism has been principally derived. But to understand Plato rightly it is not enough to study isolated passages which happen to charm the imagina tion; nor should single expressions be interpreted without regard to the manner in which he presents the truth else where. It has already been shown (1) that Socratic inquiry implied a standard of truth and good, undiscovered but end lessly discoverable, and to be approached inductively; and (2) that in Plato this implicit assumption becomes explicit, in the identification of virtue with knowledge (Lack., Charm.) as an art of measurement (Protag.), and in the vision (towards the end of the Lysis) of an absolute object of desire. The Socratic &quot;self-knowledge&quot; has been de veloped (Charm.) into a science of mind or consciousness, apart from which no physical studies can be fruitful. (3) Co-ordinate with these theoretical tendencies there has appeared in Plato the determination not to break with experience. The bearing of these remarks on the further progress of Plato s thoughts will appear in the sequel. Meanwhile, in the Ph&do, a long step is made in the direction of pure idealism. The ordinary virtue, which in the Protagoras and Meno was questioned but not con demned, is here rejected as unreal, and the task proposed to the philosopher is less to understand the world than to escape from it. The universal has assumed the form of the ideal, which is supposed, as elsewhere in Plato, to include 1 Comp. Milton, II Penscro 3-92- &quot; To unsphere The spirit of Plato, to unfold What worlds or what vast regions hold The immortal mind that hath forsook Her mansion in till* fleshly nook.&quot; mathematical as well as moral notions. The only function of perception is to awaken in us some reminiscence of this ideal. By following the clue thus given, and by searching for clearer images of truth in the world of mind, we may hope to be emancipated from sensation, and to lay hold upon the sole object of pure reason. It is obvious that when he wrote the Phsedo Plato conceived of universals as objective entities rather than as forms of thought. The notion of &quot; ideal colours &quot; (though occurring in the myth) is an indication of his ontological mood. Yet even here the elSt) are not consistently hypostatized. The notion of &quot; what is best &quot; has a distinctly practical side, and the &quot; knowledge through reminiscence &quot; is in one aspect a process of reflexion on experience, turning on the laws of association. 2 It is also said that objects &quot; partake &quot; of the ideas, and some concrete natures are regarded as embodiments or vehicles of some of them. Still, if taken as a whole, notwithstanding the scientific attitude of Socrates, the Phsedo is rather a meditation than an inquiry, a study of the soul as self-existent, and of the mind and truth as co-eternal. IV. Symposium, Pkxdrus, Cratylus. Socrates is again imagined as in the fulness of life. But the real Socrates is becoming more and more inextricably blended with Platonic thought and fancy. In the Apology there is a distinct echo of the voice of Socrates ; the Phsedo gives many personal traits of him ; but the dialogues which are now to follow are replete with original invention, based in part, no doubt, on personal recollections. The Symposium admits both of comparison and of con- Sympo- trast with the Phsedo. Both dialogues are mystical, both sium - are spiritual, but the spirituality in either is of a different order. That is here immanent which was there transcend ent ; the beautiful takes the place of the good. The world is not now to be annihilated, but rather transfigured, until particular objects are lost in universal light. Instead of flying from the region of growth and decay, the mind, through intercourse with beauty, is now the active cause of production. Yet the life of contemplation is still the highest life, and philosophy the truest The leading conception of the Symposium has been anticipated in the Lysis, where it was said that &quot; the indifferent loves the good, because of the presence of evil. &quot; The banqueters (including Socrates), who are met to celebrate the tragic victory of Agathon, happen not to be disposed for hard drinking. They send away the flute-girl and entertain each other with the praise of Love. Phsedrus tells how Love inspires to honourable deeds, and how Alcestis and Achilles died for Love. Pausanias rhetorically distinguishes the earthly from the heavenly Love. The physician Eryximachus, admitting the distinction, yet holds that Love pervades all nature, and that art consists in following the higher Love in each particular sphere. So Empedocles had spoken of Love as overcoming previous discord. For opposites cannot, as Hcraclitus fancied, coexist. Aristophanes, in a comic myth, describes the origin of Love as an imperfect creature s longing for completion. The original double human beings were growing impious, and Zeus split them in twain, ever since which act the bereaved halves wander in search of one another. Agathon speaks, or rather sings, of Love and his works, He is the youngest, not the eldest of gods, living and moving delicately wherever bloom is and in the hearts of men, the author of all virtue and of all good works, obeyed by gods, fair and causing all things fair, making men to be of one mind at feasts pilot, defender, saviour, in whose footsteps all should follow, chanting strains of love. Socrates will not attempt to rival the poet, and begins by stipu lating that he may tell the truth. He accepts the distinction between Love and- his works, but points out that, since desire implies want, and the desire of Love is toward beauty, Love, as wanting beauty, is not beautiful. So much being established in 2 Comp. Themt., 184-186.