Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 18.djvu/338

 316 What is the single element which underlies the apparent plurality of the material world 1 their answers, Parmenides conceived, by attributing to the selected element various and varying qualities, reintroduced the plurality which the question sought to eliminate. If we would discover that which is common to all things at all times, we must, he submitted, exclude the differences of things, whether simultaneous or successive. Hence, whereas his prede cessors had confounded that which is universally existent with that which is not universally existent, he proposed to distinguish carefully between that which is universally existent and that which is not universally existent, between ov and p,r) ov. The fundamental truism is the epigram matic assertion of this distinction. In short, the single corporeal element of the Ionian physicists was, to borrow a phrase from Aristotle, a per manent ova- fa having TrdOrj which change ; but they either neglected the Trd&r) or confounded them with the oiia-ia. Parmenides sought to reduce the variety of nature to a single corporeal element ; but he strictly discriminated the inconstant irdOr} from the constant oixrta, and, under standing by &quot; existence &quot; universal, invariable, immutable being, refused to attribute to the 7rd6r] anything more than the semblance of existence. Having thus discriminated between the permanent unity of nature and its superficial plurality, Parmenides pro ceeded to the separate investigation of the Ent and the Nonent. The universality of the Ent, he conceived, necessarily carries with it certain characteristics. It is one ; it is eternal ; it is whole and continuous, both in time and in space ; it is immovable and immutable ; it is limited, but limited only by itself ; it is evenly extended in every direction, and therefore spherical. These pro positions having been reached, apart from particular experience, by reflexion upon the fundamental principle, we have in them, Pannenides conceived, a body of infor mation resting upon a firm basis and entitled to be called &quot; truth. &quot; Further, the information thus obtained is the sum total of &quot; truth ;&quot; for, as &quot; existence&quot; in the strict sense of the word cannot be attributed to anything besides the universal element, so nothing besides the universal element can properly be said to be &quot; known.&quot; If Parmenides s poem had had &quot; Being &quot; for its subject, it would doubtless have ended at this point. Its subject is, however, &quot; Nature&quot;; and nature, besides its unity, has also the semblance, if no more than the semblance, of plurality. Hence the theory of the unity of nature is necessarily followed by a theory of its seeming plurality, that is to say, of the variety and mutation of things. The theory of plurality cannot indeed pretend to the certainty of the theory of unity, being of necessity untrustworthy, because it is the partial and inconstant representation of that which is partial and inconstant in nature. But, as the material world includes, together with a real unity, the semblance of plurality, so the theory of the material world includes, together with the certain theory of the former, a probable theory of the latter. &quot; Opinion &quot; is then no mere excres cence ; it is the necessary sequel to &quot; Truth.&quot; Thus, whereas the lonians, confounding the unity and the plurality of the universe, had neglected plurality, and the Pythagoreans, contenting themselves with the reduc tion of the variety of nature to a duality or a series of dualities, had neglected unity, Parmenides, taking a hint from Xenophancs, made the antagonistic doctrines supply one another s deficiencies ; for, as Xenophanes in his theo logical system had recognized at once the unity of God and the plurality of things, so Parmenides in his system of nature recognized at once the rational unity of the Ent and the phenomenal plurality of the Nonent. The foregoing statement of Parmenides s position differs from Zeller s account of it in two important particulars. First, whereas it has been assumed above that Xenophanes was theologian rather than philosopher, whence it would seem to follow that the philosophical doctrine of unity originated, not with him, but with Parmenides, Zeller, supposing Xenophanes to have taught, not merely the unity of God, but also the unity of Being, assigns to Parmenides no more than an exacter conception of the doctrine of the unity of Being, the justification of that doctrine, and the denial of the plurality and the mutability of things. This view of the relations of Xenophanes and Parmenides is hardly borne out by their writings ; and, though ancient authorities may be quoted in its favour, it would seem that in this case as in others they have fallen into the easy mistake of confounding successive phases of doctrine, &quot; con struing the utterances of the master in accordance with the principles of his scholar the vague by the more definite, the simpler by the more finished and elaborate theory &quot; (W. H. Thompson). Secondly, whereas it has been argued above that &quot;Opinion&quot; is necessarily included in the system, Zeller, supposing Parmenides to deny the Nonent even as a matter of opinion, regards that part of the poem which has opinion for its subject as no more than a revised and improved statement of the views of opponents, introduced in order that the reader, having before him the false doctrine as well as the true one, may be led the more certainly to embrace the latter. In the judgment of the present writer, Parmenides, while he denied the real existence of plurality, recognized its apparent existence, and consequently, however little value he might attach to opinion, was bound to take account of it : &quot; pour celui meme qui nie 1 existence rcelle de la nature,&quot; says llenouvier, &quot; il reste encore a faire une histoire naturelle de 1 apparence et de 1 illusion.&quot; The teaching of Parmenides variously influenced both his immediate successors and subsequent thinkers. By his recognition of an apparent plurality supplementary to the real unity, he effected the transition from the monism of the first physical succession to the pluralism of the second. While Empedocles and Democritus are careful to j emphasize their dissent from &quot; Truth, &quot; it is obvious that &quot; Opinion &quot; is the basis of their cosmologies. The doctrine of the deceitfulness of &quot; the undiscerning eye and the echoing ear &quot; soon established itself, though the grounds upon which Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Bemocritus maintained it were not those which were alleged by Parmenides. Indirectly, through the dialectic of his pupil and friend Zeno and otherwise, the doctrine of the in adequacy of sensation led to the humanist movement, which for a time threatened to put an end to philosophical and scientific speculation. But the positive influence of Parmenides s teaching was not yet exhausted. To say that the Platonism of Plato s later years, the Platonism of the Parmenides, the Philebua, and the Timseus, is the philosophy j of Parmenides enlarged and reconstituted, may perhaps i seem paradoxical in the face of the severe criticism to
 * which Eleaticism is subjected, not only in the Parme?tides y

but also in the Sophist. The criticism wa/&amp;gt;, however, pre paratory to a reconstruction. Thus may be explained the i selection of an Eleatic stranger to be the chief speaker in the latter, and of Parmenides himself to take the lead in the former. In the Sophist criticism predominates over recon struction, the Zenonian logic being turned against the Parmenidean metaphysic in such a way as to show that both the one and the other need revision : see 241 D, 244 B /., 257 B /., 258 D. In particular, Plato taxes Parmenides with his inconsistency in attributing (as he certainly did) to the fundamental unity extension and sphericity, so that &quot; the worshipped ov is after all a pitiful /ZT) ov &quot; (W. H. Thompson). In the Parinenides reconstruc-