Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 17.djvu/301

Rh NAVY 289 other by more than 100 per cent, according as the makers and the particular brand were supposed to have credit in the market. The steel now in use is absolutely faultless as to surface, stronger and more ductile than iron, and very uniform in, quality. That actually employed in the &quot; Iris &quot; and &quot; Mercury,&quot; being a new material (Siemens-Martin of special quality), was no cheaper than the highest quality of tested iron. Since then the extension of its use in all directions has brought it down to half the price given at first. Siemens-Martin and Bessemer steel are now employed almost indifferently. Between 1866 and 1876 only three small vessels were built of steel in the United Kingdom. It is now employed in all the shipbuilding establishments in the country. In this case the royal navy gave the start, and private shipbuilders followed, in a most important change in the use of materials of construction. The use of steel in the navy has not been confined to shipbuild ing. The guns took it up first for internal tubes, and now the whole gun is built of it. The armour has also adopted it, wholly or in part. In England a steel face is cast upon an iron back, the steel being about one-third of the thickness of the plate. The hard face has been found very eificacious in breaking up the attack ing projectiles. It has been found by experiment, for example, that flat plates of compound armour 12 inches thick are more eifective against iron and steel projectiles, fired normally, at high velocity, from a 9-inch gun, than plates of iron 14 inches thick. But the most important point gained is that it has become impos sible for iron shell to perforate armour as shell. The hard face of the armour breaks the shell to pieces. Mercantile Marine. There has never been a time in British naval history when the merchant service has failed to supply ships and men for the national defence. For some years prior to 1853 it was the practice to insert in mail contracts clauses providing for the armament of the steamships employed in mail service. Towards the end of 1852 a report was presented to the Board of Admiralty by a committee of four officers on the question of arming the mail contract steam-packets belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental and Eoyal West India Mail Packet Companies. Their recapitulation of their report is as follows : &quot;That the two companies have 53 vessels (23 of iron) ; that 16 ply between Southampton and foreign ports ; that 5 on an average are always at home and fit for sea ; that 8 may be rendered available for war purposes on an emergency, if they can be spared from the mail packet service within different periods extending altogether over sixty-six days; that they would not make efficient substitutes for regular men-of-war ; that they might be fitted for armed packets and armed troop-ships ; that it would be prudent in future that the fittings be executed beforehand ; that the fittings necessary to the nature of proposed armaments (including magazines and shell- rooms) would cost from 600 to 800 for first and second class vessels, if attended to while a vessel is in progress of building or undergoing a large repair, and proportionally less for smaller vessels; that guns of such calibre be used as are common in the royal navy (viz., 8-inch guns of 65 cwt., and 32-pounders of 42 cwt. ), to faci litate the supplies and render fittings and ordnance stores transfer able from ship to ship ; that a store of guns be kept at the port of Southampton (or Portsmouth), with a proper proportion of ordnance and gunners stores laid apart ready for an immediate call ; that it would be advisable to introduce a clause in the contracts giving the Admiralty a right of pre-emption, and possibly to prevent their sale (but with permission) to a foreign power.&quot; In a second report from the same committee, dated March 1853, upon the British and North American, the Pacific, the General Screw, the Australian, the South Western, and the African Companies, the report is summed up in the statement that out of 91 vessels belonging to eight distinct companies employed in mail contracts, there were only 16 which could be made available on an emergency for auxiliary war purposes. Iron vessels were excluded from those which might be considered available on account of the material used in their construction,&quot; but the committee does not state why the material was considered unsuitable. To go into the reasons influencing their decision would make it necessary to refer to the experiments and the scientific and political controversies which had then been going on for ten years. During this time it had been decided to create a war navy of iron ships ; the ships were commenced ; then it was attempted to stop the building of them, but without success ; they were then transformed into troop- and store-ships. Of two great parties, one contended that iron had been proved to be unfit for fighting ships, and the other that there had been no such proof, and that in the end wood must be given up. The officers composing this committee appear to have agreed with the former party ; and they do not seem to have thought it necessary togive any reason for their rejection of all the large and fine ships employed in the mail service which, at some small expenditure of money, were suitable for receiving an armament in every particular, except that they were built of iron. In March 1853 a Treasury minute was issued calling attention to the enormous cost of the mail packet service, and appointing Mail a committee to consider the whole question. Among other things contracts. it is said in these instructions : &quot;In reviewing the purposes and stipulations of the contracts, the committee will have to consider and report whether they can learn either that the prospect of a reserve of ships of war, which was at one time confidently entertained, has been realized in any sensible degree under these costly arrangements, or whether there is any probability that it can be realized hereafter compatibly with the paramount purpose for which the packets have been constructed, viz., that of postal vessels. On this point the committee will consult a report which has been presented to the Board of Admiralty by a committee of naval and artillery officers. &quot; It will also be their duty to observe what provisions have been inserted in the contracts to secure the sufficiency of the ships for the purpose of naval war fare ; to ascertain whether the stipulations have been carefully fulfilled; whether, in any cases where they have not been so fulfilled, permission to waive them has been regularly sought and obtained from the proper department of the Government ; and whether, in consideration of such non-fulfilment, there has been any adequate remission, or any remission, of the price which the state engaged to pay, not for postal service merely, but for the double purpose of postal service, together with a reserve force in aid of the royal navy.&quot; In July 1853 the committee reported : &quot; The question which appears to us first in the order of consideration is, whether it is desirable to simplify such contracts as may in future be made, by omitting from them all provisions which do not directly bear upon the efficiency of the postal service. In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Govern ment seized the opportunity of requiring that the vessels should be constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for national defence in war as steam packets belonging to the crown would have been if employed in their stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in 1840, and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found, requiring that the vessels should be of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as the Admiralty may think proper. In several cases they must be built of wood, and not of iron ; and there are some contracts which confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may be thought desirable to do so. &quot; The surveyor s report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness for war purposes, is in the following terms : Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted. This report accords with the opinion expressed by the committee of naval and artillery officers upon the vessels which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of that committee that, although the packets they have examined are for the most part of sufficient strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would be necessary before they could be got ready for service would be very considerable, and that, even when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal tonnage without endangering the honour of the British flag. &quot; With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no ex pense should be incurred for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels. We believe the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. Should a war suddenly break out, the imme diate demand for mail steamers would probably be greater than ever, and it might be exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their legitimate use for the purpose of arming them for battle. Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been borne with the greater readiness, because it has been supposed by some to include a provision, of large but unknown amount, for the defence of the country ; while, on the other hand, the naval estimates have sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the force provided for was in addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers. &quot;We accordingly recommend that for the future the contracts for the convey ance of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature we have been describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency.&quot; They add : &quot; An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among thu public as to the efficiency of our postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged with the direction of the military affairs of the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any great service in an engagement, but their advantage as an auxiliary force will be very consider able. They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of despatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and stores. Their speed will be such as probably to secure them from the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for procuring intelligence of hos tile movements. They may also be expected to furnish queen s ships with men trained to steam navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which cannot fail to be valuable in several ways. &quot;Again, it is not only in a military sense that rapidity of communication between all parts of the British empire tends to increase its security. While the mother country continues to exercise any control over the proceedings of the colonies, the inconveniences attending the delay of correspondence are severely felt, and speedy communication is of the highest consequence to the preserva tion of satisfactory relations between them.&quot; Within the last few years all references to armament or fitness for warlike services have disappeared from the mail contracts, but there has been in some of them a clause providing that the Admiralty may in cases of great public emergency charter vessels of the company at rates to be agreed on, but in case of difference as to such rates, or damages consequent upon such purchase or hiring, the same is to be settled by arbitration. Since 1852, when the committee refused to accept vessels built of iron, many changes have taken place. There are no wooden mail steamers left : iron or steel has completely displaced wood as a material of construction for such purposes. The great development of incendiary projectiles in war, such as percussion shell, red-hot shot, and hollow shot filled with molten iron, not only led to the adoption of iron armour, and thus incidentally to iron frames and skin as well, but showed also that wooden ships would be rapidly set on fire in an action. In the ironclad ship the objection raised to iron for the structure of Avar ships, viz., that the plating and riveting could be driven out in numerous and dangerous fragments by projectiles, does not hold. The experiments on the &quot;Simoom&quot; targets (1849-51) were doubtless in the minds of the officers who made the reports referred to a&quot;bove, and they must not be forgotten. , XVII ^7