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Rh 1805.] the war. In order to understand in any degree the course he took, it seems necessary to suppose that the intoxication of the Marengo campaign still held him, that as then, con trary to all expectation, he had passed the Alps, crushed his enemy, and instantly returned, so now he made no doubt of passing the Channel, signing peace in London, and return ing in a month with a fabulous indemnity in his pocket to meet the Coalition in Germany. To conquer England it was worth while to wait two years, but his position was very critical when, after losing two years, he was obliged to confess himself foiled. He retrieved his position suddenly, and achieved a triumph which, though less complete than that which he had counted on, was still prodigious, the greatest triumph of his life. At the moment when his English scheme was ending in deplorable failure, he pro duced another, less gigantic but more solid, which he unfolded with a rapid precision and secrecy peculiar to himself. In the five years which had passed since Marengo his position for the purposes of a Continental war had improved vastly. Then he had no footing either in Germany or Italy, and his new office of First Consul gave him a very precarious control over the armies, which themselves were in a poor condition. Now his military authority was absolute, and the armies after five years of imperialism were in perfect organization ; he had North Italy to the Adige; he had Hanover; and since the Germanic revolution of 1803 Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden had passed over to his side. Therefore as the Coalition consisted only of Austria, Russia, and England he might count upon success, and the more confidently if he could strike Austria before the arrival of the Russian army. It is strange that in this estimate it should be unnecessary to take Prussia into the account, since the Prussian army (consisting of 250,000 men) was at that time supposed to be a match by itself for the French. At the last moment, and in the midst of the Austerlitz campaign, Napoleon might have been brought near to ruin by a sudden resolution on the part of the king of Prussia, and it is to be added that he did not escape this risk by any circumspection of his own. But for ten years Prussia had been rooted in the strangest system of immovable neutrality, and in this war both sides had to put up with the uncer tainty whether the prodigious weight of the army of Frederick would not be thrown suddenly either into its own or into the opposite scale. It was at the end of August 1805 that Napoleon made his sudden change of front. At the beginning of that month he had been still intent on the invasion of England ; ever since March maritime manoeuvres on an unparalleled scale had been carried on with the object of decoying the English fleets away from the Channel, and so giving an opportunity for the army of invasion to cross it in a flotilla under the pro tection of French fleets. But in spite of all manoeuvres a great English fleet remained stationary at Brest, and Nelson, having been for a moment decoyed to Barbados, returned again. In the last days of August Admiral Villeneuve, issuing from Ferrol, took alarm at the news of the approach of an English fleet, and instead of sailing northward faced about and retired to Cadiz. Then for the first time Napoleon admitted the idea of failure, and saw the necessity of screening it by some great achievement in another quarter. He resolved to throw his whole force upon the Coalition, and to do it suddenly. Prussia was to be bribed by the very substantial present of Hanover. Five years had passed since Napoleon had taken the field when the second period of his military career began. He now begins to make war as a sovereign with a bound less command of means. For five years from 1805 to 1809 he takes the field regularly, and in these campaigns he founds the great Napoleonic empire. By the first he breaks up the Germanic system and attaches the minor German states to France, by the second he humbles Prussia, by the third he forces Russia into an alliance, by the fourth he reduces Spain to submission, by the fifth he humbles Austria. Then follows a second pause, during which for three years Napoleon s sword is in the sheath, and he is once more ruler, not soldier. From the beginning of this second series of wars the principles of the Revolution are entirely forgotten by France, which is now a monarchy and even a propagator of monarchical principles. Napoleon s strategy always aims at an overwhelming surprise. As in 1800, when all eyes were intent on Genoa, and from Genoa the Austrians hoped to penetrate into France, he created an overwhelming confusion by throwing himself across the Alps and marching not upon Genoa but upon Milan, so now he appeared not in front of the Austrians but behind them and between them and Vienna. The wavering faith of Bavaria had caused the Austrians to pass the Inn and to advance across the country to Ulm. It was intended that the Russians should join them here, and that the united host should invade France, taking Napoleon, as they fondly hoped, by surprise. So often unfortunate in their choice of generals, they had this time made the most unfortunate choice of all. Mack, who at Naples in 1799 had moved the impatient con tempt of Nelson, now stood matched against Napoleon at the height of his power. He occupied the line of the Iller from Ulm to Memmingen, expecting the attack of Napoleon, who personally lingered at Strasburg, in front. Meanwhile the French armies swarmed from Hanover and down the Rhine, treating the small German states half as allies half as conquered dependants, and disregarding all neutrality, even that of Prussia, till they took up their positions along the Danube from Donauworth to Ratisbon far in the rear of Mack. The surprise was so complete that Mack, who in the early days of October used the language of confident hope, on the 19th surrendered at Ulm with about 26,000 men, while another division, that of Werneck, surrendered on the 18th to Murat at Nordlingen. In a month the whole Austrian army, con sisting of 80,000 men, was entirely dissolved. Napoleon was master of Bavaria, recalled the elector to Munich, and received the congratulations of the electors of Wiirtem- berg and Baden (they had just at this time the title of electors). It was the stroke of Marengo repeated, but without a doubtful battle and without undeserved good luck. After Marengo it had been left to Moreau to win the decisive victory and to conclude the war ; this time there was no Moreau to divide the laurels. The second part of the campaign begins at once; on October 28 Napoleon reports that a division of his army has crossed the Inn. He has now to deal with the Russians, of whom 40,000 men have arrived under Kutusoff. He reaches Linz on November 4, where Gyulai brought him the emperor s proposals for an armistice. He replies by demanding Venice and Tyrol and insisting upon the exclusion of Russia from the negotiations, conditions which, as he no doubt foresaw, Gyulai did not think himself authorized to accept. But Napoleon did not intend this time, as in 1797 and in 1800, to stop short of Vienna. Nothing now could resist his advance, for the other Austrian armies, that of the archduke John in Tyrol and that of the archduke Charles on the Adige, were held in play by Ney and Massena, and compelled at last, instead of ad vancing to the rescue, to retire through Carniola into Hungary. On November 14 he dates from the palace )f Schonbrunn ; on the day before Murat had entered Vienna, which the Austrian emperor, from motives of humanity, had XVII. 27 Cam- P ai 8 n anc i Russia. Capitu- lation of