Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 16.djvu/90

Rh 80 METAPHYSIC gence 1 which, beginning in sense perception, with the dis tinction of particular from particular, can rest only when it has apprehended things in their universal forms or defini tions. Looking at knowledge formally, the highest law of thought, the law of contradiction (or, as we might call it, to indicate Aristotle s meaning more exactly, the law of de finition or distinction), is already implied in the first act of perception by which one thing is distinguished from another. Looking at it materially, the reason of man is to be con ceived as potentially all that is knowable ; i.e., objects are so related to it that for it to know them in their essential definitions is only to know itself. The aim of science, in this view, is to break through the husk of matter, and to apprehend things in their forms, in which they are one with the mind that knows them. Hence also it follows that in rising to the most universal science, the science of Being in general, the mind is not leaving the region of immediate experience, in which it is at home, for a far-off region of abstractions. Rather it is returning to itself, apprehend ing that which is most closely related to itself, and which therefore, though it is late in being made the direct object of investigation, is yet presupposed in all that is, and is known. 2 Metaphysic, then, is the science which deals with the principles which are presupposed in all being and knowing, though they are brought to light only by philosophy. Another trait completes the Aristotelian account of it. It is theology, or the science of God. Now God is 1/0770-15 voT/o-ctos, pure self-consciousness, the absolute thought which is one with its object, and He is therefore the first cause of all existence. For, while the world of nature is a world of motion and change, in which form is realized in matter, this process of the finite can be explained only by referring it back to an unmoved mover, in whom there is no distinc tion of matter and form, and who is, therefore, in Aristotle s view, to be conceived as pure form, the purely ideal or theoretic activity of a consciousness whose object is itself. Such a conception, however, while it secures the independ ence and absoluteness of the unmoved mover, by removing him from all relation to what is other than himself, seems to make his connexion with the world inexplicable. We can on this theory refer the world to God, but not God to the world. Hence Aristotle seems sometimes to say that God is the first mover only as He is the last end after which all creation strives, and this leads him to attribute to nature a desire or will which is directed towards the good as its object or end. Aristotle then brings together in his metaphysic three elements which are often separated from each other, and the connexion of which is far from being at once obvious. It is to him the science of the first principles of being. It is also the science of the first principles of knowing. Lastly, it is the science of God, as the beginning and end of all things, the absolute unity of being and thought, in which all the differences of finite thought and existence are either excluded or overcome. To some this description of the contents of Aristotle s treatise, and especially the last part of it, may seem to be a confirmation of all the worst charges brought against metaphysic. For at both extremes this supposed science seems to deal with that which is beyond experience, and which therefore cannot be verified by it. It takes us back to a beginning which is prior to the existence as well as to the consciousness of finite objects in time and space, and on to an end to which no scientific prophecy based upon our consciousness of such objects can reach. In the 1 Auca,u&amp;lt;y KpiTiicfi, Anal. Post., ii. 996. 2 What is said here as to the intelligence is partly taken from the De Anima. The necessary qualifications of the above general state ment of Aristotle s views will be given subsequently. former aspect of it, it has to do with notions so abstract and general that it seems as if they could not be fixed or tested by reference to any experience, but must necessarily be the playthings of dialectical sophistry. In the latter aspect of it, it entangles us in questions as to the final cause and ultimate meaning of things, questions involving so comprehensive a view of the infinite universe in which we are insignificant parts that it seems as if any attempt to answer them must be for us vain and presumptuous. On both sides, therefore, metaphysic appears to be an attempt to occupy regions which are beyond the habitable space of the intelligible world to deal with ideas which are either so vague and abstract that they cannot be fastened to any definite meaning, or so complex and far- reaching that they can never by any possibility be verified. For beings like men, fixed within these narrow limits of space and time, the true course, it would seem, is to &quot; cultivate their gardens,&quot; asking neither whence they come nor whither they go, or asking it only within the possible limits of history and scientific prophecy. To go back to the beginning or on to the end is beyond them, even in a temporal, still more in a metaphysical, sense. That which is -n-purov &amp;lt;ucm escapes us even more absolutely than the prehistorical and pregeological records of man and his world. That which is va-rarov &amp;lt;rcrei escapes us even more absolutely than the far-off future type of civilization, which social science vainly endeavours to anticipate. Our state is best pictured by that early Anglican philosopher who compared it to a bird flying through a lighted room &quot; between the night and the night.&quot; The true aim of philosophy is, therefore, it would seem, to direct our thoughts to the careful exam ination and utilization of the narrow space allotted to us by an inscrutable power, and with scientific self-restraint to refrain from all speculation either on first or on final causes. The main questions as to the possibility and the nature of metaphysic, according to Aristotle s conception of it, may be summed up under two heads. We may ask whether we can in any sense reach that which is beyond experience, and, if so, whether this &quot; beyond &quot; is a first or a last principle, a pre-condition or a final cause of nature and experience, or both. The former question branches out into two, according as we look at metaphysic from the objective or the subjective side, or, to express the matter more accurately, according as we consider it in relation to those natural objects which are merely objects of knowledge, or in relation to those spiritual objects which are also subjects of knowledge. We shall therefore consider meta physic, first, in relation to science in general, and, secondly, in relation to the special science of psychology. The latter question also has two aspects ; for, while the idea of a first cause or principle points to the connexion between metaphysic and logic, the idea of a last principle or final cause connects metaphysic with theology. We shall there fore consider in the third place the relation .of metaphysic to logic, and in the fourth place its relation to religion and the philosophy of religion. 1. The Relation of Metaphysic to Science. The beginnings of science and metaphysic are identical, though there is a sense in which it may be admitted that the metaphysical comes before the scientific or positive era. The first efforts of philosophy grasp at once at the prize of absolute knowledge. No sooner did the Greeks become dissatisfied with the pictorial synthesis of mythology by which their thoughts were first lifted above the confusion of particular things, than they asked for one universal principle which should explain all things. The Ionic school sought to find some one phenomenon of nature which might be used as the key to all other phenomena. The Eleatics, seeing the