Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 16.djvu/584

Rh 556 MOHAMMEDANISM MOHAMMED. (Ahabish) assembled, they set out under the command of Abu Sofydn, and without any check reached Medina, where they pitched their camp to the north-east of the city, in the green corn-fields by Mount Ohod. In Medina the elders were for awaiting the attack on the town and de fending themselves within it, but the young men hurried the Prophet into the determination to meet the enemy without the gates ; this resolution once come to he per severed in, even after those who had urged him to it had Battle of changed their minds. On the morning of Saturday, the Ohod. 7th of Shawwal, A.H. 3 (Jan. Feb. 625), the armies met. At first the battle seemed to be going once more in favour of the Moslems ; one after another the standard-bearers and champions of the enemy fell, the whole host wavered, and even the camp was gained. But here their lust for plunder did them an evil turn. Mohammed had covered his left flank against the Meccan horsemen by a number of bowmen, whom he had ordered on no account to leave their post. But as soon as they saw that the enemy s camp was taken, they threw off all discipline, and determined to have their share of what was going. It thus became possible for the Meccan cavalry to fall upon the Moslem rear, and snatch back the victory that had already been won. In the confusion which now ensued Mohammed himself was wounded in the face, and for some time lay for dead on the ground. Among the slain was found his uncle, Hamza b. Abdalmottalib, &quot;the lion of God ; &quot; his liver was cut out and carried to Abu Sofydn s wife, Hind bint Otba, whose father had been killed by Hamza at Bedr. But the Meccans did not know how to follow up their triumph. Instead of at once attacking Medina where, to be sure, a second struggle with Ibn Obay, who with his following had not taken part in the battle at Ohod, would have been necessary they con tented themselves with the honour of their victory, and took the road home, after having summoned the Moslems to a repetition in the following year of the duel at Bedr. Mohammed even pursued them for a short distance on the following day (as far as to Hamrd al-Asad), of course only for the sake of appearances, that the Arabs might not suppose him to have been daunted by his defeat. Band Nothing came of the proposed meeting at Bedr, the event of A.H. 4 was the expulsion of the Banti Nadir, the most distinguished and powerful Jewish family in Medina (Summer 625). Mohammed, under some pretext, suddenly broke with them and ordered their departure within ten days, on pain of death. Relying upon the support of Ibn Obay, they resolved to resist, and sus tained a siege within their walls ; but the ally they had counted on proved a broken reed, 1 and they were soon compelled to surrender. They were permitted to with draw, taking along with them all their movable property except their arms. With music and roll of drum, the women in gala dress, they marched through the streets of Medina, on their way to Khaibar, where they had pro perty. Their land the Prophet appropriated to himself (sur. lix. 7) ; the income derived from it could be em ployed to meet the numerous claims that were made upon him. He seems also to have handed over some of it to the Emigrants, who until then had acquired no property in land in Medina. Meanwhile, the Banii Nadir were not idle in Khaibar, but left no stone unturned to annihilate their mortal enemy. They succeeded in bringing about an alliance of the Koraish and the great Bedouin tribes of Solaim and Ghatafdn, for the suppression of Islam. In the month 1 The sympathy shown by many scholars for Ibn Obay, whose weak ness degenerated into faithlessness, is unjustified. Dhu l-ka e da, A.H. 5 (March 627), the three armies set out, 10,000 strong, under the command of Abu Sofydn. Mohammed received word of this through the Khozd a, who secretly played into his hands, and on this occasion he resolved, not as formerly to offer battle on the open field, but to make preparation for a siege. For the most part the houses of the town were built so close to one another as to make a continuous wall ; at the north-west corner only was there a wide open space, through which an enemy could easily effect an entrance. Here Mohammed, with the advice and direction of the Persian freedman Salmdn, drew a ditch, behind which he entrenched him self with the Moslems, the hill of Sal 2 protecting their rear. This fosse, which has become famous, and has even given its name to the entire campaign (the War of the War of Fosse), fully served its purpose. The enemy with their tlie cavalry perseveringly directed their attack on this spot, sse&amp;gt; but were constantly repelled by the vigilant and courageous defence of the fosse. They at last gave up all hope of reaching their end in this way, unless a simultaneous attack were to succeed in another quarter. To assist them in this, they endeavoured to stir up the Koraiza, the last autonomous family of Jews still remaining in Medina, having their settlements in the south-east of the town. The Nadirite Hoyay b. Akhtab, the most zealous promoter of the alliance against Mohammed, undertook charge of the negotiations, and succeeded at last in persuading their prince, Ka b b. Asad, to break his pact of neutrality Avith the Moslems. But nothing came of it. The Jews doubted the perseverance of the Koraish and their allies they had their fears lest, if the struggle proved a protracted one, the besiegers might withdraw and leave them to their fate. They accordingly demanded hostages in security against such an event, being otherwise determined not to break up all hope of reconciliation with Mohammed by entering the contest. This attitude, in turn, aroused suspicion on the part of the besiegers, whom it was not difficult to con vince that the Jews were demanding hostages of them for the purpose of handing them over to Mohammed, and so making their peace with him. All this crippled their activi ties still more than did the failure of their own attacks upon the fosse. The season also was against them ; the weather was windy, the nights extremely cold, and, worst of all, the fields yielded nothing. From this cause the chief sufferers were the Bedouins, who had brought no forage for their camels and horses. Mohammed, who appears to have been kept well informed of their mood, judged it expedient to open negotiations with them. These were soon broken off indeed, but the mere fact that the Ghatafdn had ever entered upon them was enough to create mutual suspicion amongst the allies. One stormy night the Meccans suddenly raised the siege, after it had lasted fourteen days, and returned home ; they were followed by the Ghatafdn and Solaim. It was with no small joy that the Moslems on the following morning discovered the de parture of the enemy ; it would have been impossible for them to have held out much longer, exhausted as they were, not less by cold and hunger, than by the fatigues of constantly mounting guard. As soon as Mohammed had given them permission to leave the camp beside the hill of Sal, they dispersed with the greatest alacrity to their homes. Mohammed, however, did not allow them much time to Attack recruit. Hardly had they reached their abodes, when he on tn p again called them to arms against the treacherous Koraiza. J &amp;gt; orai ? a&amp;gt; The unlucky Jews had been given over to the sword by the withdrawal of the allies ; a siege of fourteen days compelled them to surrender unconditionally. The men 2 Now the citadel, it would seem.
 * Meccans failing to put in an appearance. The principal