Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 13.djvu/169

 I N S I N S 157 show discrepancies which cannot be explained on the theory of wilful or involuntary mistakes of copyists. The Socinians and certain Arminians, such as Episcopius, who started with the idea that the Bible is simply a com munication of knowledge, and so revived the medieval idea, also resuscitated the scholastic doctrine of partial inspira tion. They did not admit the allegorical method of inter pretation, and were therefore compelled to reject the &quot;indirect inspiration&quot; of Thomas Aquinas; but they held that inspiration was only required to communicate know ledge which the writer could not otherwise obtain, and they usually asserted that only the doctrinal parts of the Bible were inspired while the historical were not. Calixtus in the Lutheran Church held a somewhat similar opinion. G. In more recent times the doctrine of inspiration has assumed various forms, many of which have but slight connexion with either the Reformation or the mediaeval theories. All admit that the inspiration of Scripture implies that the revelation of God has been committed to writing. Those who hold naturalistic views of revelation reduce inspiration to a peculiar aptitude for and sympathy with religious and moral truth. Others, although believing in the supernatural character of revelation, hold that there is no warrant to suppose anything specially supernatural about the committal of the revelation to writing, and believe that God left His revelation to be recorded in the natural course of providence by men who had perhaps a larger share than their fellows of the spiritual enlightenment common to all believers. Others again have revived the old Thomist doctrine that parts of the Bible are inspired and that parts are not. To meet such theories, orthodox theologians have invented the terms plenary inspiration and verbal inspiration, but the phrases are neither very exact nor very enlightening. Meanwhile it is interesting to observe that a number of modern theologians, among whom may be named the late Adolphe Monod of Paris, have sought to revive the old simple Reformation form of the doctrine divested of its 17th century subtilties. See Sonntag, Doctrina Inspirationis ejusque ratio, &c., Heidelberg, 3810; Hagenbach, History of Doctrines ; Baur, Vorlesungcn iibcr die Chri.stlicha Dogmcngcschichte ; Schaff, History of the Creeds of Christ mdom ; Bannerman, Inspiration ; Gaussen, Theopneustic ; Lee, The Inspiration of the Holy Bible, &c. (T. M. L.) INSTERBURG (16,303). the chief town of a circle in government district of Gumbinnen, East Prussia, is situated at the point where the Angerap and Inster join to form the Pregel, about 55 miles east of Konigsberg. It is the seat of an appeal and other courts, and of a reformatory for the district, and has a chamber of commerce, a hospital, a gymnasium, a real-school of the first class, and several other schools. Insterburg is an active manufacturing town, and, besides flax-spinning and iron-founding, carries on the manufacture of machinery, shoes, cement, leather, and furs, along with a considerable trade in cereals, vegetables, flax, linseed, and wood. Close to the town is a large stud-farm, and about 2 miles off is the old castle of Georgenburg. Including the garrison, the population in 1875 was 10,303. Insterburg was founded in the 14th century as a castle and coni- mandery of the knights of the Teutonic order. The commandery was removed in 1525, but the village which had sprung up round the castle received town privileges in 1583 from the margrave of Brandenburg. During the next century it made rapid advances in prosperity, owing to the settlement in it of several Scotch trading families. In 1679 it was besieged by the Swedes, in 1690 it suffered severely from a fire, and in 1710-11 from a pestilence. INSTINCT is a term which does not admit of rigid de finition, because, as ordinarily used, the meaning of the term is not rigidly fixed. But for the purposes of scientific expo sition from a biological point of view the nearest approach we can make to such a definition is perhaps the following : Instinct is a generic term comprising all those faculties of mind which lead to the conscious performance of actions that are adaptive in character, but pursued without neces sary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends attained. We must, however, remember that instinctive actions are very commonly tempered with what Pierre Huber calls &quot; a little dose of judgment or reason.&quot; But although reason may thus in varying degrees be blended with instinct, the distinction between the two is sufficiently precise ; for reason, in whatever degree present, only acts upon a definite and often laboriously acquired knowledge of the relation between means and ends. Moreover, adjustive actions due to instinct are similarly performed by all individuals of a species under the stimulus supplied by the same appropriate circumstances, whereas adjustive actions due to reason are variously performed by different individuals. Lastly, instinctive actions are only performed under particular circumstances which have been frequently experienced during the life history of the species, whereas rational actions are performed under varied cir cumstances, and serve to meet novel exigencies which may never before have occurred even in the life history of the individual. All instincts probably arose in one or other of two ways. Origin of (1) By the effects of habit in successive generations, instincts, mental activities which were originally intelligent become, as it were, stereotyped into permanent instincts. Just as in the life-time of the individual adaptive actions which were originally intelligent may by frequent repetition become automatic, so in the life-time of the species actions originally intelligent may, by frequent repetition and heredity, so write their effects on the nervous i.ystem that the latter is prepared, even before individual experience, to perform adaptive actions mechanically which in previous generations were performed intelligently. This mode of origin of instincts has been appropriately called the &quot;lapsing of intelligence.&quot; (2) The other mode of origin consists in natural selection, or survival of the fittest, con tinuously preserving actions which, although never intelli gent, yet happen to have been of benefit to the animals which first chanced to perform them. Thus, for instance, take the instinct of incubation. It is quite impossible that any animal can ever have kept its eggs warm with the intelligent purpose of hatching out their contents, so we can only suppose that the incubating instinct began by warm-blooded animals showing that kind of attention to their eggs which we find to be frequently shown by cold blooded animals. Thus crabs and spiders carry about their eggs for the purpose of protecting them ; and if, as animals gradually became warm-blooded, some species for this or for any other purpose adopted a similar habit, the impart ing of heat would have become incidental to the carrying about of the eggs. Consequently, as the imparting of heat promoted the process of hatching, those individuals which most constantly cuddled or brooded over their eggs would, other things equal, have been most successful in rearing progeny ; and so the incubating instinct would be developed without there having been any intelligence in the matter. That many instincts must have been developed in this way is rendered evident by the following considerations. (1) Many instinctive actions are performed by animals too low in the scale to admit of our supposing that the* adjustments which are now instinctive can ever have been intelligent. (2) Among the higher animals instinctive actions are performed at an age before intelligence, or power of learning by individual experience, lias begun to assert itself. (3) Considering the great importance of instincts to species, we are prepared to expect that they must be in large part subject to the influence of natural selection. As Mr Darwin observes, &quot;it will be universally admitted that instincts are as important as corporeal structures for the welfare of each species under its present