Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 12.djvu/427

411 H U T H U T 411 from Locke is his account of the idea of personal identity, which he appears to have regarded as made known to us directly by conscious ness. &quot; Meutein suain eandeiu inanere, sibi conscius est quisque, repetentia ilia, sive perceptione interim, certissima, ast ineffabili, qua uovit suam mentem a mente quavis alia omnino diversam esse&quot; (.S j/tt. Mctaph., pars. i. cap. 3). The distinction between body and mind, &quot;corpus&quot; or &quot; materia &quot; and &quot;res cogitans,&quot; is more emphatically accentuated by Hutcheson than by Locke. Generally, he speaks as if we had a direct consciousness of mind as distinct from body (see, for instance, Syn. Mctaph., pars ii. cap. 3), though, in the posthumous work on Moral Philosophy, he expressly states that we know mind as we know body &quot;by qualities immediately per ceived though the substance of both be unknown&quot; (bk. i. ch. 1). The distinction between perception proper and sensation proper, which occurs by implication though it is not explicitly worked out (see Hamilton s Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 24 ; Hamilton s edition of Ducjald Stewart s Works, vol. v. p. 420), the imperfection of the ordinary division of the external senses into five classes, the limitation of consciousness to a special mental faculty (severely criticized in Sir W. Hamilton s Lectures on Metaphysics^ Lect. xii. ), and the disposition to refer on disputed questions of philosophy not so much to formal arguments as to the testimony of consciousness and our natural instincts (&quot;ad gravissima qiuv.dam in philosophia dogmata amplectenda, non argnmentis aut ratiocinationibus, ex reruni perspecta natura petitis, sed potius sensu quodam interno, usu, atque natune impulsu quodam aut instinctu ducimur,&quot; pars ii. cap. 3) are also amongst the points in which Hutcheson supple mented or departed from the philosophy of Locke. The last point can hardly fail to suggest to our readers the &quot;common-sense philosophy&quot; of Reid, and here it may be remarked that the interest attaching to Hutcheson s psychological and metaphysical views consists very largely in the intermediate position which they occupy between the system of Locke and that of Reid and the later Scottish school. If we confine ourselves to merely enumerat ing detached questions, he perhaps stands nearer to Locke, but in the general spirit of his philosophy he seems to approach more closely to his Scottish successors. The short Compendium of Logic, which is more original than such works usually are, is chiefly remarkable for the large proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In these parts of the book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. The technicalities of the subject are passed lightly over, and the book is eminently readable. It may be specially noticed that lie distinguishes between the mental result and its verbal expression [idea term ; judgment proposition], that lie constantly employs the word &quot;idea,&quot; and that he defines logical truth as &quot; convenientia signorutn cum rebus signiiicatis&quot; (or &quot;pro- positionis convenientia cum rebus ipsis,&quot; 8yn. Metaph,, pars i. cap. 3), thus implicitly repudiating a merely formal view of logic. Hutcheson may claim to have been one of the earliest modern writers on lesthetics. His speculations on this subject are contained in the Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, and Design, the first of the two treatises published in 1725. He maintains that we are endowed with a special sense by which we perceive beauty, harmony, and proportion. This is a reflex sense, because it pre supposes the action of the external senses of sight and hearing. It may be called an internal sense, both in order to distinguish its perceptions from the mere perceptions of sight and hearing, and because &quot;in some other affairs, where our external senses are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observed in sensible objects, and accompanied with like pleasure&quot; (Inquiry, &c., sect. 1). The latter reason leads him to call attention to the beauty perceived in universal truths, in the operations of general causes, and in moral principles and actions. Thus, the analogy between beauty and virtue, which was so favourite a topic with Shaftesbury, becomes also prominent in the writings of Hutcheson. Scattered up and down the treatise, there are many important and interesting observations which our limits prevent us from noticing. But to the student of mental philosophy it may be specially interesting to remark that Hutclieson both applies the principle of association to explain our ideas of beauty and also sets limits to its application, insisting on there being &quot;a natural power of perception or sense of beauty in objects, antecedent to all custom, education, or example&quot; (see Inquiry, &c., sects. 6, 7 ; Hamilton s Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 44 ail fin.). Hntcheson s writings gave rise, as they could hardly fail to do, to much controversy among those who were interested in ethical speculations. To say nothing of minor opponents, such as &quot; Philaretus&quot; (Mr Gilbert Burnet, already alluded to), Dr John Balguy, author of two tracts on The Foundation of Moral Goodness, and Dr John Taylor of Norwich, a Presbyterian minister of consider able reputation in his time, the essays appear to have suggested, by antagonism, at least two works which hold a permanent place in the literature of English ethics. One of these is Butler s Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, which is, throughout, a criticism of the main positions maintained by Hutcheson. The other is an answer of a far more complete and systematic character, Dr Richard Price s Treatise nf Moral Good and Evil, which first appeared in 1757. In this work, the author maintains, in opposition to Hutcheson, that actions are in themselves right or wrong (an ambiguous expression, which he is not sufficiently careful to explain), that right and wrong are simple ideas incapable of analysis, and that these ideas are per ceived immediately by the understanding. Price s work is remark able for the close similarity between many of the ideas and even expressions contained in it and those which subsequently became so celebrated in the speculations of Kant. We thus see that, not only by its direct but also by its indirect influence, through the replies which it called forth, the system of Hutcheson, or at least the system of Hutcheson combined with that of Shaftesbury, may be regarded as having contributed, in very large measure, to the forma tion and development of some of the most important of the modern schools of ethics. n s various works have been already men HUTCHINSON, JOHN (1616-1664), a Puritan soldier, son of Sir Thomas Hutchinson, was born at Nottingham in September 1616. After completing his education at Cambridge University he entered Lincoln s Inn, but soon became tired both of the study of law and the amusements of London, and was meditating travel on the Continent when he accidentally made the acquaintance of Lucy, daughter of Sir Allan Apsley, whom he married in 1638. After his marriage he returned to Owthorpe, where the study of divinity and politics gradually led to a change of his sentiments in regard to the dispute between the parlia ment and the king At first he did not find a clear call to join the Parliamentary army, but the efforts of the Pioyalists to seize him as a disaffected person soon dissipated his ] neutrality, and, becoming governor of Nottingham, he with i great firmness and courage held the tow r n and castle against internal treachery and external attacks till the triumph of the parliamentary cause. Having bet n chosen to represent Nottingham in the new parliament, lie became a member of the high court of justice for the trial of the king, and gave his vote for his execution, but, disapproving of the subsequent political conduct of Cromwell, he took no further part in politics during the lifetime of the Protector. After the Restoration he became member for the county of Nottingham, and he was included in the Act of Amnesty passed in favour of certain of the regicides. Subsequently, however, he was arrested upon suspicion of being concerned in a treasonable conspiracy ; and after an imprisonment of ten months in the Tower of London, and of one month in Sandown Castle, Kent, he died llth September 1G64. The life of Colonel Hutchinson is now only of interest from the manner in which it is narrated in the Memoirs written by his wife, and first published in 1806, a work not only valuable for the picture which it gives of the time in which he lived, but for the simple beauty of its style, and the naivete with which the writer records her senti ments and opinions, and details the incidents of her private life. HUTCHINSON, JOHN (1674-1737), the author of Moses s Prinrijria and other works in which the so-called Hutchinsonian system is expounded, was born at Spenni- thorne, Yorkshire, in 1674. and after receiving an adequate elementary education there, served as steward in several families of position, latterly in that of the dnke of Somerset, who ultimately obtained for him the post of riding purveyor to the master of the horse, a sinecure worth about 200 a year. In this employment he became acquainted with Dr Woodward, physician to the duke, and author of a work entitled The Natural History of (he Earth, to whom ha