Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 12.djvu/367

355 355 The closing sentences of this passage maybe regarded as pointing to the very essence of the Kantian attempt at solution of the problem of knowledge. Hume sees distinctly that if conscious experience be taken as containing only isolated states, no progress in explanation of cognition is possible, and that the only hope of further develop ment is to be looked for in a radical change in our mode of conceiv ing experience. The work of the critical philosophy is the intro duction of this new mode of regarding experience, a mode which, in the technical language of philosophers, has received the title of transcendental as opposed to the psychological method followed by Locke and Hume. It is because Kant alone perceived the full sig nificance of the change required in order to meet the difficulties of the empirical theory that we regard his system as the only sequel to that of Hume. The writers of the Scottish school, Reid in particu lar, did undoubtedly indicate some of the weaknesses in Hume s fundamental conception, and their attempts to show that the iso lated feeling cannot be taken as the ultimate and primary unit of cognitive experience are efforts in the right direction. But the question of knowledge was never generalized by them, and their reply to Hume, therefore, remains partial and inadequate, while its effect is weakened by the uncritical assumption of principles which is a characteristic feature of their writings. The results of Hume s theoretical analysis are applied by him to the problems of practical philosophy and religion. For the first of these the reader is referred to the article ETHICS, where Hume s views are placed in relation to those of his predecessors in the same field of inquiry. His position, as regards the second, is very note worthy. As before said, his metaphysic contains in abstracto the principles which were at that time being employed, uncritically, alike by the deists and by their antagonists. There can be no doubt that Hume has continually in mind the theological questions then current, and that he was fully aware of the mode in which his analysis of knowledge might be applied to them. A few of the less important of his criticisms, such as the argument on miracles, be came then and have since remained public property and matter of general discussion. But the full significance of his work on the theological side was not at the time perceived, and justice has barely been done to the admirable manner in which he has reduced the theological disputes of the century to their ultimate elements. The importance of the Dialogues on Natural Religion, as a contribution to the criticism of theological ideas and methods, can hardly be over estimated. A brief survey of its contents will be sufficient to show its general nature and its relations to such works as Clarke s De monstration and Butler s Analogy. The Dialogues introduce three interlocutors, Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo, who represent three distinct orders of theological opinion. The first is the type of a certain a priori view, then regarded as the safest bulwark against infidelity, of which the main tenets were that the being of God was capable of a priori proof, and that, owing to the finitude of our faculties, the attributes and modes of operation of deity were abso lutely incomprehensible. The second is the typical deist of Locke s school, improved as regards his philosophy, and holding that the only possible proof of God s existence was a posteriori, from design, and that such proof was, on the whole, sufficient. The third is the type of completed empiricism or scepticism, holding that no argu ment, either from reason or experience, can transcend experience, and consequently that no proof of God s existence is at all possible. The views of the first and second are played off against one another, and criticized by the third with great literary skill and effect. Cleanthes, who maintains that the doctrine of the incomprehensi bility of God is hardly distinguishable from atheism, is compelled by the arguments of Philo to reduce to a minimum the conclusion capable of being inferred from experience as regards the existence of God. For Thilo lays stress upon the weakness of the analogical argument, points out that the demand for an ultimate cause is no more satisfied by thought than by nature itself, shows that the argument from design cannot warrant the inference of a perfect or infinite or even of a single deity, and finally, carrying out his principles to the full extent, maintains that, as we have no experience of the origin of the world, no argument from experience can carry us to its origin, and that the apparent marks of design in the structure of animals are only results from the conditions of their actual existence. So far as argument from nature is concerned, a total suspension of judgment is our only reasonable resource. Nor does the a priori argument in any of its forms fare better, for reason can never demonstrate a matter of fact, and, unless we know that the world had a beginning in time, we cannot insist that it must have had a cause. Demea, who is willing to give up his abstract proof, brings forward the ordinary theological topic, man s consciousness of his own imper fection, misery, and dependent condition. Nature is throughout corrupt and polluted, but &quot; the present evil phenomena are rectified in other regions and in some future period of existence. Such a view satisfies neither of his interlocutors. Cleanthes, pointing out that from a nature thoroughly evil we can never prove the existence of an infinitely powerful and benevolent Creator, hazards the conjec ture that the deity, though all-benevolent, is not all-powerful. Philo, however, pushing his principles to their full consequences, shows that unless we assumed (or knew) beforehand that the system of nature was the work of a benevolent but limited deity, we cer tainly could not, from the facts of nature, infer the benevolence of its creator. Cleanthes s view is, therefore, an hypothesis, and in no sense an inference. The Dialogues ought here to conclude. There is, however, ap pended one of those perplexing statements of personal opinion (for Hume declares Cleanthes to be his mouthpiece) not uncommon among writers of this period. Cleanthes and Philo come to an agree ment, in admitting a certain illogical force in the a posteriori argu ment, or, at least, in expressing a conviction as to God s existence, which may not perhaps be altogether devoid of foundation. The precise value of such a declaration must be matter of conjecture. Probably the true statement of Hume s attitude regarding the prob lem is the somewhat melancholy utterance with which the Dia logues close. It is apparent, even from the brief summary just given, that the importance of Hume in the history of philosophy consists in the vigour and logical exactness with which he develops a particular metaphysical view. Inconsistencies, no doubt, are to be detected in his system, but they arise from the limitations of the view itself, and not, as in the case of Locke and Berkeley, from imperfect grasp of the principle, and endeavour to unite with it others radically in compatible. In Hume s theory of knowledge we have the final expression of what may be called psychological individualism or atomism, while his ethics and doctrine of religion are but the logi cal consequences of this theory. So far as metaphysic is concerned, Hume has given the final word of the empirical school, and all ad ditions, whether from the specifically psychological side or from the general history of human culture, are subordinate in character, and affect in no way the nature of his results. It is no exaggeration to say that the more recent English school of philosophy, represented by J. S. Mill, has made in theory no advance beyond Hume. In the logic of Mill, e.g., we find much of a special character that has no counterpart in Hume, much that is introduced ab extra, from general considerations of scientific procedure, but, so far as the groundwork is concerned, the System of Logic is a mere reproduction of Hume s doctrine of knowledge. Such a statement does not de tract from the merits of the Logic or even from its originality, for it is remarkable how slight seems to have been the acquaintance of Mill with the works of his greatest predecessor, but it does imply that, so far as solution of the philosophical problem is concerned, no advance has been made beyond the position of Hume. The same remark, indeed, may be applied to the few efforts of the later em pirical writers in the region of metaphysics or theology. It is im possible for any reader of Mill s remarkable posthumous essay on theism to avoid the reflexion that in substance the treatment is identical with that of the Dialogues on Natural Religion, while on the whole the superiority in critical force must be assigned to the earlier work. All this merely shows how fully the conclusion one would naturally draw from Hume s writings has been borne out by the history of later thought. From his position, and on his lines, no further advance was possible. For a new treatment of philosophi cal problems a thorough revision of those premises, the adoption of new ground, was requisite. So far as one can see, the only systems of thought which have endeavoured or are endeavouring in a com prehensive fashion to take up anew the work of philosophy are, on the one hand, the Kantian, with its extensive developments, and, on the other, that of scientific naturalism, which latter, though weak in its metaphysic, is yet penetrated with a truly philosophical spirit. The chief work for Hume s life is that of Mr J. H. Burton, Life and Correfpond- eiice of David Hume. 2 volt.. 184(&amp;gt;. Of his collected writings, the standard edition has been till recently tlmt (if 1826 (reprinted 1854), in 4 vols. The best edition, con taining, in addition to philosophical introductions, much bibliographical matter, is that of 1874, in 4 vols.. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Of works upon Hume, the numerous sketches and essays being omitted, the following are the most Important: Jod), Ltben vml Philosophie David Hume s, 1872; E. Pfieiderer, Em- pn tsnnis und SKeps-if. in Dai-id Hume .1 Fftilosnphie, 1874 (containing good matter, but too much spun out) ; T. H Gieen, Introduction to the Treatise,&quot; in vol. i. of Humes Works,, 1874 (by far the most elaborate and minute analysis of Hume in his philosophical relation to Locke and Berkeley); Spicker, Kant, Hume, and Berkeley, 1875; Compayre. La PlnlorvpMe de David Hume, 187, i, A. Meinong, Hiime-Stitdien, i.. 1877 (a very caieful study of Hume s nominalism); V. Gizycki, Die Ethik Darid Hume s in tlirer ijeschirhtlirhen Stellting, 1878 (the most thorough exposition of Hume s utilitarianism); T. H. Huxley, Hume, 1879 (a clear repro duction of the more popular results of Huma s philosophy, without criticism or historical treatment). Mr Leslie Stephen s English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i., 1876, contains the best account of Hume s theological position. Most works on the Kantian philosophy contain sections specially on Hume. The treatments in the general histories of philosophy cannot be pronounced satis factory. CK. AD -&amp;gt; HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855), an eminent political reformer, was born in January 1777, of humble parents, at Montrose, Scotland. After completing his course of medical study at the university of Edinburgh he sailed in 1797 for India, where he was attached as surgeon to a regiment ; and his knowledge of the native tongues and his capacity for business threw open to him the lucrative offices of interpreter and commissary-general. On tho