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Rh centralizing the state control of railways, are instances of a more coercive regime established by war. In England, the peaceful period from 1815 to 1850 is contrasted with the militant period since 1850. The latter has been marked by the usurpations of military officialism, by sanitary dic tation, by coercive philanthropy, by compulsory education, by an unhesitating faith in state-judgment, and by a general disregard of the principles of free government, even on the side of the party which in the previous period effected changes in the direction of freedom.

Tendency of recent Legislation.&mdash;Turning from political theory to political practice, let us see how the legislation of the List fifty years in England has drawn the line between legitimate and illegitimate state action. The period that has elapsed since the passing of the Reform Act of 1832 has been one of great legislative activity. In no former period has legislation been so completely under the control of public opinion, or so directly affected by opsn discussion of the principles of projected measures. It will be of some interest, therefore, to inquire how the most enlightened political community in the world has, during the period of its fullest freedom, defined the business of government.

Reduction of State Action.&mdash;Religion.&mdash;The cases in which Government interference has been abolished or greatly limited during this period are mainly two in matters of opinion (especially roltgious opinion), and in matters of con tract. The principle that the state ought to maintain some form of religion has been surrendered by the disestablish ment of the Irish Church. The disqualifications, political and civil, of dissenters, have, with a very few and not very important exceptions, been removed. The last remnant of the old rule, making witnesses incompetent on religious grounds, was remove I by the Act enabling persons to give evidence without an oath. A few statutes making various forms of irreligion punishable still remain, but they are never enforced, and any attempt to enforce them would almost certainly end in their formal repeal. State prosecu tions for expression of opinion have almost entirely ceased, and practically the only instrument of control now left is the law of libel. Under the influence of the judges, that hw has, during the period in question, been uniformly interpreted in a sense favourable to the freedom of discus sion. One of the few remaining restrictions on religious freedom is the principle, acted on in several recent cases, that a contract may bs broken if its object is to facilitate the expression of irreligious opinions. 1 At the same time there appears to be a tendency to dis tinguish b3tween merely irreligious opinions and opinions pronounced to be immoral. Convictions have lately been obtained for publishing and selling books advocating opinions on certain moral and social questions which appeared to a jury to be calculated to deprave the morals of the people. But here again the distinction lias been authoritatively drawn between such views when presented in a scientific form, and adapted to a scientific audience, and the same views offered openly to the unscientific public. Untenable as such distinctions are, they manifest a ten dency on the part of the courts to confine the prosecution of opinion within the principle of the law against indecent publications. It may further be added that, with one not able exception, the Public Worship Regulation Act, the dealings of the state with the church have been confined within a very narrow compass. The endowment of new sees, for instance, although sanctioned by the state, is left to the voluntary contributions of the public.

Contract.&mdash;Freedom of contract, in general, has been greatly advanced by the success of the free-trade agitation in 1843, which was not so much a protest against state regula-

1 E.g., a contract to let a hall for a lecture advocating atheistic principles.

tion as a demand for a cheap supply of food. Since that time, the principle that the state should leave men to make what bargains they please, without attempting to encourage any particular industry or to favour any special class, has taken rank as a maxim of universal application. One class of contracts those between master and servant long remained an exception to the general rule. Breach of such contracts by the servant was treated as a criminal offence, and the combination of servants to obtain a rise of wages as a conspiracy. A series of statutes, the last of which was passed a few years ago, has abolished the criminal character of the breach of the contract of service, except in a few cases. The abolition of the laws against usury in 1857 is another instance ; the authorization of trading companies with limited liability is another. The last great legislative measure before parliament (the Criminal Code Bill of 1879) proposes to do away with the old offences of maintenance and champerty. Besides the classes regarded by law as under disability to contract (infants, lunatics, and married women), a few doubtful instances of protected persons might still be named. Thus expectant heirs are treated in the spirit of the old laws against usury. Seamen are not allowed to make a charge upon their wages. In certain employments specified in the Truck Act wages are not allowed to be paid otherwise than in coin. The principle of free trade is outraged in its own name by the legal rule which vitiates contracts made &quot; in restraint of trade.&quot;

Increase of State Action.&mdash;The enumeration of new restrictive measures, and instances of increased state inter ference within the same period, would occupy a much more formidable list. A rough classification only will be here attempted. We shall take first, interference for the pro tection of definite classes of persons.

Education of Children.&mdash;This is perhaps the most con spicuous, as it is certainly the most beneficial and the least disputed, of the recent encroachments of the state. The progress of opinion and legislation on this subject has been singularly rapid. Beginning with Government grants in aid of education, strenuously resisted on grounds going to the very n,ot of the question of legitimate state interference, the system has now culminated in a net-work of state-supported and state-administered schools spread over the whole coun try. That the state should compel parents to educate their children would only be a slight departure, if any, from the general principle imposing duties on parents and disabilities on childrer. Under the present system the state not only compels the parent to educate, but itself provides, and in great measure pays for, the education. A generation of dis cussion has, however, drawn very distinctly the line beyond which this advance of state authority must not proceed. Compulsory state education is for children only, and may be justified by the general argument which justifies state protection to the helpless; it is elementary only; and it is secular only.

Regulation of the Labour of Children and Women.&mdash;The long series of Factory Acts is the best example of the steady and persistent advance of Government control in this direc tion. Here the line of protection is considerably advanced, but is again carefully drawn under male adults, although these of necessity share in the benefits of the protection in all employments where their work requires the co-operation of women and children. See FACTOEY ACTS.

Regulation of Dangerous Employments.&mdash;Of these the Mines Regulation Acts are perhaps the best example. Here the Government actually lays down the rules under which alone these employments are suffered to be carried on. Here the principle that adults are capable of looking after themselves is overruled by the dangerous character of the employment.

In all these cases the action of the state is defended on 