Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 10.djvu/530

Rh 512 1867-70. for this result; but the engagement, which was never Northern seriously intended, was abrogated by secret treaty between Colffedv Austria and Germany on the lltli October 1878. All "“‘°"' states to the north of the Main, including the northern half of lIesse—D-ariiistadt, were compelled to form a North- Geriii-.iii confederation niider the leadership of Prussia. The four South-German states, Baden, l{esse—Darmstadt, Wur- temberg, and Bavaria, were left independent, but with the right, if they chose, to form a South-German confederation and to unite with that of North Germany. By secret treaties, as Count Bismarck announced at a critical moment soon afterwards, they undertook to place their armies at the disposal of Prussia in time of war. King William, who had accompanied his troops, returned in triumph to Berlin, and the nation was so elated by his victories that the newly-elected house of representatives willingly consented to forget past disputes. On the 24th Conrede. February 1867 the constituent diet of the confederation, T1‘-he <=_0I1- elected by universal suffrage and the ballot, met in Berlin, st‘t““°“' and soon accepted in its essential features the constitution submitted to it. It was arranged that the headship of the confederation should be hereditary, that it should belong to the king of Prussia, and that legislative functions should be exercised by a federal council, representative of the various Governments, and by a diet elected by the whole people. The confederate parliament began at once the task of consolidating the new institutions. In the sessions of 1869 and 1870 it established a supreme tribunal of com- merce, sitting in Leipsic, and passed a new penal code. Great as were these results, they did not satisfy the aspirations of patriotic Germans, who, having so sud- denly and so unexpectedly approached unity, longed that the work should be completed. A party called the National “ national liberals” was formed, whose main object was to “b0’313- secure the incorporation of south with north Germany, and it at once entered into peculiar relations with the great minister at the head of the country. The members of this GERMANY [H1s'roI:v. nationalists had a large majority ; and even in Baden and llesse—Dariiistadt, where the opposition to Prussia was less severe, a powerful minority of the deputies had no liking for the Prussian premier. Thus the customs parliament was kept rigidly to the objects for which it was founded, greatly to the disappointment of patriots who had not doubted that it would become an effective instrument for the attainment of far larger purposes. Even in regard to the army, notwithstanding the secret treaties giving Prussia the command of the southern forces in the event of war, a spirit of bitter opposition to the northern confederation was manifested. Baden and Hesse—Darmstadt reorganized their armies in accordance with the Prussian system, but Bavaria and Wiirtemberg were more obstinate, and in both countries there was an agitation for military arrangements by which the secret treaties should be virtually annulled. Had the completion of unity depended wholly on internal Irrit causes, it certainly would not have been soon achieved; but 01.171 other forces, not altogether unexpectedly, came to Count Bisniarck’s aid. France had been irritated by the enormous increase of Prussian power, and even before the treaty of Prague was signed the emperor Napoleon III. indicated a wish to be “ compensated” with the left bank of the Rhine. Not being in a position to make war, he was compelled to suppress this desire. Soon afterwards he proposed a secret arrangement by which Belgium was to fall to France, while Prussia was to have free scope elsewhere. Finding that if not decisively rejected his plan was at least not accepted, Napoleon next sought to restore the balance by concludiiig a treaty with the king of Holland, in 1807, for the purchase of Luxembourg. Prussia protested; and it was on this occasion that Count Bismarck first made public the secret treaties with the South-German states. War ap- peared almost inevitable, but the emperor, being still iiiicer- tain as to the state of his forces, allowed the question to be settled by a conference, which declared Luxembourg a neutral state, its neutrality being guaranteed by the great powers. party, believing, as sincere liberals, that the German people were ripe for free institutions, desired from the outset to give larger power to the popular element of the constitution The idea of a war with Prussia was not given up by irmn Napoleon. Whether he felt the necessity of sti'eiigtli-Ggrr ening the claims of his dynasty by military glory, or “” both in Prussia and in Germany. With these ideas Prince Bismarck had no sympathy. Throughout his career he has consistently manifested contempt for parliamentary forms of government. He cannot tolerate that a minister should be thwarted or hindered by political critics, and fancies that the community would be much better off if it allowed itself to be directly governed by the statesmen who are good enough to devote themselves to its service. But his achievements in the cause of German unity have more than counterbalanced, in the esteem of the liberals, his dislike of national freedom. An important step towards complete unity was supposed to be taken in 1867, by the conclusion of a treaty with the southern states, by which it was agreed that all questions of customs should be decided by the federal council and the federal diet, and that, for the consideration of such questions, the southern states should send representatives to Berlin. In reality, however, the customs parliament was of no service beyond the strict limits of its special activity. The mass of the South Germans were bitterly opposed to the ide.i. pf union with the north. The democrats detcsted Prussia more than any other country, and looked upon Count Bismarck as the incarnation of all that was most ob- jectionable in its aristocratic and military system of govern- ment. Among the ultramontanes there was a not less vehement dislike of a nation which continually boasted that South- it was the lieidquartr.-rs of Protestantism and free thought. II'L:IlCC, in the election to the customs parliament in 1868, to union. urtenib-erg did not return a single deputy who was favourable to the national cause, in Bavaria the aiiti- Customs parlia- meat. whether, as many Germans believe, he was urged forward by a powerful iiltramontane intrigue, he seems to have re- solved in 1870 to undertake the long—delayed struggle. A pretext was found in a proposal of the Spaniards to raise to their throne Prince Leopold of Ilohenzollern. There is no evidence that the French people were in the least disturbed by this scheme; certainly, if they had been left to their own free judgment, they would never have thought of going to war about it. But the imperial ministry, managing to get up a little artificial excitement among a noisy section of the Parisians, angrily protested ; and Prince Leopold announced that he would not accept the Spanish crown. Stimulated by this diplomatic triumph, the emperor next required that Prussia should give a general engagement that no Ilolienzollcrn prince should in future become king of Spain. Prussia declined to humble herself so far, whereupon, on the 19th July 1870, France declared war against her. A telegram from Eins, falsely stating that the French ambassador had been publicly insulted by KingWilliani, caused considerable sensation in France; and enemies of Bismarck often assert that he caused it to be despatched for the purpose of making war unavoidable. Although this is a mere assertion, he was not unwilling to accept the challenge, coming as it did in a manner that would have rendered any sliriiikiiig from it disgraceful. He believed that, wliatever policy she adopted, Prussia would one day have to defend her conquests; and he could not but foresee the enormous advantages which would spring from a triumphant war with France. Napoleon, as we now know, had reason to suppose that