Page:Emile Vandervelde - Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution - tr. Jean Elmslie Henderson Findlay (1918).djvu/178

 of Russians on the front is at least double that of their enemy. Let us not forget, moreover, that for one Russian soldier at the front there are at least four in the reserve camps or depots.

For the very reason that they are inferior in numbers the Austro-Germans have made a great effort by employing probably second-rate or tired troops to organize their front in such a manner as to obtain a maximum of defensive power with a minimum of men. In the sector where the offensive of the 1st of July was being prepared, for instance, the enemy trenches of the first line were a system of four, five, or six parallel lines, while the Russian trenches opposite formed in general only one or two. Moreover, the enemy trenches were much deeper than the Russian trenches. In short, what struck us most was the great abundance of barbed-wire entanglements that protected the Austrian positions for a great distance behind the first line. In some places where the Russian and Austrian trenches were relatively far apart—from 800 to 1,000 metres on the oppo-