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 which—like all good Kremlinology—requires him to read between the lines to determine the motives of specific Soviet actors at any given time. Still, Valenta’s argument is persuasive, and his use of the bureaucratic politics paradigm gives a most en lightening structure to the evidence he has brought to bear.

Finally, Professor Valenta’s study should put to rest the notion somettimessometimes [sic] heard that the various Soviet and Warsaw Pact political manoeuverings of July–August 1968, the negotiations and conferences, were empty exercises meant only to distract attention from the “real” Soviet intentions, Valenta’s accounts of the Warsaw, Cierna, and Bratislava meetings, based on numerous firsthand reports, strongly argue that these negotiations were not purely tactical or deceptive manoeuvers. Rather, they represented genuine attempts to resolve the crisis in bloc relations through means short of military force. The author agrees with Zdeněk Mlynař that the decision to intervene was taken by the Soviet Politburo on August 17-three days before the actual occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armies of five Warsaw Pact countries. The change in policy between the time of the Bratislava Declaration (August 3) and the Politburo decision can be explained by the mounting pressures from those bureaucratic elites who feared the continuing effect of Czechoslovak reformism on their organizational interests. According to Valenta, these pressures caused a shift in the balance of power within the Politburo, quite probably involving the conversion of General Secretary Brezhnev from a fence-sitter to a pro-interventionist. The pro-interventionists at last gained the upper hand, and the rest, as they say, is history.

David W. Paul

University of Washington