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 any other restriction than conformity to that of the nation. In regard of foreign relations and general interests, all the States are cemented into one nation. If one or more States are invaded, the citizens have a right to the protection of the Union; and in the case of controversies or disputes between States, the judicial power provided under the general constitution is the umpire between them. Had the individual members of the United States placed a hereditary sovereign at the head of each, and put the reins of government in the hands of a few, we might have heard, before this time, of American courtiers making treaties to last forever; and violating them so soon as the strong found it convenient to attack the weak; of wars furnishing pretexts for raising vast sums to support the views of a party or a faction, perhaps for depriving the people of their liberties, and subjugating their neighbours; and of winding up the whole with holy leagues, admitting of no subsequent arbitrator but the sword.

The organization, of which a brief outline has just been given, is, in theory, well adapted to insure internal tranquillity, and protection against invasion. In practice, it has hitherto been conducive {187} to both these objects; and to a degree of national prosperity, that is unparalleled in the present age. The people govern for themselves, and are too sensible of the value of their rights to allow them to pass into other hands. Power is delegated only for a short period; and the representatives are closely watched by their constituents. Should a congress propose to disfranchise a part of the people; or to engraft a borough system on the present equal representation; or to establish septennial elections; every member voting for the obnoxious motion might expect to be marked out and expelled for ever. A case somewhat in point occurred in