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 protected by and within State jurisdiction, an action for damage must, in practically every case, involve that which is both interstate and intra-state.

In other words, the object, or the intent, must be to invade national right; but the means equally must, almost of necessity, be some intra-state matter.

Nothing could be more thoroughly intra-state than the specific transactions described in Atlanta vs. Chattanooga, 203 U. S. 390.

Whilst our objects, our purposes, may be interstate, they must almost inevitably be achieved chiefly, if not entirely, through intra-state acts and things.

It is of the first importance to bear this in mind, as otherwise error cannot be avoided.

Take the Knight case, for example. There the object was to profit by manufacture, not by curtailing trade. It was held perfectly legal to control a number of Pennsylvania refineries with this object, though manufacture could not be carried on except through imports of raw sugars. In the Addyston case, it quite as much related to the control of manufactures, even, indeed, to a less control; but as, under the circumstances, it was fair to presume that the object was to lessen competition and thus restrain trade, it was unanimously held to be illegal; and just so in the Montague and the Loewe cases. Some control of manufactures was sought in each case; but the legality of that control was determined by the purpose, the object of that control, ascertained, of course, from its real tendency under the circumstances. Thus, in both the Knight and Montague cases, import into a State was a necessity of the business; but,