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56 take measures for obliterating a State which could never become a peaceful neighbour.' The experiment proved a splendid success. During the Mutiny the Sikh soldiery rendered invaluable service; but, in calculating the chances of that dire encounter, it is well to remember how easily matters might have gone otherwise — how, by the merest change of circumstances, we might have had the most soldierly population in India arrayed amongst our foes, and how supremely fortunate for the English it was that the annexation of the Punjab — the expediency of which was greatly called in question by the opponents of Dalhousie's policy — had been effectively carried out — the Sikh army broken up — the population disarmed, and that an exceptionally vigorous British administration had got the Province well in hand. Had an army — such as that with which Ranjít Singh threatened Upper India, or as that which Gough confronted at Chilianwála — been hovering in our rear during the siege of Delhi, the whole character of the struggle would have been altered, and the odds against the British immeasurably enhanced. Another fortunate circumstance was that the portion of the Province, through which the route to Delhi lay, was held by Chieftains who owed their escape from absorption by Ranjít Singh to a British Protectorate, and who showed their gratitude by loyal co-operation at a moment when the fortunes of the British seemed at the lowest. The Chief of Patiála lent an army to preserve our communications; and