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 25 Ousley was a case where listening device warrants were asserted to be invalid as a basis for objecting to the tender of evidence obtained under those warrants. In other words, it involved a collateral attack on the warrants rather than an administrative law proceeding seeking to have them set aside. The decision in Ousley predated Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597 (Bhardwaj), and the reference by Gummow J to a presumption of validity needs to be read in the light of what was decided in that case. In Bhardwaj at [151], Hayne J said (referring to Ousley):

26 Many kinds of litigation would become very unwieldy if a party relying on the legal effect of an administrative decision could be put to proof of all factual matters going to its validity. Where an official notice (such as the removal notice here) is relied upon and is valid on its face, the starting point at least must be that it has the effect it purports to have unless "some invalidating feature" is proved. Even if that is not correct, and the Commissioner must prove the validity of the removal notice at a final hearing, it would in my view be incumbent on X Corp at least to identify clearly any asserted basis of invalidity. For the purpose of identifying a real issue to be tried at an interlocutory stage, it is appropriate to proceed on the basis that the removal notice is valid unless the evidence discloses a substantial basis for doubting that its validity will be established at trial. These observations have some relevance to how the evidence (such as it is) going to the delegate's reasoning process is to be understood.

27 On 30 April 2024 the solicitors for X Corp wrote to the Commissioner's solicitors requesting a statement of reasons, under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act) and s 28 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), for the decision to issue the notice. The statement was requested as a matter of urgency, although the legislation relied upon allows the decision maker a period of 28 days after a request for the provision of reasons. The Commissioner's solicitors responded to the effect that a statement of reasons had not been, but would be, prepared. Noting the timing of these proceedings, they enclosed a document signed by the delegate, dated 16 April 2024 and entitled eSafety Commissioner v X Corp [2024] FCA 499