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 # Id. at 1057 (quoting, supra note 135, at 157).
 * 1) See Jane Perry Clark, Some Recent Proposals for Constitutional Amendment, 12  313, 316 (1937) (discussing, among others, proposals from the National Committee for Clarifying the Constitution by Amendment aimed at ensuring that “the right will be clear for the federal and the state governments to enact labor and social legislation in accordance with the needs of the complicated industrial and economic system today”).
 * , 147 (1938).
 * 1) Kalman, supra note 133, at 1056.
 * 2) See, e.g.,,  (1998).
 * , 2 291 (1998).
 * 1) Id.
 * , supra note 135, at 161.
 * 1) See Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan, 12  45, 58–59 (1992).
 * 2) Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80  277, 279 (1994) (quoting Composition and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 9 (statement of Justice Owen J. Roberts)).
 * 3) 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
 * 4) See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 364 U.S. 500, 501 (1960) (rejecting the state of Louisiana’s assertion that certain state statutes were valid because the state “has interposed itself in the field of public education over which it has exclusive control” (quotations omitted)).
 * 5) See generally Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92  1053 (2014) (noting that although the debates over the Southern Manifesto challenged the Court’s authority, they also suggest widespread popular belief in judicial supremacy by 1956, two years before the Court’s decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which scholars often identify as establishing judicial supremacy).
 * 6) See James Madison, Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798, in 17  189 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Jeanne K. Cross & Susan Holbrook Perdue eds., 1991) (describing “the powers of the federal government” as “resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties” and stating that “in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties there-to, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them”).
 * 7) 103  S12787 (daily ed. July 26, 1957) (Res. of the Leg. of Fla. to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
 * 8) 103  S10863 (daily ed. July 3, 1957) (Res. of the Leg. of Ala. to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
 * 9) 107  S2154 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1961) (Res. of the Leg. of Ark. to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
 * 10) 109  S2071–72 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1963) (Res. of the Leg. of Fla. to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
 * 11) 111  S15769–70 (daily ed. July 7, 1965) (Res. of the Leg. of Miss. to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
 * , supra note 134, at 255.
 * 1) 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
 * 2) Id. at 18; see  art. VI.
 * 3) 358 U.S. at 17.
 * , supra note 134, at 149.
 * 1) See,  141 (2000).
 * 2) 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
 * 3) 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
 * 4) J.W. Peltason, Reapportionment Cases, in, supra note 127, at 826–27.