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 circuits. See Governance & the Judicial Conference,, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (last accessed Sept. 18, 2021).
 * 1) The constitutionality of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act has been challenged at least once in the past, in a case brought by a United States District Judge; there, the Act’s constitutionality was upheld. See McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct and Disability Orders of Jud. Conf. of U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 64–70 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act against arguments based on Article III and the impeachment clause).
 * 2) Anthony J. Scirica, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, Madison Lecture, in 90  779, 788 (2015).
 * 3) Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 8 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Russell Wheeler), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/R.-Wheeler-statement-6.30-rev.7.12-on-SCOTUS_.pdf (noting that a “small bureaucracy” would be required to sift through the high number of potential complaints against Supreme Court justices).
 * 4) See 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2).
 * 5) Such a sanction might also be unconstitutional as a de facto impeachment or impairment of the Court’s ability to discharge its constitutionally mandated duties. See Lynn A. Baker, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94  1117, 1133 (1985) (“By authorizing the judicial councils and the Judicial Conference to order that no new cases be assigned [to] a judge, the Act contravenes th[e] explicit decision of the Framers not to permit so much as the temporary removal of an official, even if already impeached, until convicted by the Senate.”); but see McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct and Disability Orders of Jud. Conf. of U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 64–70 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the facial constitutionality of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act on the theory that principles of judicial independence established by the Constitution were designed to protect judges from interference by the other branches, and not to prevent intrabranch organization and discipline).
 * 6) A conduct oversight option frequently proposed by some members of Congress is the creation of an Inspector General for the Federal Courts. Some variations of the proposal give the Inspector General the power to investigate misconduct on the Supreme Court. This proposal has been around for decades and has been heavily discussed. See, e.g., Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35  243 (1999); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41  301 (2010). Members of the federal judiciary have criticized the proposal and noted the dangers such an office could pose to judicial independence. See Scirica, supra note 141, at 789–97 (2015). Since 2018, the Judicial Conference has provided for a “Judicial Integrity Officer” who oversees workplace conduct in the federal judiciary. The responsibilities of the Judicial Integrity Office include “answering individuals’ questions, providing guidance on conflict resolution, mediation, and formal complaint options.” Judicial Integrity Officer Named for Federal Judiciary,  (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/12/03/judicial-integrity-officer-named-federal-judiciary.
 * 7) Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54  1955 (2001) (arguing that where lawyers are given clear rules to follow, informal social pressures from other members of the profession can serve the role of formal sanctions).
 * 8) 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
 * 9) Id. § 455(1)–(4).
 * 10) See Tuan Samahon, Rehnquist’s Recusals, 10  205, 207 (2007); Memorandum of Justice Scalia, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-475scalia.pdf.
 * 11) See Recent Times in Which a Justice Failed to Recuse Despite a Conflict of Interests,  (June 13, 2021), https://fixthecourt.com/2021/06/recent-times-justice-failed-recuse-despite-clear-conflict-interest.