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 the corporate context); Alan Doig & John Wilson, The Effectiveness Of Codes Of Conduct, 7 140 (1998) (finding that codes of conduct can positively affect ethical practices when paired with practices that inculcate and reinforce values).
 * 1)  1 (1991), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/296686-1991-supreme-court-internal-ethics-resolution.html.
 * 2) Although, as noted below, there might be reason to be cautious when considering the current Code’s provisions on recusal because recused Justices cannot be replaced. Although the current statutory standards of recusal apply equally to the Justices. 28 U.S.C. §455(a).
 * 3) Alito & Kagan House Testimony, supra note 121.
 * 4) Id.
 * 5) Although the statutory standards for recusal are fixed, courts have developed doctrines that assist in their application. For example, many circuits require timely filing of recusal motions so that waste of judicial resources may be avoided. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We require recusal motions to be lodged in a timely fashion because the absence of such a requirement would result in increased instances of wasted judicial time and resources.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is well-settled that—for obvious reasons—one seeking disqualification must do so at the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such disqualification.”). The Supreme Court might similarly tailor the application of the statute to fit its institutional concerns.
 * 6) There has been an internal debate in the federal judiciary over to what extent judges should be limited in their attendance at events and memberships in organizations. In 2020, the Code of Conduct Committee of the Judicial Conference released a draft opinion concluding that the Code prohibits membership in the Federalist Society and American Constitution Society.,  (2020). But the opinion was rescinded after widespread opposition from many members of the judiciary.
 * 7) See, e.g., Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2015, S. 1072, 114th Cong. (2015); Supreme Court Ethics Act, H.R. 1057, 116th Cong. (2019). As noted above, Congress has enacted such legislation with respect to other federal courts. See Resnik Testimony, supra note 4, at 13 (“During the twentieth century, Congress built on constitutional and common law understandings of judicial impartiality and due process to articulate norms for most of the federal judiciary. … Congress elaborated methods for rulemaking, imposed standards for recusal, mandated term limits on individuals serving as the chief judge of a district and or a circuit court, and instituted a process for complaints to be filed against judges.”).
 * , supra note 120, at 4.
 * 1) Amanda Frost, Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26  443, 460–61 (2013).
 * 2) 28 U.S.C. § 453.
 * 3) Several observers have argued that Congress is limited in its capacity to regulate the ethical practices of the Supreme Court when such regulation might intrude on the Court’s inherent constitutional powers. See Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69  1535, 1562–75 (2012); Suzanne Levy, Your Honor, Please Explain: Why Congress Can, and Should, Require Justices to Publish Reasons for Their Recusal Decisions, 16  1161, 1181–84 (2014); but see Frost, supra note 135, at 463–75 (arguing against various constitutional objections to proposed ethics legislation governing the Supreme Court, in part because ethics legislation might encroach on the Court’s decisionmaking function).
 * 4) See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Rules Enabling Act).
 * 5) Circuit judicial councils are composed of a circuit’s chief judge sitting as chair and an equal number of other circuit and district court judges. Circuit judicial councils perform various administrative roles within their