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 # Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 11 (U.K.) (excluding from the “notwithstanding clause” democratic rights, mobility rights, language rights, and education rights); see Dixon Testimony, supra note 5, at 7.
 * 1) See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33.
 * 2) See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013) (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
 * 3) The Eleventh Amendment, immunizing states from certain lawsuits, overruled the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—the Reconstruction Amendments—effectively overruled the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); the Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority to enact income taxes, overturning the Supreme Court’s ruling in PollackPollock [sic] v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised women, overruling Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolished poll taxes, overruling the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases like Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment made clear that all U.S. citizens eighteen years of age and older have the right to vote in 1971, overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
 * 4) See Moyn Testimony, supra note 2, at 19; see also Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 8–9 (Aug. 15, 2021) (written testimony of Christopher Jon Sprigman, New York University School of Law) [hereinafter Sprigman Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Professor-Christopher-Jon-Sprigman.pdf.
 * 5) See, supra note 3, at 105–10, 125, 135–36; , supra note 139, at xi; Wurman Testimony, supra note 139, at 5–7.
 * 6) See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109  1535, 1543 (2000). It is important to note, however, that such an argument likely would not extend to limiting the stare decisis of state court decisions.
 * 7) See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76  570 (2001)
 * 8) See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
 * 9) See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 (1991) (“[S]elective prospectivity … breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally.”). Some Justices have also expressed concern that applying decisions only to subsequent litigants violates the judicial power established by Article III. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring).
 * 10) See Sprigman, supra note 19, at 9 (“There is nothing standing in the way of Congress asserting its power to override judicial decisions save the will to do so and the political judgment to do so successfully. As a matter of practical politics, Congress can draw the outlines of its own authority by using its Article III power effectively and in ways that voters approve.”).
 * 11) Cf. Dixon Testimony, supra note 5, at 7–8 (emphasizing importance of formal amendment to change longstanding norms); Jackson Testimony, supra note 52, at 14 (suggesting, while evaluating term limit proposals, that constitutional amendment would be needed to “significant[ly]” depart from longstanding norms surrounding Justices’ tenure on the Court); see also Fallon, supra note 171, at 582 (arguing that “deeply entrenched practices” greatly inform the American constitutional order).