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 # See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
 * 1) The Defense of Marriage Act defined marriage as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife” for federal purposes. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). For related jurisdiction-stripping proposals, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
 * 2) See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
 * 3) Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1220–21 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)).
 * 4) 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
 * 5) 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
 * 6)  art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
 * 7) See, e.g., Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 16 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Jamal Greene, Columbia Law School), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Greene-Testimony.pdf (stating that “Congress unquestionably has the constitutional power, via the Exceptions Clause, to require the Court to hear certain appellate cases and not to hear others”); Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 12 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Stephen E. Sachs, Harvard Law School), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Sachs-Testimony.pdf (noting that Congress exercising its power under the Exceptions Clause to make “Exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is “wholly constitutional”). Even critics of proposals to limit the Court’s jurisdiction, on policy and constitutional grounds, could not conclude that such proposals are categorically or definitively unconstitutional. The most that they conclude is that such proposals would raise constitutional questions. See, e.g., Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 57 (July 16, 2021) (written testimony of Kenneth Geller, Mayer Brown LLP, and Maureen Mahoney, Latham & Watkins, LLP), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Geller-Mahoney-Testimony.pdf (expressing significant reservations on proposals to limit the Court’s jurisdiction and concluding that such proposals “would raise serious constitutional issues”).
 * 8) See, e.g., Feldman Testimony, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that Supreme Court reform proposals ought to be evaluated against (a) the function of the Court in the American constitutional context and (b) whether reform proposals would advance or impede that function).
 * 9) See, e.g., Moyn Testimony, supra note 2, at 3; Sprigman, supra note 19, at 1858–59.
 * 10) See generally Bowie Testimony, supra note 2, at 24, 25; Moyn Testimony, supra note 2, at 1.
 * 11)  art. VI cl. 2.
 * 12) See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115  1346, 1384 (2006); see also Scheppele Testimony, supra note 10, at 6.
 * 13) However, the power remains a subject of debate. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73  1385 (1964); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124  45, 81 (1975); Peter N. Salib & David K. Suska, The Federal–State Standing Gap: How to Enforce Federal Law in Federal Court Without Article III Standing, 26  1155, 1190 (2018).
 * 14) Several of the experts who testified before the Commission counseled that any reforms of our current system should be developed and implemented in a manner that reduces partisan polarization and minimizes institutional instability. See, e.g., Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 2 (July 16, 2021) (written testimony of Vicki C. Jackson, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Jackson Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Jackson-Testimony.pdf; Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 3 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Neil S. Siegel, Duke Law School), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Siegel-Testimony.pdf.
 * 15) See Feldman Testimony, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that jurisdiction stripping “could potentially devastate the Court’s ability to fulfill its functions”).