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 might not apply to judges appointed after the proposal’s enactment—Weiss assumes without deciding that germaneness also governs the prospective addition of duties for unknown future officeholders.
 * 1) McConnell Testimony, supra note 3, at 6.
 * 2) Adam J. White, Toward the Framers' Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29  103 (2005).
 * 3) Ginsburg Testimony, supra note 10, at 10.
 * 4) See Steven G. Calabresi, End the Poisonous Process of Picking Supreme Court Justices,  (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/opinion/ginsburg-supreme-court-confirmation.html (arguing that “the Senate [should] be forbidden from taking action whatsoever on any of its calendars” in the event of “[f]ailure to confirm a justice by July 1 of a president’s first or third year”).
 * 5) Jackson Testimony, supra note 3, at 11 n.30.
 * 6) The current federal statute that determines who serves as chief judge of a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 45, is well-designed and has served the country well. To the extent there is any concern Congress might modify the statute for partisan reasons to game this fallback mechanism for Supreme Court appointments, the amendment could include the provisions of the current statute.
 * 7)  art. I, § 5.
 * 8) Supreme Court Practitioners’ Testimony, supra note 1, at 82; see also Harrison, supra note 72, at 372 (providing examples of “gamesmanship” that could be attempted).