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 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that extreme partisan gerrymanders implicate non-justiciable political questions that courts cannot hear); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Leg., 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (reversing a federal district court’s decision to permit counting of ballots post-stamped after Election Day despite unclear instructions from state officials).
 * 1) See infra Section III.B.1–3; see also Klarman Testimony, supra note 79, at 10–12; cf. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85  491 (1996).
 * 2) See Klarman Testimony, supra note 79, at 16–17.
 * 3) See Kang Testimony, supra note 79, at 6–7.
 * 4) See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 11 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Noah Feldman, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Feldman Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Feldman-Presidential-Commission-6-25-21.pdf (noting “the implicit threat of court-packing” and stating “if their interpretations over time go so far away from mainstream constitutional opinion that they cause the court to lose legitimacy, the justices know that it could lead to substantial loss of independence in the form of court-packing”); Kramer Testimony, supra note 92, at 6–7 (“Roosevelt’s effort was also entirely successful in getting him exactly what he sought: the Court reversed course and upheld the second New Deal. … As with any tool of deterrence, making clear that the other branches can and will push back against an overreaching Court makes it less necessary to do so. … [T]he Court adjusts its behavior to greater sensitivity in the other branches.”).
 * 5) See supra note 98 and accompanying text; Kramer Testimony, supra note 92, at 6.
 * 6) See, e.g., Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 23 (June 30, 2021) (written testimony of Judith Resnik, Yale Law School) [hereinafter Resnik Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Resnik-PDF-Presidential-Commission.pdf (“[I]ncreasing the number of sitting Justices and shifting to a system of panels would mitigate the undue impact of any one appointment. … These proposals are but a few of the many ideas that aim to constrain a small group of people from entrenching their views of the law’s obligations.”); Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 9 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Jamal Greene, Columbia Law School) [hereinafter Greene Testimony], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Greene-Testimony.pdf (“Increasing the Court’s size could significantly reduce the influence of particular justices, thereby lowering the stakes that attach to their appointment and increasing the Court’s diversity along multiple dimensions.”).
 * 7) See Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 4 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Wade Henderson, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Henderson-Testimony.pdf; Id.id. [sic] at 10 (“Courts rely on public trust for legitimacy, and diversity among judges and justices helps improve both public trust and balanced judicial decisionmaking.”); Aron Testimony, supra note 87, at 12 (“By expanding the Court, we can ensure that it actually looks like America, and includes Justices with diverse backgrounds and experiences who will bring important perspectives to major decisions.”).
 * 8) Emergency petitions are discussed at length in  of this Report.
 * 9) See,  74 tbls.2–6 (6th ed. 2015) (showing that the Court granted review in 184 cases in 1980; 149 cases in 1983; 186 cases in 1985; and 122 cases in 1989).
 * 10) We include statistics from the pre-pandemic era, given that more recent statistics may reflect the complexities of the past eighteen months. See,  5–6 (2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-endreport.pdf (reporting that the Supreme Court decided sixty-nine cases in the 2018 term, and sixty-three in the 2017 term); ,  13 (2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2017year-endreport.pdf (reporting that the Supreme Court decided sixty-eight cases in the 2016 term, and seventy in the 2015 term); ,  13 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf (reporting that the Supreme Court decided seventy-five cases in the 2014 term and seventy-seven in the 2013 term).