Page:EO 14023 Commission Final Report.pdf/104

 # See, supra note 22, at 147–48 (“The prospects for enacting this new bill appeared very promising.”).
 * 1) See, supra note 22, at 481–89, 497–500.
 * , supra note 22, at 160;, supra; see also Shesol, supra note 22, at 525 (observing of the Court-packing plan that it was “not the cause, but the catalyst that helped fracture the New Deal coalition; reawaken the GOP; unite conservatives across party lines; and shatter the myth of FDR’s omnipotence.”).
 * 1) Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, Essay, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy, Yale L.J.F. 821, 822 (2021); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105  255, 269–87 (2017); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71  465, 505–17, 538–44 (2018).
 * 2) See 99  1106 (1953) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-MD).
 * 3) Id.
 * 4) 100  6256 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-MD).
 * 5) 99  1106 (1953) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-MD) (emphasizing that the amendment would “plug[] the loopholes in the Constitution’s protection for the Supreme Court”); Id.id. [sic] at 1108 (statement of Sen. Russell Long, D-LA) (“Undoubtedly, one of the weak links is the possibility that the Supreme Court could be packed. … [T]hat is one loophole which we should close in order to protect ourselves in the future.”).
 * 6) See 100  6256 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Butler, R-MD).
 * 7) Id.
 * 8) See id. at 6347 (showing that the Senate voted 58 to 19 in favor of the amendment). A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds supermajority vote in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and then ratification by three-fourths of the states.  art. V.
 * 9) See C.P. Trussell, Court Amendment Tabled in House,, Aug. 4, 1954, at 11.
 * 10) 100  10,454 (1954) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel Celler, D-NY). A similar objection was raised in the Senate. Id. at 6342 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings, D-MO) (arguing that Congress might in the future decide that the Supreme Court should be either larger or smaller, depending on its workload, and for that reason a constitutional amendment was “undesirable”).
 * 11) Judiciary Act of 2021, H.R. 2584, 117th Cong. (2021); H.R.J. Res. 95, 116th Cong. (2020).
 * 12) Kalman Testimony, supra note 24, at 28.
 * 13)  art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
 * 14) See  art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
 * 15) See id.
 * 16) Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Fight Goes On,, Sept. 20, 1941, at 16, 37 (also arguing that the approach “seemed … to have the best chance of passing both Houses of the Congress most quickly”).
 * 17) Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States 2, 4 (July 20, 2021) (written testimony of Randy E. Barnett, Georgetown University Law Center), [hereinafter Barnett Testimony] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Barnett-Testimony.pdf (arguing that “partisan court packing” is unconstitutional, because “seeking a partisan advantage on the Supreme Court is not a legitimate end” under the Necessary and Proper Clause). Most scholars who have considered the issue, by contrast, have concluded that Congress has broad power to modify the Court’s size. See, e.g.,,  354–55 (2012) (“[I]f Congress has a sincere good-government reason for altering the Court’s size, it is hard to see why Congress’s views should not prevail, even if the Court sincerely disagrees about what size would be best for achieving good government … Even if … Congress was retaliating against what it perceived as Court abuses—say, a string of dubious rulings