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the threat of explosion but were occupying again. They were putting their machine-guns into position, but the rising tide of the assailants overwhelmed them.

In the centre the dash of the I33rd Div., known as " La Gaul- oise," under Passaga, had overcome all obstacles; and it had established itself in the angle N.E. of Douaumont and by the pool at Vaux. On the right, in front of the 74th Div. under Lardemelle, the artillery preparation had been insufficient against some centres of resistance, and the advance had been more difficult. More powerful artillery, which had become available, smashed the framework of the fort; long-range guns enfiladed the casemates (the surface which faced Verdun was covered with only ordinary masonry instead of being concreted) ; and finally the advance in the direction of Douaumont enabled field guns to be brought into action on the only position from which they could fire on the very steep slopes to the E. of the fort, whose communications were thus cut. The pressure of the infantry continued after the gth Div. under Audlauer had re- lieved Lardemelle's division; the enemy evacuated the fort and Gen. Audlauer installed himself there on the 3rd. He occupied the villages of Vaux and Damloup.

The recapture of the Douaumont and Vaux forts was an important event, which consecrated the victory of Verdun in the eyes of the whole world; 6,000 prisoners emphasized it. This great success, however, called for its complement.

On Oct. 21 Gen. Mangin had pointed out to Gen. Nivelle the necessity which obtruded itself, after the capture of the objec- tives assigned for the operation on the 24th, of seizing the crater Douaumont-Hardaumont and the Poivre height, both of which had direct observation into the positions which were to be conquered, and of clearing the way round Fort Douaumont. General Nivelle then considered a combined operation, but he was very limited by the means at his disposal. The front of attack must not be beyond that of one for three divisions, but it might be possible to have a break of continuity in the centre. The ammunition would be only that which could be economized out of the daily allowances. General Mangin, however, insisted on the advantages of an attack from the Meuse to the Woevre, even should it be necessary to wait for the necessary troops and munitions. It was this scheme which the command finally agreed to. Before Mangin's group the German front was held by five divisions in the front line and by four in the second; the latter could intervene in one night, 247 batteries having been identified (960 guns approximately).

The French attack had 4 divisions available in the first line, 4 in the second, and 740 guns. It was, accordingly, inferior to the defence, but it could count on the results obtained on Oct. 24. The artillery in actual fact rapidly established a superiority over the German artillery, thanks to deeper penetration; 13 German artillery officers were captured, whose evidence confirmed in detail this undoubted superiority. As far as the infantry is concerned the smashing in of the front trenches led to the com- plete destruction of the 13 battalions defending them, and to the partial destruction of the 13 battalions in support in the zone to be conquered, so that the attack could then meet the slight initial numerical inequality.

The enemy, forewarned by the experience of Oct. 24, had organized three lines of resistance defended by a network of barbed wire; further the distance of the final objective introduced a greater element of chance; it was, accordingly, necessary to have more elasticity in the mechanism of the creeping barrage and to vary its application. It was laid down in the attack orders of Mangin's group that: " Each objective must be seized at the first onset and with one bound the pace to be 100 metres in four minutes. The infantry to be preceded at a distance of 70 to 80 metres by percussion shell and at 150 metres by shrapnel, time and percussion. Further, when circumstances demand it and when it is possible, owing to long-range observation, artillery fire will be carried out in conjunction with the advance of the infantry; general officers commanding divisions will organize, with this end in view, the closest possible liaison between infantry and artillery."

The great obstacle to the organization of the attack was the state of the ground, which was frightfully cut up by 10 months of repeated fighting; in the slushy clay, where the water oozes out at any altitude, the shellholes, nearly touching one another, were at this time covered with ice. Without a complete fitting up of the ground every attack would come to grief in the mud. It was necessary to construct 25 km. of roads, several of which were planked with wood, 10 km. of Dreauville line, and a very great number of telephone systems. Everywhere supply and ammuni- tion dumps had to be made and camouflaged battery emplace- ments; water tanks and pipes had to be fitted up, etc., etc. The inclemency of the weather, very severe on the Meuse heights, made these works particularly arduous. All the soldiers, however, realized their necessity, and they were completed in five weeks with wholehearted self-denial and with great spirit by the divi- sions who succeeded one another in this zone, right up to the time when the attack divisions went into line.

On Dec. 15, about 10.00 hours, the French regiments, after as complete an artillery preparation as was possible, issued from their trenches and attacked from the Meuse to the Woevre. On the left, the I26th Div. under Muteau seized Vachcrauville and the Poivre height, where it established itself; the 38th, under Guyot de Salins, once again on the ground of its former exploits, seized Louvemont; the 37th under Garnicr-Duplcssis advanced as far as the Caurieres wood, fighting step by step; the I33rd (" La Gauloise ") under Passaga captured the Hardau- mont work and the village of Bezouvaux. The advance, which had slowed down at certain points, carried the attack on the i8th to the second objective. At the same time, after the ijth, offensive reconnaissances had gone right beyond their objectives, and, protected by their creeping barrage, destroyed guns and captured prisoners to the number of 11,387, including 284 officers. By adding the number of killed and seriously wounded the total losses of the enemy could not be estimated at less than 25,000, on a front of 10 kilometres. One hundred and fifteen guns were taken and destroyed, and the defence of Verdun was now established on the narrowest part of the Meuse heights and in an excellent position.

The moral effect of this victory was great on both sides. Ludendorff speaks of it in the following terms: " The blow which we then received was a particularly hard one. We suf- fered great losses and also lost important positions. The effort exerted during the year had been too great. The elasticity of our troops had been weakened by the immobility of the defence, by the powerful artillery of the enemy, and in consequence of our own losses. On the western front we were completely exhausted."

The Germans drew many useful conclusions from these events, and recognized noticeably the impossibility of reducing the defence to lines of regular trenches, too visible targets for the opposing artillery. The French learnt from them the brilliant confirmation of the methods employed on Oct. 24. Without in any way decrying this success, it should be remarked that the most distant objectives (3 km.), which according to the fixed time-table should have been reached in a few hours, had been conquered only on the fourth day. Indeed, this was not the condemnation of the methods used, nor of the time-table fixed in advance in particular; but it went to show the necessity of foreseeing that this time-table could not be followed, and that it was necessary to manoeuvre, because the advance does not always develop with mechanical precision. On Dec. 12 Germany, for the first time, made overtures for peace, overtures which ap- peared to slacken the energies of the Government, of the armies and of the peoples of the Entente.

In thanking his victorious troops Gen. Mangin enumerated the results obtained, and the hopes that they could picture in the future. He added these words: " Admitting themselves incapa- ble of conquering us on the field of battle, our savage aggressors dare to hold out to us a clumsy snare in the shape of a premature peace. While still picking up new arms they cry ' Kamerad.' You know that gesture. Our fathers of the Revolution refused to treat with the enemy as long as he was soiling the sacred