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In the meantime the movement on El 'Arish had progressed with such speed as was possible where the pace had to be set by that of the construction of the railway and pipe-line. Early in Dec. Gen. Dobell's advanced guard, which was called the Desert Column, came under the command of Lt.-Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode. This force varied in strength from time to time according to circumstances. On Dec. 10, when railhead was within 20 m. of El 'Arish, and the final advance was in view, Gen. Chetwode had under his command the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. and the 42nd and 52nd Divs.

The enemy had about 1,600 infantry in El 'Arish with sup- porting forces at Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila, and he held the only water supplies. The supply of water for the final advance of the Desert Column required the most elaborate arrangements and the establishment of a large reserve .of water, rail-borne from Bir el 'Abd, at railhead. Thus the movement had to be delayed till Dec. 20. Just before the advance of the Desert Column the enemy hurriedly withdrew, and Gen. Chetwode's mounted troops, surrounding El 'Arish after a zo-m. night march on Dec. 20-21, found the place unoccupied.

The nearest Turkish force was at Magdhaba, about 20 m. S. of El 'Arish, and consisted of some 1,600 infantry with four mountain guns. During the night of Dec. 22-23, Gen. Chauvel, commanding the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div., led a column composed of the majority of his mounted troops and the Imperial Camel Bde. against this force. The enemy's position was reached in the early hours of the morning. Some sharp fighting ensued. The enemy was practically surrounded by mid-day; but no water having been found for his horses Gen. Chauvel was faced with a situation in which, if he could not force the enemy's surrender before nightfall, he would have had to withdraw. By the late afternoon, however, the enemy's stout resistance was overborne, and practically the whole of his force was killed, wounded or captured. Four guns and 1,282 prisoners were taken, at a cost of under 150 casualties.

After this the enemy withdrew the few small posts which he had maintained farther S. within the borders of Sinai, and the only Turkish force remaining in Egyptian territory was a de- tachment about 2,000 strong near Rafa, the frontier post on the " road " into Palestine, some 25 m. E. of El 'Arish. On the night of Jan. 8-9, Gen. Chetwode moved out against this force with the greater part of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div., a mounted brigade (yeomanry) and the Imperial Camel Bde. The long night march was carried out with remark- able speed and efficiency; the enemy was completely surprised, and found his position almost entirely surrounded as day broke. As at Magdhaba, however, he offered a very determined resist- ance, and again he held the only water obtainable for Gen. Chetwode's horses. In the middle of the afternoon a small relieving force approached from Shellal; this force was, however, neither in time nor strong enough to effect its purpose. At one time it looked as if the Turks might hold out long enough to force Gen. Chetwode to relinquish his hold; but by 5:30 P.M. their resistance had been worn down and their position taken. The whole of the Turkish force, with its commander, was accounted for, and Gen. Chetwode returned to El 'Arish with over i, 600 unwounded prisoners, four mountain guns and other booty, his own casualties being less than 500.

As a result of these two actions both admirable examples of the tactics of mounted troops relying on fire action the Sinai province of Egypt was finally freed from the enemy.

The defender who holds the country between Gaza and the sea on the W. and Beersheba on the E. commands the access to S. Palestine from the direction of Egypt. East of Beersheba, a mountainous country, lacking roads and water, opposes a barrier which could only be overcome by preparations so long and ardu- ous as hardly to admit of their inception. At the beginning of 1917 the enemy held Gaza and Beersheba, and, after the actions at Magdhaba and Rafa, began to concentrate his advanced force at Shellal, a point on the Wadi Ghuzze nearly equidistant from Gaza and Beersheba, and some 7 or 8 m. in front (from the Turkish point of view) of the general line between those places.

From Shellal he was in a position to watch the approaches tt Gaza and to Beersheba, and to cover his lines of communicatior to those places especially the railway to Beersheba from the north. Behind the advanced position which the enemy began tc prepare at Shellal lay the line of ridges which, running almost direct from Gaza to Beersheba, dominated the open plain to the S.W. and formed a naturally favourable line on which to organ- ize a strong defensive position to bar the way into S. Palestine!

Meanwhile, the desert railway having been pushed on through El 'Arish to within a few miles of the Egyptian frontier, Gen. Dobell advanced his headquarters to El 'Arish before the end of Feb. Sir Archibald Murray, so far from receiving the fifth division which he had always held to be necessary for the further prosecution of the campaign, was now required to send one of his divisions to France the 42nd. This left available for the eastern force only three divisions, the sand, 53rd and 54th, with the nucleus of a fourth the 74th to be formed from dismounted yeomanry; but the satisfactory position of affairs in Egypt and the western desert enabled the available mounted troops to b increased to two mounted divisions.

It had by now been made clear to Sir Archibald Murray thai the forward policy of Dec. had been altered. The general sit-j uation of the Allies, envisaged as a whole, had developed andl wore a new aspect. Naturally there could be no ground for 1 surprise at any alteration or transformation of the policy govern- ing the conduct of operations in one of the very minor theatres.! On Jan. n 1917, the day on which, in France, the British attackl was launched against the Beaumont Hamel spur, Sir Archibald! Murray was told that his primary mission was the defence ofj Egypt during the summer months and the preparation of an offensive campaign in the autumn. Meanwhile Beaumont| Hamel developed into the great German retreat in the west.; Nearer to Egypt, the Rumanian retreat came to an end Wallachia lost but Moldavia held; and Gen. Maude's victorious campaign in Mesopotamia carried him from success to success past the ill-omened Kut to the capture of Bagdad.

Nor were these happenings without effect upon the attitude of the Turks on the confines of Egypt. Early in March the enemy evacuated his positions near Shellal before he could be attacked. His general intention appeared to be to avoid battle, trusting to the severe limitations set to the pace of Gen. Dobell's advance by the difficulties of overcoming the desert. Thus he would conserve his strength, retain his liberty of action in other directions, and choose his ground at leisure for an eventual con-j test d entrance in S. Palestine. Obviously this did not suit Sir Archibald Murray's plans.

In the early days of March the Turkish dispositions were as follows: rather less than a division (say 7,000 fighting troops) held Gaza; about a division was in the neighbourhood of Tellesh Sharia, roughly half-way between Gaza and Beersheba and 15 m. distant from either; and a small garrison occupied Beersheba. i In these circumstances, apart from the desirability of foiling the ' enemy's Fabian tactics, to which reference has been made, Sir Archibald Murray was influenced by other considerations of more or less weight. In order to make adequate preparations for a serious autumn offensive, in accordance with the instruc- tions of the War Cabinet, it was necessary to move railhead for- ward, and for this purpose it was necessary to advance to within a few milesof Gazaand to seize the lineof the Wadi Ghuzze. Further, ; the enemy's detachment at Gaza was a day's march distant from any supporting troops; by an operation of the same nature as though on a greater scale than those at Magdhaba and Rafa it , might be disposed of by a coup de main. Finally, such a coup de main, if successful, might result in Gaza passing not only tem- porarily, but perhaps permanently into British hands. If so, the effect would be to open the gate into S. Palestine and to make it impossible for the Turks to hold the naturally strong Gaza- Beersheba line as their first line of defence, when the time came for the main effort later in the year.

General Dobell commanding the Eastern Force, and Gen. Chetwode commanding the Desert Column under him, agreed that the chances of capturing Gaza by a coup de main were on