Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/844

814

from the E., and to maintain a general strategic reserve of troops for the whole Empire, ready for use wherever required. The reorganization, reequipping and refitting of the war-worn troops from the Dardanelles was the first consideration. In measure, as this progressed, the " general strategic reserve " was drawn upon to meet the exigencies of other theatres of war; and by the end of June 1916 nine divisions, three infantry brigades, a num- ber of Indian units, and a number of heavy artillery batteries had left Egypt, most of them for the main theatre in France and Flanders. By July, therefore, Sir Archibald Murray's force available for the defence of Egypt against attack from the E. had been reduced to four divisions, three dismounted yeomanry brigades, one mounted division, one mounted yeomanry brigade, and a few Indian and garrison battalions.

During this period, the first half of the year 1916, the scheme of defence on the E. of Egypt had undergone very considerable modification. The rapid depletion of Sir Archibald Murray's force rendered modification essential, while the Russian victory at Erzerum in the spring, and the fact that no Turkish attack on a great scale was to be apprehended during the hot weather, rendered it also practicable. In Jan. Sir Archibald Murray had taken over a scheme, prepared with Lord Kitchener's personal approval, for the construction of a great defensive system, suit- able for withstanding an attack with heavy artillery, of which the front line was some 7 or 8 m. of the Suez Canal, and which extended from the head of the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean. By Feb. 15, however, Sir Archibald Murray had already written to the chief of the Imperial general staff pointing out that this scheme of defence was very wasteful in men and material, and recommending an advance across the Sinai Peninsula towards the Egyptian frontier, with dispositions for an active instead of a passive defence. He showed that strategically the true base of the defensive zone of Egypt against invasion from the E. was not the 80 odd miles of the Suez Canal, but rather a line less than half as long near the frontier running S. from El 'Arish. From El 'Arish it would be possible to oppose any advance against Egypt directed along the N. Sinai road; to attack in flank an invader moving on the lines of approach farther to the S.; and to undertake rapid offensive operations against enemy concentrations in S. Palestine. Five divisions and not less than four mounted brigades would be required, but this was a consid- erably smaller force than would be needed adequately to hold the great defensive system prepared from end to end of the Suez Canal. Moreover, the farther the defence was removed from the Nile delta the less would be the unrest and the chances of disturbance in Egypt in the event of attack by the enemy.

As a first step Sir Archibald Murray proposed in Feb. an advance to a suitable position E. of Katia on the N. Sinai road, and the construction of a railway to that place. Katia itself is some 25 m. E. of the Suez Canal, and its importance lay in the fact that round it, and in the district immediately to the E. of it, it is possible to find or to obtain in shallow " wells " a consider- able supply of drinkable though brackish water. It was the only district in which any considerable force of the enemy could

possibly be collected, and for a time maintained, within striking distance of the Suez Canal. The organization of camel transport for the troops undertaking this advance was immediately put in hand, and the construction of the railway was begun. By the end of May Sir Archibald Murray had established a strong posi- tion near Romani, about 20 m. E. of the Suez Canal at the head of the Bay of Tine. This position was held by the 52nd Div., and from it the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. was able to keep under constant observation the whole of the " watered " district round, and E. of, Katia. More advanced positions, E. of Katia, were in course of preparation. A stand- ard-gauge railway had reached Romani, and water from the Sweetwater Canal had been brought there by pipe-lines. Lieu- tenant-General Hon. H. A. Lawrence was in immediate command of this northern portion of the forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Meanwhile the enemy had not permitted this advance to take place entirely undisturbed. Towards the end of April he had made a partially successful raid, which penetrated to some con- siderable distance W. of Katia and caused the loss of three and a half squadrons of yeomanry besides other casualties. His raiding force was, however, driven off without difficulty, and for about three months he gave no further sign.

By about the middle of July preparations were well in hand for undertaking the advance across the desert to El 'Arish and the Egyptian frontier. Railhead was some 30 m. E. of the Suez Canal. The construction of a large filter plant at Qantara, of a series of storage reservoirs, and of a great new pipe-line had been ordered, with a view to supplying the troops throughout the advance and as far as El 'Arish with half-a-million gallons of water a day from the Sweetwater Canal. Large numbers of camels were being collected, and all manner of equipment designed to facilitate the passage of the desert from " ped- rails " for the wheels of the artillery to wire-netting for roads was being procured and tested.

Then on July 19 an enemy force was found to be advancing, and to have entered the eastern part of the area of " wells " and palm groves which extends about 18 m. E. of Katia. By : the 24th this force had come to a standstill within 10 m. of the Romani position on a line on which it entrenched itself. From j that day until the end of the month there was little further move- I ment. During this period it became fairly clear that the enemy's force consisted of the Turkish 3rd Div., of three regiments, with a number of machine-gun companies, mountain artillery, some batteries of 4-in. and 6-in. howitzers and a body of Arab camelry. It was commanded by the German Col. Kress von Kressenstein. I

Sir Archibald Murray was in no hurry to force the issue. His troops were in a strong position with all their requirements close at hand, while the enemy, if he attacked, would fight with a desert behind him and very far from his base. All that Sir Archibald required was time to complete the provision of camel transport for Gen. Lawrence's force so as to render its mobility adequate for counter-attack or pursuit, or for attack eventually if the enemy should refuse to take the initiative. General Law- rence was, therefore, reinforced, till he had under his orders the 52nd and 42nd Divs., a brigade of the 53rd Div., two battalions of the 54th Div., a dismounted yeomanry brigade, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. and a yeomanry brigade. By Aug. i over 10,000 transport camels had been provided for this force. An independent mobile column, composed of camel corps with a' few squadrons of yeomanry and light horse, had also been organized for cooperation from the section of the Canal defences which lay to the S. of that for which Gen. Lawrence was responsible.

Not until Aug. 3 did the enemy disclose his intention, but on the night of the 3rd-4th he launched an attack against Gen. Lawrence's southern flank with the aim of outflanking and envel- oping the British force. General Lawrence's prepared defences extended from the sea on the N. southward for some 5 or 6 m., into a region of heavy sand-dunes, with the southern flank refused. The enemy's blow fell first on the Australian Light Horse, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. being posted on 'Gen. Lawrence's right. These troops were obliged