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victory and perhaps driven Turkey out of the war in the summer of 1917, were never carried out. This was in part due to the fact that all available Russian forces were being concentrated for Brussilov's great offensive in Volhynia, but mainly to the out- break of the Russian revolution, which checked all large operations in Asia. When the revolution broke out in April the advance had not begun. In the course of the winter there had been nothing but local skirmishes for the possession of a hill or pass, which, whether they turned out to the advantage of Turks or Russians had no influence on the general strategic situation.

The outbreak of the revolution was taken by many of the Russian troops as a signal that the war was at an end, though there were formations which still maintained their cohesion and discipline. The Turks, however, were prevented partly by the general military situation of Turkey and partly by the peculiar difficulties of the II. and JII. Armies, from seizing and exploiting their advantage as they might have been expected to do. The rapid progress of the English towards Bagdad had necessitated the despatch of reinforcements to that theatre, and the main- tenance of the Palestine front also absorbed large forces, so that ihcre were neither men nor material left over for the Caucasian front. The two armies, barely 40,000 strong in the spring of 1917, were now formed into the " Caucasian Army Group " under 'Izzet Pasha, whose H.Q. were still at Kharput, and who had now been provided with a German chief of staff, Maj. von Falken- hausen. All this, however, did not in any way make it possible to resume operations. Typhus was still raging; in Feb. the II. Army lost 42 of its few doctors from this cause. There was so little wood that the delousing stations could not be heated. The deportation of the Armenian population had left the fields antilled, and the villages deserted and in ruins. Of the craftsmen ,vho exhibit a multitudinous activity behind the armies on the European fronts there was not a sign, and even the workshops vhich had been busy in peace-time were deserted. The supply )ften broke down entirely. A shameless traffic in waggons went l>n on the single railway from Haidar Pasha to Ulu Kyshla, vhich served the Palestine, Mesopotamian and Caucasian fronts. These waggons, which should have been used for military purposes, I vere privately hired out by officers and officials to contractors nd war profiteers at high prices, and on this railway an illicit
 * arrying trade was developed on a gigantic scale. The higher

.uthorities, who also took their quota of profit, were not inclined o interfere. So for the sake of these brutes thousands of brave Anatolian soldiers perished of cold and starvation without even .nowing the true cause of their miserable death.

The reports of the hopeless military position in 1917, which rere sent to Berlin by the Turkish Supreme Command, were rom first to last lies, and served only to increase the exaggerated stimate of themselves which obsessed the minds of the German Supreme Command as well and caused the loss of every oppor- . unity of arriving at peace of understanding.

When Bagdad fell to the English on the night of March 10-11, he chance offered itself of a successful Russian offensive on rlosul either westward from Lake Urmia or from the region of .ake Van southwards. Had it been carried out even by one good orps it could not have failed to be successful. During the whole ,f 1917 some 15 infantry and 2j cavalry divisions remained on he Russian front facing the Turks, but nothing important was ndertaken. The front from Trebizond to the Diala near Bagdad, i /here it connected with the English line in Mesopotamia, leasured over 600 m. from flank to flank, and afforded far reater scope for free strategic manoeuvres than the narrow onts in France, which were actually filled with guns and men. Warlike activity was only resumed in E. Anatolia, however, 'hen Russia at the end of 1917 entered into negotiations with le Central Powers. The political event which decided the re- Jtnption of the offensive by the Turks, which took place early in 918, was the notification by the Turkish plenipotentiaries at rest Litovsk on Jan. 17 that a Russian retirement from all the rea occupied by them in Asia Minor was an essential pre- minary to the conclusion of peace. At the same time the 'krainian delegates were asked by the Turkish delegates how

far they were interested in the retention of the Caucasus by Russia. On their replying that they had no interests in the Caucasus, the Turks resolved to conquer it, and obtained Ger- many's consent to their doing so, though at the time they did not disclose to her all their ulterior designs.

The Russians retired at the end of Jan. 1917, and in Feb. the Turks advanced across the line Van-Erzerum-Trebizond. The Turkish armies, which together could muster only the strength of a weak army corps, were in such poor condition that even the small, unorganized Armenian bands, who opposed them, were able to give them greater trouble. Their communiques at this time were full of stories of great victories which never took place.

The forward march was carried out in two columns. The northern one, feeling its way very cautiously along the coast of the Black Sea, reentered Trebizond on Feb. 24; the other reached Erzinjan on the i4th, and moved thence by Mamakha- tun on Erzerum. Nothing was seen of the Russians, who, as a matter of fact, had long since recrossed the frontier; only a few desperate Armenians endeavoured to dispute the reoccu- pation of their country by their hereditary tormentors. The Turks were held up for some time by these bands in front of Erzerum, which they only "recaptured" on March n, and revenged themselves by the usual revolting barbarities on the unhappy Christian population.

While Erzerum was being taken, the left Turkish column advancing from Trebizond was approaching the frontier be- tween Chopa and Magriali, and the political problem of the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, the occupation of which had been the motive of the advance, became acute. Their interest in these provinces caused the Turks to commit their last and decisive strategic blunder, the greatest of which they had been guilty since 1914. The Turkish Government consid- ered these operations in the Caucasus to be of the first impor- tance, although the true decisive theatre for Turkey in 1918 was Palestine. Instead of concentrating in Palestine the few troops it had available, the Supreme Command withdrew troops and war material from that front and despatched them to the " East Caucasian Group." Even the small German contingent, which formed the backbone of the Palestine army, was also sent to the Caucasus. Liman von Sanders' words to Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Constantinople, written in June 1918, were fully justified by events: " The Turks are sacrificing all Arabia, Palestine and Syria to these boundless undertakings of theirs in Trans-Caucasia. Germany will some day be burdened with the responsibility for this."

Enver and the German High Command had, however, suc- ceeded in completely deceiving the German ambassador as to the Turkish objective, for the latter, in reply to Liman von Sanders, wrote on June 21 that the German Jager battalion was being transferred from Palestine to Georgia, " not in response to . Turkish wishes, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of restoring order in the Caucasus, so as to allow of the whole Turkish army being transferred thence to Mesopotamia by way of Urmia and Tabriz." This, of course, could have been done more quickly and easily if the Turkish army had never advanced from Arme- nia into the Caucasus. The motive of the Caucasus adventure lay deeper. Enver's idea of attacking India, childish as it was, had yet proved enticing to the German High Command, and the strategic base for an invasion of India by way of Persia was actually established in the Caucasus in the summer of 1918. And this at a time when the decision of the World War was ripening on the front in France!

Considerations of an economic nature, it is true, carried great weight in the minds of the German Supreme Command at this time. The output of the Rumanian oil wells was insufficient; and it was therefore thought necessary to occupy Baku, and to despatch petroleum thence to the Black Sea by the Tiflis rail- way. It has been necessary to mention these considerations in order to make clear the motives of the Turkish operations in 1918.

After the occupation of Erzerum the southern Turkish column reached Olti, the first objective of the Turks in the winter of 1914-5, on March 26. Meanwhile the coast column was moving