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Corps. Naturally enough, this isolated attack was broken with- out producing any effect beyond making it possible for the remnants of the IX. and X. Corps to escape to Erzerum.

The III. Army, which owing to the heavy snow had been unable to take its field artillery with it, had suffered appalling losses, which were due not so much to the fighting as to the fact that the troops had had to bivouac in the snow without tents and practically without food. An epidemic of typhus now broke out in its ranks. After the offensive the strength of the army had been reduced to the following totals: IX. Corps 2,000, X. Corps 2,400, XI. Corps 2,400, Artillery and 2nd Cav. Div. 4,800; or 12,400 in all. The army had thus lost 86 % of its effectives, and had suffered a disaster which for rapidity and completeness is without parallel in military history. The miserable surviv- ors were in a pitiable condition. Enver Pasha, with Bronsart von Schellendorf, at once left the army, handing over the com- mand to Havis Hakki Pasha, his brother-in-law, and returned to Constantinople; he never again during the World War at- tempted to conduct operations, though he often interfered with the decisions of the other army commanders with disastrous re- sults. Thus, soon after the defeat E. of Erzerum, he ordered the despatch of the V. Corps to that theatre from Constantinople, and was only at the last moment persuaded by Liman von Sanders to cancel his instructions. During his return journey he also announced that no orders other than his own should be carried out by the troops, and instructions to this effect were sent to all the Turkish armies. The greatest confusion would have resulted had not the Grand Vizier cancelled this ridiculous order. Havis Hakki Pasha dying in Feb. of typhus, the command was given to Mahmud Kiamil,who knew next to nothing of strategy and owed his rise solely to political considerations and his in- fluential connexions.

It was an undeserved piece of good fortune for Turkey that the Russian losses and the increasing severity of the weather forbade any pursuit, and that the situation on the Polish front was absorbing all the available Russian troops and preventing the despatch of reinforcements to the Caucasus. There ensued therefore a cessation of all activity in this quarter, and Mahmud Kiamil had time to reorganize his army. By occupying the Id and Olti passes he secured his left flank against any raids and surprise attacks which the Russians might be planning. Farther still to the left the small detachment which had carried out the push into Ardahan was wintering at Artvin in Russian territory. It consisted of 1,000 regulars, reinforced by volunteers raised in Constantinople by the Committee of National Defence with the assistance of the German military representatives. More of these somewhat inferior troops were sent to the detachment in Feb. and March, and it was resolved to attempt a coup de main against Batum. The fortifications of the town, however, though antiquated, were quite sufficient to repel the attack of these un- organized and half-trained men, and the enterprise was a com- plete failure. This was all the more unfortunate for Turkey, as she had found herself unable, despite the presence in the Black Sea of the " Goeben " and the " Breslau," which were manned by German crews but had been transferred to the Turkish fleet, to maintain uninterrupted command of that sea. During 1915 the two German ships, the only effective portion of the Turkish navy, were needed to cooperate in the defence of the Dardanelles; so the Russians were able once more to venture out to sea and shell the coal-mines of Zunguldak and Eregli and the town and harbour of Trebizond. Henceforward the line of communication of the III. Army by sea had to be given up, and it now ran over- land along the railway from Haidar Pasha (opposite Constanti- nople) by Konia, to Ulu Kyshla (in the Taurus N.E. of Adana), where everything was loaded onto carts and camels, and pro- ceeded by road via Kaisariyeh and Sivas to Erzinjan, there to be distributed. The length of this line from the railhead at Ulu Kyshla to the main depot at Erzinjan was some 475 miles.

Mahmud Kiamil, with the assistance of the German Lt.-Col. Guse, who was still chief of staff, succeeded during the winter months in bringing the strength of his army up to 35,000 men; most of the new recruits, however,had had little or no training. His

small army had to hold a wide front of some 220 m. from the Black Sea to Lake Van, and in these circumstances Mahmud Kiamil kept the main- body of his army concentrated round Erzerum, and protected the rest of the front only by small de- tachments. This was not difficult, particularly in winter, since few passable paths led over the frontier mountains, which are in places over 9,000 ft. high.

The Russians were not strong enough to fight a battle along the Sarikamish-Erzerum road. They therefore had recourse to wide turning movements, but not until May 1915, when the snow on the roads had melted. They first pressed the Turks back from the Olti pass and pushed on to Turtum. This village lies in a wild and precipitous valley in the midst of the high mountains, and here it was therefore possible for the Turkish reserves to stem the Russian advance. The Id pass was also occupied by the Russians. While the attention of the Turkish Higher Command was thus attracted to the N., far stronger Rus- sian forces began, likewise in May, an offensive over the passes of the Aghri Dagh (W. of Bayazid) in the direction of Lake Van, capturing the weakly defended villages of Dutak and Melass- girt and threatening Van and Bitlis. At the same time the Armenian population rose in arms. A Turkish division, hur- riedly despatched to Bitlis, suppressed the rebellion with awful savagery, but the Russians continued their advance from Melassgirt on Bitlis, and on July 13 drove its defenders out.

Again fortune favoured the Turks. The Russians, presum- ably too weak to venture forward, contented themselves with what they had gained. Before them to the W. of Bitlis lay the high plateau which stretches eastward from Diarbekr. Strong Russian forces might have either descended thence on Mosul and down the Tigris, thus facilitating the British operations against Bagdad, or might have pushed forward in the Euphrates valley on Kharput and turned the whole line held by Mahmud Kiamil's army, which was known to be in no fit state to offer serious resistance, and would have no alternative but to retire hurriedly on Erzinjan or to accept battle before Erzerum with its front facing S.W., with the certainty of complete destruction if it were defeated. However, nothing was done. A few detach- ments crossed into Persia (Azerbaijan) and occupied Urmia and a few other places W. of the lake of that name. Here, however, they were cut off by a belt of stupendous mountains over 115 m. wide from the Mosul plain, so that this enterprise had no strate- gic effect and merely exercised some political influence in bring- ing over to the side of the Russians the Armenian and Persian population of that region.

Summer passed, and as early as Sept. the first snow fell. Mahmud Kiamil had now increased his army to a strength of 58,000 men, and had in addition assembled some 20,000 recruits in special training camps in Erzerum. The governor of Erzerum was a German, Gen. Posseldt, who exerted himself in every way to put the antiquated works of the fortress in a state of defence. Lack of all material, even wood, however, prevented the con- struction of anything except earth-works. Erzerum drew all its wood and fuel in peace-time from the Pontic Alps, whence it had to be carried for 115 m. in carts. The Russian bivouacs near Melassgirt were constructed of wood brought up all the way from the mountain forests W. of Kars.

Although Erzerum was by no means a strong fortress, some 60 guns inits outer works and some 40 in the inner line being out of date, it was of great importance as the only road junction in the whole theatre of operations, as the capital of an area disaffected towards Turkey and the central point d'appui of a weak army. In Oct. 1915 the situation in Mesopotamia appeared so serious that the Turkish Supreme Command, all being quiet at Erzerum, took away from Mahmud Kiamil two divisions (the sth and 6th) and sent them to Bagdad. And just at this moment the Rus- sian Grand Duke Nicholas assumed command on the Russian Caucasus front, and brought with him not only reinforcements and material, but still more important the will to utilize them to the full.

Nicholas had no need to resort to turning movements, and decided to attack the centre of the Turkish front and break