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Rh of a war with Turkey had for some time been taken in hand by the Russian general staff. Russia fully realized the importance of possessing the Armenian plateau, with its Christian population and great mineral wealth. The frontier fortress of Kars, which . with its whole district had passed to Russia in 1878, was modern- ized, placed in a permanent state of defence, and well provided , with guns, ammunition and supplies. A lateral line through Transcaucasia from Baku by way of Tiflis to Poti on the Black I Sea was constructed, from which branch lines led to the Turkish . frontier. The network of roads was also carefully completed and I the frontier area thus converted into an excellent base for i strategical deployment.

From the first, then, the Russians had the better strategic

, position. In this country whichever side was nearest to its

railways was bound to have a decisive strategical advantage over

the other, especially if in addition it possessed a better network

of roads. Enver Pasha, however, failed to realize this. As a

strategist he was a hopeless amateur, who believed that his

personal will in Constantinople could remedy in a moment the

i age-old defects of the Turkish military system and the Turkish

general staff.

Long before Russia, in Nov. 1914, declared war on Turkey, i Gen. Liman von Sanders had planned to create a diversion in favour of the German and Austrian armies in the eastern front by landing several Turkish corps near Odessa and advancing into the Ukraine, where he hoped to rally the numerous German colonists to his standards. This scheme may be considered to have been the one great strategic error which could be laid to the account of Liman von Sanders: for it violated all those canons of 'prudence, the disregard of which the general himself so often and vigorously censured in the projects of others.

Liman von Sanders earmarked for this operation the I., IV., V.

ind X. Corps, and proposed to lead the army in person. It is


 * 5asy to understand that the Turkish High Command looked with

) disfavour on this plan, if only because it needed all its available

worces for operations in the Turkish theatre of war. The project

i)f effecting a landing at Odessa held out no promise of success;

'or the expedition could never have ventured far from its ships,

ind could therefore have exercised no effect on the general

ritrategic situation. It might perhaps have served as a centre

or a rising in the Ukraine, whose agents were in Constantinople.

Gut, in view of the military strength of Russia at that time, the

.mccess of such a rising was more than doubtful. The adventurous

..cheme was finally abandoned on Sept. 18 1914, largely because

he commander of the fleet considered it impossible to guarantee


 * ather the smooth disembarkation of the troops or the maintenance

if the line of communications by sea between Odessa and Con-

lUantinople. The Corps comprising the I. Army were also needed


 * K>r political reasons in the Adrianople area.where they were to be

,ised to cover the rear of Bulgaria against a Rumanian attack,


 * hould the former commit herself to an offensive against Serbia.

i For Liman von Sanders' scheme was now substituted Enver's

Teat plan for an advance against Russia, to be carried out by

he III. Army, assembling in Sept. and Oct. at Erzerum, under

he incompetent Hasan 'Izzet Pasha (not to be confused with

he Ahmad Tzzet who later became commander-in-chief).

This army consisted of the IX. and XI. Corps, the 2nd Cav. )iv. and the so-called 2nd Res. Cav. Div. made up of Kurdish rregular bands. This reserve cavalry, useless for fighting pur- oses, showed great skill in massacring and plundering the de- 2nceless Armenians whenever opportunity offered. In Nov. he X. Corps also joined the III. Army. The condition of the roops may be gathered from a report of the middle of Nov. 1914, ccording to which the X. Corps alone was short of 17,000 vercoats, 17,400 pairs of boots, 23,000 tents and 13,000 packs nd this just before the Armenian winter, in a country where ivouacking is unavoidable on account of the settlements being ir too thinly scattered to allow the housing of large bodies of roops. The III. Army was brought up to strength by reserves om E. Anatolia; they were excellent military material, but icrtage of clothing and food in the autumn soon caused them ) desert in masses.

Enver's plan of operations involved a frontal advance by the XI. Corps -along the Erzerum-Sarikamish road, combined with an attack against the Russian right flank by the two other corps moving to the left over the mountains in the direction of Olti, with the idea of cutting the Russians off from Kars and capturing that fortress. The present writer repeatedly told the Turkish High Command that the whole operation was impossible of execution, and Liman von Sanders endeavoured in a personal interview with Enver to dissuade him from carrying out his plan, which was foredoomed to failure. The latter, who had an exaggerated idea of his own capacity, refused to listen to advice or to take warning. Not only would he not see that his scheme was impracticable, but he expressed to Liman von Sanders his ultimate intention of marching by way of Afghanistan against India. No better proof could be desired of Enver's incapacity to understand what strategy means.

As a matter of fact the scheme as it stood was never put into execution, for the Russians anticipated it by undertaking an advance on Erzerum with a Cossack division and a mixed bde. Hasan 'Izzet attacked them at Koprii Keui on Nov. 8, and by the 1 2th he had succeeded in taking the Russian positions. Mean- while, however, the I. Caucasian Corps had taken up a position in rear near Asap, which resisted all the efforts of the Turks to storm it, though they gained ground at certain points. The Turks were already running short of ammunition and the arrival of parts of the II. Turkestan Corps to reinforce the Russians seemed to indicate that the Turkish superiority in numbers would shortly be lost, if it had not already been so. Hasan 'Izzet therefore withdrew the III. Army, gave up all idea of any further offensive, and turned his attention to completing the equipment and supply services of his troops, who were even now beginning to suffer privations. This wise decision must largely be attributed to the influence of his German chief of staff, Guse. The losses of the Turkish army in these first encounters amounted to 1,500 killed, 5,600 wounded no inconsiderable proportion of the effective strength of the army, estimated at some 90,000 men.

At this point, however, Enver took the bit between his teeth. He ordered a detachment which had been assembled under a German officer at Haidar Pasha to be transported across the Black Sea and landed W. of Batum, and to advance thence into Russian territory in fact, to attack Russia. The detachment pushed forward boldly to Ardahan, where it encountered over- whelming hostile forces and had to retire to the Russo-Turkish frontier. Enver himself, burning with impatience, and his German chief of staff, Bronsart von Schellendorf, who also was no strategist, sailed on board a warship for Trebizond. Leaving Constantinople on Dec. 6 he reached Erzerum on the 2ist, and, taking over the command of the III. Army, set to work at once to carry into action his pet scheme outlined above. The various corps received the following missions. The IX. Corps was to drive the Russians from the pass between Erzerum and Olti and advance on the latter place. The X. Corps, moving from Erzerum northward, was to wheel round south-eastward in front of Olti in order to cut the line of retreat of the enemy in conjunction with the IX. Corps, marching parallel to it. The Russians would then be attacked frontally by the XI. Corps, as soon as the turning movement succeeded.

This scheme was a real piece of geometrical strategy, which in view of the bitter cold, the deep snow and the miserable equipi- ment of the Turkish army was bound to turn out disastrously. Enver, however, persisted in his attempt to ape the deeds of Alexander the Great, and the operation proved a complete failure. The IX. Corps successfully forced the pass, but got utterly out of hand in the tangle of snowclad and pathless mountains. With its units inextricably mixed up it encountered near Sarikamish a superior and well-ordered enemy force, and suffered a complete defeat. The X. Corps, which had an even longer road to traverse, also arrived piecemeal on the battle- field on Jan. 4 1915, when the IX. Corps was already pouring back in complete disorder. The X. Corps shared its fate and retreated in disordered haste over the mountains. Enver attempted to retrieve the position by attacking with the Xj.