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Rh not laid and no trains ran in 1921 beyond Burnoi. It was intended later to continue this line from Vicrni to Semipalatinsk (about 900 versts) and join up with the Trans-Siberian line. Important railway lines were constructed from Kagan (the station on the main line 10 m. S. of Bukhara City) to Karshi and Kerki, whence the line runs up the right bank of the Oxus to Termez on the Afghan border. A branch runs from Karshi to Kitab, and the intention was to join Kitab to Samarkand. All these lines were destroyed by the Bukha- rians in 1918 but could presumably be easily repaired. The total length of these railways in Bukhara was about 400 m. and there are, in addition, lines from Andijan to Jalalabad coal-fields, about 45 m., from Khokand to Namangan, about 57 m.,and from Fechenko i(N. E. of Skobelev) to Sharikhan, about n miles. (F. M. B.)

TURKEY. An organized State of Nationalist Turkey, in its wider aspect an Anatolian State created by Turkish Nationalists in 1919-20, was the outcome of the terms of )eace dictated to the Ottoman Empire by the victorious Powers ifter the war of 1914-8. A severe peace was expected by the Turkish rulers and people. They were resigned to the loss of Turkish Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia; to stringent breign control of Turkish finance; to the reimposition of the Capitulations; to international control of the waterway between he Aegean and the Black Sea; and to measures for the protection >f Christian populations in Turkish territory. Such curtailments >f territory and supervision of their internal affairs would doubt- ess have received their reluctant acquiescence. But the surrender if Ottoman territory of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece as part >{ the terms of peace was a matter that touched all Turks to the [uick. The Turkish Nationalist movement received its first reat impulse when a Greek force, acting on a decision of the Supreme Council, occupied Smyrna and the surrounding terri- ory in May 1919. Nationalist plans were rapidly matured and , iut into execution.

, General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an officer who had fought

,-ith much credit in the defence of Gallipoli, left Constantinople

, arly in June 1919, ostensibly for his military district in Asia

^inor. On June 19 he outlined the Nationalist plan for saving

i he country at a public meeting held at Khavsa, 50 m. inland

,rom Samsun. It was the official opening of the Nationalist

lovement. In brief, the scheme was to create a government

nd army in the heart of Asia Minor to resist the partitioning of

i'urkish territory within "Armistice limits." The definition of

rea referred to the armistice of Mudros of Oct. 30 1918, and thus

xcluded Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia from the territory to

1 e preserved, but included Smyrna and Thrace. For this area

Jationalists professed willingness to accept a single Great Power

js mandatory; they would not, however, accept more than one.

'he movement spread rapidly. A provisional government was

i ;t up at Erzerum in August. In Sept. a National Congress was

, eld at Sivas, which affirmed the purpose not only of maintaining


 * ie integrity of Ottoman territory within armistice limits, but of

pholding the Caliphate and Sultanate. A few weeks later the

';at of the government was changed to Angora, as a more central

.osition. By the end of 1919 the Nationalist movement had been

ccepted by nearly the whole of Asia Minor, and the Ottoman

irovernment at Constantinople became a government represent-

'ig little, and wielding no authority.

Behind the Nationalist movement was the military class of 'urkey, and the still powerful secret society known as the Com- Uittee of Union and Progress. In fact, though the movement presented on the part of the people a genuine patriotism and esire to resist what was deemed as aggression, it is doubtful if le Committee were not its real founders. At all events Talaat asha, Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha, Sais Halim Pasha, and many .her Committee leaders became exceedingly active in the ationalist cause. They gave it, too, the Panislamist policy hich the Committee had followed when in power behind the ttoman Government at Constantinople. Owing to this con-
 * xion between Turkish Nationalism and Panislamism Mos-

m sympathy was excited in British India. Doubtless the agita- on was arranged, but nevertheless it carried weight. A " Cali- mte Committee " to oppose the imposition of harsh terms of ace on Turkey was formed, and a delegation sent to London, he delegation laid much stress on a speech made by Mr. Lloyd

XXXII. 26

George on Jan. 5 1918, in which he said: " Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turk- ish in race." This speech the delegation, and other supporters of a lenient policy towards Turkey, claimed as a pledge. At the Peace Conference of the Allies held in London early in Feb. 1920, to discuss the terms of the Turkish peace, it was decided to leave Constantinople in the possession of Turkey. At this time the Nationalists began military operations against Cilicia. Turkish troops drove the French out of Marash and other places in this region, and used their success to massacre great numbers of Armenians. Simultaneously the Nationalists organized resist- ance in Thrace under Col. Jaffas Tayar Bey.

The Government at Constantinople were now taken with the idea that they could suppress the Nationalists from within. They sought to rally to their side the sober and religious masses of the Turkish population by the joint influence of the Sultan as Caliph and of the Sheikh ul Islam. An Imperial decree was also issued declaring the Nationalists rebels. At the same time a military effort was made by sending Anzavour Pasha with a considerable force to occupy Brusa. But the appeal of the Caliph and the Sheikh ul Islam had little effect; the decree as to rebels was ignored ; and Anzavour Pasha's force deserted to the Kemal- ists before Brusa was reached.

The Supreme Council sitting at San Remo finally decided the terms of the Turkish peace in April 1920, and the treaty was handed to the Turkish delegates on May 9. The terms of the treaty caused the fiercest hostility in Angora. The Great Na- tional Assembly declared for resistance to the last, and formally denied the right of the Constantinople Government to conclude any treaty on behalf of Turkey. It declared further that no treaty made by that Government would be recognized by the Nationalists. It was evident now that nothing but the application of force by the Allies would compel acceptance of the treaty by the Government at Angora. On the proposal of M. Venizelos, then the Greek premier, the Allies therefore entrusted the task to Greece of dealing with the Nationalist forces in western Asia Minor, and imposing the treaty. In support of Greece the Allies undertook minor naval operations. During June and July 1920 the Greek armies conducted a campaign in which they overran the part of Asia Minor lying westward of a line drawn from Brusa to Ushak in the valley of the Menderez. A Greek army also occupied Thrace. As the result of these operations, which destroyed any hope the Ottoman Government may have had of obtaining better terms by delay, the treaty was signed by the Ottoman delegates on August 20 1920.

In spite of their defeat at Greek hands the Nationalists showed no inclination to accept the treaty. Instead, they turned more and more towards Bolshevik Russia, with hostility to the Allies as the common cause in pursuit of which each could assist the other. Arms, munitions and money were the chief Nationalist needs; and for her own ends Russia, to some extent, supplied them. In return she took the opportunity for spreading Bolshe- vik principles in Asia Minor, though with little success among Moslems, who held that Bolshevik theories were in opposition to the teachings of Mahomet. Towards the end of 1920 the Government of Constantinople made an attempt at peace with the Nationalists by sending a " Mission of Reconciliation " to Angora. But this effort, too, had no results. Notwithstanding defeat in the West, and risings and discontent within the area over which they had power, the Nationalist Government was in a fairly strong position. Nothing but force could overthrow them, and the nature of the country and absence of roads made the application of such force from outside a dangerous and exceedingly difficult undertaking. They were in alliance with Bolshevik Russia. Their country was self-supporting. They had but to wait, and time would assure their ultimate success.

Meanwhile Bolshevik Russia and Nationalist Turkey endeavoured to secure better land communications between their territories, to bring, in fact, their territories to a common frontier. Russia was established in the Transcaucasian Republic of Azerbaijan; but between Turkey and Azerbaijan lay the Ar-