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The second Agreement defined the loan, which was fixed at 2,000,000 at 7%, redeemable in 20 years. There were two let- ters, in the first of which the British Government promised co- operation in securing a revision of the treaties actually in force between the two Powers, compensation for damage suffered dur- ing the war, and any justifiable rectification of frontiers. In the second it was laid down that Great Britain would not claim from Persia the cost of maintaining British troops in Persia for the defence of her neutrality, and asked Persia, in return, not to claim compensation for any damage done by her troops.

The Agreement was signed, but no immediate steps were taken to elect a new Majlis and submit it for ratification. In consequence, everything was held to be in suspense.

Finance. In 1920 a British Financial Adviser was engaged by the Persian Government, a member of the Treasury staff be- ing selected for the post. To a certain extent he could occupy himself with superintending the payment of money in connexion with the Cossack brigade and other matters in which help was given to the Persian Government, but his office was in suspense and the loan of 2,000,000 could not be made until the Agree- ment was ratified. With all overdue instalments paid up, the total debt of Persia as at Dec. 31 1920 was as follows:

Loans

Original Amount

Outstand- ing

I. Russian 5% Loan of 1900, 1902

(Rubles) 2. Russian Consolidated 7% Loan

32,500,000

31,223,170

1911 . . . (Krans) 3. Indian 5 % Loan

60,000,030

314,281 i6s.4d

31,524,501 180,421

4. Imperial Bank of Persia 5%

Loan of May 8 1911

1,250,000

1,223,061

5. British Advances of 1912-4,

7%

490,000

490,000

6. Russian Advances (Rubles)

1,891,500

1,576,250

7. British Advances 1915-7.

817,000

817,000

8. (Krans)

1,000,000

1,000,000

9. 1918 (Krans)

92,500,000

10. British Loan, Aug. 9 1919.

2,000,000

? Not yet 1 received.

The Anglo- Persian Military Commission. Among the impor- tant questions was the formation of a uniform force for Persia. An Anglo-Persian Commission was appointed and recommended a total strength of 60,000 men. As funds for such a force were not immediately available, it was decided to absorb the S. Per- sia Rifles, 6,000 strong; the Cossack division, 8,000 strong; and the Swedish gendarmerie, 8,400 strong. The total force would be gradually raised to 40,000 and all other troops would be dis- banded. The Chief Military Adviser would be British and the Chief of the General Staff a Persian, although there was no Persian officer who possessed the qualifications. This scheme was in abeyance in 1921, pending ratification of the Agreement.

The Bolshevist Invasion of Persia. In May 1920 the Bolshe- vist fleet from Baku bombarded Enzeli, took possession of the remnants of Denikin's squadron and leisurely occupied Resht, where a Provisional Government was formed under Kuchik Khan. The British detachment at Enzeli was withdrawn to Kazvin. At Teheran there was a panic and the British were blamed for not protecting Persia. The Cossack brigade recap- tured Resht some months later, but finally retreated in a demor- alized condition and took refuge inside the British lines. In March 1921 there was a considerable Bolshevist force in the pro- vince of Gilan, but it was thought unlikely to prove a serious threat to Persia until the brigade of British troops should be withdrawn from Kazvin.

Railways. The question of railways has loomed large in Persia partly from the political and strategical and partly from the com- mercial point of view. For many years Teheran had been the unsuccessful hunting-ground of seekers for concessions, who had finally been replaced by the representatives of Great Britain and Russia. It may be readily granted that the only satisfactory solution of the problem of transport in Persia lies in the construction of rail- ways. Their influence would probably help the country to pass quickly from the methods of transport used by the patriarch Job to those of the aoth century. But there are many difficulties to be surmounted before railways can be constructed in Persia, the chief obstacles being financial and political.

Persia is a vast but miserably poor country with a scanty popula- tion living in isolated villages, generally lying many miles apart. The towns are small and do not increase, and there is very little trade. In the N. the country is more fertile, owing partly to a heavier rainfall, and there are important exports as well as imports, whereas in the S., if we except oil, there are practically no exports, carpets, pistachio nuts, opium, hides and wool making a small total compared with the large imports. In other words, unless minerals are found which it is profitable to export, Persian railways, con- structed in the S. or W., cannot pay.

Had the Russian Government continued on the old lines it is probable that money would have been found for the construction of a railway" across Persia. The grandiose scheme appealed to the Tsar, while his ministers considered that it would secure their hold on the Russian sphere and also bring them closer to the Indian Empire, thereby enabling them to exercise pressure on Great Britain. These facts were fully realized by the British Government, which was, however, unable to refuse to discuss the scheme and, in 1912, a Spciete d'tudes, including British, Russian and French representa- tives, was formed, with the object of constructing a Trans-Persian railway. It was intended, in the first instance, to build a line to Teheran, starting from Alyat, a station to the S. of Baku. Negotia- tions in connexion with this, the first section of the Trans-Persian railway, were carried on until the outbreak of the World War. In addition to this important scheme the Russian Government in 1913 obtained a concession for the construction of a line to Tabriz, starting from the terminus of the Trans-Caucasus system at Julia. This concession included rights for a service of steamers on Lake Urmia to which a branch was to be run, and also a concession for an exten- sion to Kazvin. The line to Tabriz was opened in 1916.

Meanwhile the British had not been idle, and a syndicate, of which Messrs. Greenway & Lynch were the leading members, sub- mitted to the Persian Government a scheme for the construction of a network of railways in southern Persia: (a) from Mohammerah or Khor Musa to Khurramabad and Burujird; (ft) from Bandar 'Abbas to Kerman; (c) from Bandar 'Abbas to Shiraz; and (d) from Bandar 'Abbas to Mohammerah. This far-reaching scheme for a monopoly of railway construction in S. Persia included the right to develop ports where necessary. It also involved the issue by the Persian Government of bonds secured on the railways and their earnings and on any other available sources of revenue.

The syndicate decided to begin work on part (a) of the scheme. The base would probably have been Khor Musa, an inlet of the sea, which ran inland for many miles towards the Karun river and possessed remarkable advantages in the way of deep water and safe anchorage. The alternative was Mohammerah. The line would have been constructed across the level plain of Arabistan to Dizful and would then have risen through the hills to Khurramabad. Survey operations were attempted in the hills in 1913, but the greedy tribes- men attempted to levy such enormous sums for protecting the parties that the work came to a standstill. The results of the World War have entirely changed the position and it seems that this scheme will be allowed to fall into abeyance.

There is no doubt that if railways are constructed into the interior from the Persian Gulf, the port of Bandar 'Abbas, or perhaps a new port some miles to the W., will be selected. The route running across the Rudbar district and thence to Rigan and Kerman, over the low Gishu pass, avoids the very high passes to the S. of Kerman and, once the plateau is struck at Rigan, the country is ideally suitable for railway construction right across Persia. Upon the whole, this is the most satisfactory alignment. The route from Bandar 'Abbas to Shiraz and thence to Mohammerah would violate the principle that lines should be built into the interior and not run parallel to the coast, where they could not compete with sea transport.

After the World War the question of railways was again taken up by a strong group, which included Sir Charles Greenway, the chair- man of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The scheme included a railway to Teheran from the Persian frontier at Kuraitu, at which point was the terminus of a metre-gauge line from Bagdad. A survey was commenced via Kermanshan, Hamadan, Kazvin and Teheran. Surveys to Enzeli and Tabriz were also contemplated. It was agreed that, upon the completion of the surveys, the Persian Government would have the right to call on the group to construct the railway line or lines either as a Persian State railway or as a private company. No agreement as to terms was drawn up.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. R. Hall, Ancient History of the Near East (1913) ; Sir Percy Sykes, History of Persia (2nd ed. 1921) ; Prof. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution (1910); Maj.-Gen. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (1920) ; Prof. Williams Jackson, Persia, Past and Present (1906); Lt.-Col. Sykes, The Glory of the Shia World (IQIO). (P. M. S.)

Medical Conditions. Persia is divided up into a great elevated plateau which occupies the chief part of the area of the country and which is separated from the Caspian Sea in the north by a low-lying narrow strip of land from 20 to 60 m. broad, and from the Persian Gulf in the south by a strip of land little above sea level and about 40 m. in width. The strip of country bordering the Caspian Sea has a very high rainfall, its climate is damp and very relaxing, the tem- perature being moderate. Marshy and swampy areas with luxuriant forests and vegetation occupy a considerable portion of this part