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and although preparations were made for a vast output of machines in America, by the Armistice the manufacture had only recently reached the stage of production and only twenty odd American-built Renault machines had reached France. All the tank operations in which the Americans took part were therefore carried out with British or French machines.

As to personnel, in Feb. 1918, 500 volunteers from the American army assembled at Bourg in France for instruction, and from the next month onwards three companies of soldifcr mechanics assisted at the repair depot at Bourron. The establishment of the American Tank Corps was increased in May to 15 brigades (five per army), each consisting of one heavy and two light battalions. Owing to the lack of machines in America it was necessary to send the units of the Tank Corps for training with the machines to England and France, a camp being established at Bovington, in Dorset, the British tank- training centre, for training the heavy tank units, and at Bourg for that of the light tank units under French supervision. In addition to 25 instructional machines, with accessories and spares, previously supplied, 144 Renault tanks, the complement of two light battalions, were handed over in Aug. to the Americans. Two battalions were at once mobilized and took part in the attack of the St. Mihiel salient by the American I. Army on Sept. 12.

The entry into action of these units was somewhat disappointing. The tanks had to travel far from their positions of assembly to the battle, and on the first day they operated over such difficult ground that they did not catch up with the infantry, who were able to move forward rapidly owing to the comparatively feeble resistance of the enemy. On the second day they were unable to obtain petrol, and on the third day they did not have much fighting, but took a number of prisoners. The machines were practically undamaged by the action. Their next operations were with the French in the Argonne, where they were of considerable assistance. From this time until the middle of Oct., when they were re-formed into one company, they were continually at the disposal of the infantry commanders, but did not often take a cooperative part in action, though they travelled miles, being used mostly for reconnaissance and tor attacks against strong points which had checked the infan- try. After that date they accompanied the American forces in the advance right up to the end. One heavy tank battalion which had been trained in England took the field on Sept. 29 with the American II. Corps, in the attack on the Hindenburg line. On this occasion ten tanks were destroyed by running into an old British minefield, and the American infantry here suffered severely from the German machine-guns. On Oct. 8, the battalion cooperated most usefully with the American II. Corps, and again on Oct. 17, when the River Selle was crossed. Finally they assisted the British on Oct. 23 in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau. This ended the operations of the units of the Tank Corps.

The chief characteristics of the action of the Americans in regard to tanks was their quick appreciation of the value of the arm. But the extent of the preparations made for a continuance of the struggle in this as well as in some other directions prevented a greater part Being played by the American tank forces in the field. Had the war continued it would have come into play with overwhelming effect.

Since the Armistice the Americans have pressed on with the de- velopment and application of the caterpillar track system for road and cross-country transport generally. Most of their efforts in this direction have been concentrated on the " motorization " of artil- lery traction, and a considerable amount of literature has been pub- lished foreshadowing the future ideal as elimination of the horse for military transport purposes. Experiments have been and are being carried out with different types of self-propelled vehicles on the caterpillar track, and combined wheel and track principles. One machine of the latter type recently covered 251 m. in 17 hours. Of fighting tanks, the Mark VIII. of 35 tons is still the standard heavy machine, but experiments are being made with modified Renault and Ford light tanks, and a water-crossing machine. On the whole the Americans seem to be greatly impressed with the part that will be played by machines in the warfare of the future and have made great steps in applying track propulsion to military uses.

GERMAN TANKS

In spite of rumours, the first appearance of the British tanks came as a complete surprise to the Germans. In Dec. 1913, and again toward the end of 1914, proposals had been made in Germany for an armoured automobile on caterpillar tracks; and in the summer of 1915 some experiments in this direction had been carried out; but no steps were taken to proceed with the idea. In Oct. 1916, after the appearance of the British tanks, of which they temporarily captured one, the question of constructing similar machines was taken in hand by a special commission, and drawings were prepared. Construction, however, was postponed, owing to the lack of coal and steel, and to the economic condi- tions generally. H.Q. appears then to have become doubtful as to the necessity for these weapons, and did not give this service

first priority of urgency. This was actually not done until the summer of 1918. This lack of interest or apathy on the part of the Germans came as a surprise to the Allies, for it was antici- pated that so soon as the secret was out the enemy would use every endeavour to copy and improve on the machine and press on with mass production so as to make up if possible for the start the Allies had gained. For a long time opinion in Germany remained divided as to the value of the weapon, partly owing to the mechanical imperfections of the original Allied machines and partly owing to the manner in which they were first used,; especially during the summer of 1917.

Nevertheless, manufacture of a tank, known as type A.7.V., apparently the result of the deliberations of the commission already referred to, was commenced in the spring of 1917. Only 10 of these machines were ready for the offensive in March; 1918, whilst not more than 20 were completed by the end of the: war. Designs for a heavier type, also, were started about the! same time, of which the first model was to have been ready ini Dec. of that year, but it was still unfinished at the end of thel war. Experimental construction of a small light tank was also; commenced, and orders for these machines were placed in thei summer of 1918, to be ready by the spring of 1919. This con-l tract, also, was cancelled at the suspension of hostilities.

The French attack at La Malmaison in Oct. 1917, and then the British attack at Cambrai somewhat changed the aspect of j affairs. The British tanks captured by the Germans in their , counter-attack after the latter action were collected at Charlcroi ; and repaired, and the question of production in quantity of a German tank based on the British type was considered, only to be dropped, owing to the shortage in man-power. In Jan. 1918, i the first " Sturmpanzerkraftwagenabteilung " (Tank Section), I of five German A.7.V. machines, was formed and brought with ! its auxiliary transport up to the western front for training. The I captured tanks, also, were organized in sections of five machines. The personnel establishment was on an extravagant scale, no fewer than 1 76 of all ranks being allotted to a section of German machines, and 140 to a section of captured British machines, as against the British establishment for a similar section of 41 of all ranks. In all, three sections, comprising 15 of their own tanks, and six sections comprising 30 captured machines, were used by the Germans in 1918. Some of the latter were re-armed with 5-7-cm. Russian guns.

FIG. II. German A-7.V. Tank.

The description of the A.7.V. machine (see fig. 1 1) is as follows: weight, 32 tons; length, 7 metres; width, 3-2 metres; height, 3 metres; armament, 6 machine-guns and one 5'7-cm. gun ; protection, armour 30 mm., 20 mm. and 15 mm. thick; crew, I officer, 15 other ranks (mechanics, gunners, machine-gunners); power, two roo-H.P. Daimler engines, each driving one track; climbing capacity, trenches of 2-5 metres width. The German tank was a clumsy machine and a bad climber, owing to the underhung tracks. It was powerfully engined and its tracks were carried on spring bogies which enabled it to cover 8 m. per hour on the flat. The thick armour was proof against armour-piercing bullets at short range and also against light- field-gun shells; but the joints between the thick plates rendered the crew liable to bullet splashes, which was a serious defect.