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cessful attack on a similar plan launched after one hour's pre- liminary bombardment.

July 18, the date of the great French victory of Soissons, marked the turning point of the war. It depended on tanks, and was rendered possible by their proper employment in mass and as a surprise. In fact, as the recent British offensive on a smaller scale had been, it was based on the battle of Cambrai. It was followed by a similar operation, the battle of Amiens on Aug. 8 which opened the British strategic offensive.

This battle was also based on the power of the tank arm, and was designed and organized to derive the utmost value from it and to give it every chance to perform its proper, logical function in a general operation. The tactics to be employed by the tanks were an elaboration of those employed at Cambrai modified by recent ex- perience and adapted to the improved machines available. The attack was carried out by three army corps, with three divisions in reserve, a cavalry corps and II tank battalions. In regard to the tank battalions they were now better equipped than they had been. Nine were equipped with the new Mark V. machines (36 each), and two with the " Whippets " (48 each), or in all 420 fighting machines. There were also 42 tanks in reserve, 36 supply tanks, and 22 gun- carriers, or 580 machines in all. The Whippet " tanks were to act with the cavalry. There was no artillery bombardment, and the tanks advanced with the barrage at " zero" hour. The heavy guns were used for counter-battery work and the field artillery moved for- ward in close support of the infantry. Noise barrages (made by low lying aeroplanes) were used to drown the sound of the tanks' ap- proach. On the first day the maximum advance of the tanks was 7\ m., and they continued in action for four days till the nth.

The battle of Amiens was a tremendous blow, both material and moral, to the Germans, who, besides casualties, lost 22,000 prisoners and 400 guns; and the victory was admittedly very largely due to the tanks. Amongst other lessons learned it was again found that these machines, like other arms, required a reserve to keep up the pressure after the first day of action, and that the limit of endurance of the heavy machines before over- haul was three days; that they were suited for trench warfare, the medium machines for open warfare; that the heavy supply tanks should be replaced by a light cross-country tractor; that wireless and aeroplane communication, as then developed, was not so certain as that by galloper; that it was a mistake to tie up tanks to cavalry, for, during the approach they could not keep up, and during the fight were kept back by the cavalry, which under hostile machine gun-fire had to retire or move to a flank until the tanks disposed of the machine-guns; and that machines of greater speed and greater radius of action were neces- sary. According to one authority, 1 if machines capable of moving at 10 m. an hour with an endurance of some 100 m. had been available, the German forces south of the Amiens-Roye- Noyon road might have been cut off and the end of the war greatly accelerated.

July 1 8 and Aug. 8 were not only victories for the French and British over the Germans, they were victories over their oppo- nents for the tank arm in each army. In regard to the British it is sufficient to say that up to Nov. 5, their last fight, no attack took place without tanks. They cooperated in every offensive including such important operations as the battle of Bapaume, and the second battle of Arras, the battles of Epehy, Cambrai-St. Quentin (when the Hindenburg line was broken), the Selle and Maubeuge. Latterly, indeed, during the " war of movement " which set in after the Hindenburg line had been passed, advanc- ing infantry when faced by the German rear-guard machine-gun posts almost invariably halted for tanks to come up and dis- 1 pose of them before they moved forward.

So far as statistics can show what a part they played, the follow- ing facts speak for themselves: By the time of the battle of Amiens much of the personnel of the Tank Corps had been in action 15 or 16 times, and during the 95 days from that time to the Armistice tanks (to the number of 1,993) were engaged in fighting on 39 days. The casualties, killed, wounded and missing were 598 officers and 2,826 other ranks. These, though heavy in relation to the strength of the unit, which was under that of an infantry division, were not heavy for 39 days hard fighting if it be borne in mind that in pre-tank days it was not unusual for an attacking division to suffer 4,000 casualties in one day often without reaching the objective.

The final despatch of the Commander-in-Chief of the British

1 Tanks in the Great War, Col. J. F. C. Fuller.

armies contained the following words : ... Since the opening of our offensive on August 8th, tanks have been employed on every battle- field, and the importance of the part played by them in breaking up the resistance of the German infantry can scarcely be exaggerated. The whole scheme of the attack of August 8 was dependent upon tanks, and ever since that date on numberless occasions the success of our infantry has been powerfully assisted by their timely arrival. . . . " It would not be too much to say, that in spite of any artil- lery assistance, the series of overwhelming, immediate and economi- cal (both in life and treasure) victories won at Amiens and afterwards would have been absolutely impossible without tanks, as would the whole scheme of the strategic offensive which depended for its execu- tion and cohesion on the prompt and certain success of these attacks. And this statement, which is tantamount to an expression of opinion that human bodies cannot vie with armoured machines against wire and machine-guns, is no disparagement of the British infantry. It is one which would be borne out by the survivors of Neuve Chapelle, Loos and the Somme.

After the action of the Somme a few tanks were at the end of 1916 despatched to cooperate against the Turks in Palestine, where the situation was somewhat similar to that which had arisen on the western front. It was doubtful, at first, whether the machines, some parts of which wore out very quickly, would operate in the sandy desert; but it was found that the dry sand was less harmful than the mud of Flanders, and the tanks in fact stood the test well, and covered a surprising number of miles, though they happened to be machines already partly worn out in training. Only eight tanks were sent out, which was far too small a number to enable any very important result to be obtained in a field where the bold use of tanks in force might have had a decisive effect. The terrain favoured their action, and the strength of the defence, doubtless owing to German influence, lay largely in machine-guns. Their entry into action was not a surprise, for the enemy were aware of their arrival in the country; and they were used on two occasions only, at the second and third battles of Gaza, on April 17 and Nov. i 1917, all the machines taking part.

Though the tasks set before them at both battles would have been more suitable to a force of machines five times their number, they rendered in each case great assistance and saved much loss of life. As a result of their help, which was greatly appreciated by the infantry, who were, of course, chiefly affected, an effort was made early in 1918 to obtain a number of " Whippet " machines for action against the Turkish rear-guard during the further advance. But this demand synchronized with the German offensive on March 21, and no machines could be spared for a theatre peculiarly suited to them.

So far an outline has been given of the main tank operations, and the development and expansion of the unit. The former showed a gradual increase of the scale on which recourse was had to the machines, and an elaboration in the preparations made and the tactics applied. From the 49 fighting tanks which were allotted to the attack at Cambrai, the number rose to 580 of all types at Amiens nearly two years later, the latter being the greatest British tank action fought. And, according to the preparations which were being made at the time of the Armistice, any great offensive in 1919 would have been conducted with thousands of British tanks alone, leaving out of consideration the equally large numbers of French and German machines that would have been engaged.

By Aug. and Sept. 1918 the type of heavy fighting machine had been improved in design, reliability and speed, and a faster medium tank had been introduced. Measures had also been taken to equip, for cross country work, all the battle services for the tanks. There were fighting tanks; supply tanks, to carry up ammunition, drinking water and stores; gun-carrier tanks, used for the same purpose, as well as for conveying artillery and trench mortars, both sometimes dragging sledges similarly oaded; wireless signal tanks; salvage tanks; all working on a coordinated system toward the maintenance or pressure on the enemy with the maximum of efficiency. And to assist in doing
 * his there was a complete repair organization, the central work-

shops, with its advanced stores and salvage companies. For a major operation, the system of attacking with a small number of machines divided up into separate detachments had been aban- doned and the proper tactics of mass attack in as large force as Dossible in definite formations to meet different conditions, with reserves to keep up the advance, had been adopted. Signal