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In the field, though there was still considerable doubt as to the value of tanks, the next six months, from Oct. 1916, were, as had been said, a period of expansion, organization and'traini'ng and preparation for the operations of 1917. The training was always handicapped by the paucity of machines; and it was found necessary not only to educate the members of th(? new arm itself but also other arms and the staff. Headquarters, schools and rest camps and the usual organization of a large unit were established. The next action in which the tanks took part was the battle of Arras on April 9, when an attack was carried out by the I., III. and V. Armies in order to penetrate the German line by a sudden blow and allow of an army corps and two divisions of cavalry to break through. From the point of view of tanks it does not require much comment. Only 60 machines were available, and they were again not employed in

FIG. 7. Medium Mark A. or " Whippet " Tank.

a mass for a quick penetration but for " mopping up " oper- ations along the whole front. 1 More complete preparations were made for their cooperation than at the Somme. The battle was prepared by a prolonged bombardment, and was also pre- ceded by heavy rain at the last moment, which combined to produce a sea of mud pitted with craters. The Vimy Ridge was captured by a rush of the Canadians which rendered tanks un- necessary, and on other parts of the front they had varying success, but gave valuable assistance. Against Bullecourt on the nth, where they attacked without artillery preparation in the snow, the attack was a failure, though two tanks pene- trated five miles behind the German front line, when they were captured. Fighting continued till the 22nd. The cavalry were prevented from breaking through by the usual obstacles barbed wire and machine-guns. It was on the first day of the fight that the first German " tank trap " was discovered con- sisting of a deep covered-in pit. Again the main lesson learned was that tanks should be used in mass and not dispersed. After this battle an expansion of the Heavy Branch, Machine-Gun Corps, from 9 to 18 battalions (nine of heavy tanks and nine of medium machines) was decided on. But at the end of June this expansion was suspended owing to shortage of man-power, as it was apparently not yet realized to what extent the tanks reduced casualties. Before the next action, the battle of Mes- sines, a certain number of the new Mark IV. tanks had been received and several of the old Mark I. and Mark II. machines had been converted into supply tanks for carrying tank stores to the fighting machines, a very great advantage the want of which had previously been much felt. In the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, which started on June 7, 76 Mark [V. and 12 supply tanks took part. The operations in this case ipproximated to the " assault " in the old form of siege warfare md depended mostly on an intense bombardment, lasting from May 28 to June 7, and the explosion of 20 large mines. During

" Mopping up " consisted of disposing of small bodies of the
 * nemy, especially such as had escaped the bombardment and allowed
 * ne first line of the assault to pass them.

the infantry advance on Wytschaete the creeping barrage proved so effective that tanks were only necessary at different spots to overcome individual machine-guns. They advanced in two lines, the first of 40 machines, going forward at zero (dawn), and the second, of 34 machines, at 3 P.M. to the Oosttaverne line, where their help was very valuable. Apart from the de- bated point whether the third battle of Ypres should ever have been fought or not, the work of the tanks in it needs still less comment than at Arras or Messines. In spite of remarkable feats accomplished by them, especially the capture of the Cock- croft, a nest of strong points, on Aug. 19 with a loss of 15 in- fantry, it was, on the whole so far as they were concerned, a failure, and a failure which was inevitable and to be expected under the conditions which existed. They had to act in a low- lying area which had been converted into a potential swamp through the destruction of the drainage system by the artillery of both sides, rendered still worse by the churning up of the surface into a wilderness of craters, which were filled by heavy rain just before the battle. The only means of approach across this morass were the causeways, which were naturally kept con- tinuously under fire by the enemy. Preceded by many days of intense bombardment the attack commenced on July 31, and as it continued the rain made matters worse. That tanks should have been expected to function under such conditions, when, independently of the enemy's action, even the infantry were unable to move forward, is astonishing. It shows that those responsible for the decision to employ them were ignorant either of the situation or the limitations of the machines, or both.

It was not till Nov. 20, when the tanks had been in France over a year, that they were given an opportunity of showing of what they were capable when employed on a large scale, in a manner calculated to exploit their peculiar attributes, and under favourable conditions. As this was a turning-point in the his- tory of the new weapon it is of importance that it be described in detail.

During 1916 and the greater part of 1917 the tanks had been thrown into the fight in dispersed detachments to assist in over- coming certain points of resistance, and somewhat casually as an aid to the attacking infantry. The conditions, also, had usually been such as to render success doubtful, sometimes im- possible, and in any case of a minor nature. In several instances they had succeeded in achieving their immediate object and had undoubtedly saved many lives. In others they had failed. As a consequence it was seriously discussed whether tanks should not be abandoned as useless.

But those responsible for the Tank Corps (the name of the unit had been changed to " Tank Corps " at the end of June) lad been concerned in thinking out an operation which would not only be strategically valuable, but would enable the corps definitely to prove its worth and establish a confidence in itself, which, never very marked on the part of General Headquarters, lad recently been much shaken. Broadly, the scheme consisted n launching without any preliminary bombardment a surprise attack on a large scale with as many tanks as possible over round suitable for their action, i.e. reasonably hard soil which lad not been shelled to pieces. The area chosen was that near Dambrai, in the re-entrant of the Canal d'Escaut between ilibecourt, Crevecoeur, and Banteux, which consisted of almost unshellcd rolling downs of chalk. The attack was originally ntended to be of the nature of a " raid " (this was not adhered o in its execution) carried out by an advance at dawn of three ines of tanks, the first of which would make straight for the enemy's guns, previously bombed from the air, to be followed up >y the second and third; artillery cooperation to be confined to counter-battery work and the destruction of communications ,nd depots, etc., behind the German front line. The essential x>ints of the plan were surprise and speed. The project was >ut forward and approved, and the result was the battle of Cam- >rai, which took place on Nov. 20?

1 The action as fought was in almost every detail the execution of he plan put forward officially for the employment of the tanks ay Col. Swinton in Feb. 1916, 22 months previously.