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productive of valuable lessons, but they were obtained at the cost of discounting the future. It was in the face of a consider- able amount of scepticism that the machines took their place in the battle-line, and those who did not believe in them, without looking beyond the lack of any startling success achieved on a great scale, were not slow in their condemnation. But one thing the tank had definitely proved: The machine-gun and the barbed wire entanglement no longer ruled the infantry battle. In the tank, still experimental and imperfect as it was, they had found their master. At last attacking infantry could meet the defence on more than equal terms.

On the part of the tanks themselves there was mechanical failure of machines, which were the first of their kind, tried under more difficult conditions than those which they had been designed to meet. The specification in which they had been constructed had been based on the requirements of the spring of 1915 at a time when the pro- longed shelling, such as in 1916 and later rendered whole tracts al- most impassable even by infantry, was undreamt of. At the Somme the tanks had to cross a dry " crumped " area, and at the Ancre a combination of " crumped " area and morass. There were, in addi- tion, breakdowns due to faulty design and to the unexpected wear and tear of certain parts of the machinery, which only experience could have shown should have been of special material and which were, moreover, practically worn out by practice and demonstrations before the action. Failures were also due to the lack of time for the complete training and practice of the crews ; to insufficient prepara- tion in the way of reconnaissance and supply services, which for such complicated machines necessitated very complete organization. On the other hand, many of the commanders at whose disposal tanks were placed had no idea of their capabilities, weaknesses or limitations. Nevertheless, the outstanding brilliant exploits of single machines which did not break down, the great saving of life for which the tanks as a whole were responsible, and the demoralizing effect of their appearance on the enemy and the great encouragement afforded to the British infantry, clearly showed that the machines were sound in principle, only needing improvement in detail, and that those handling them required more experience in this new form of warfare.

As a result of its trial it was decided that the new Ann should not only continue, but should be expanded to a force of 1,000 tanks. After the fighting on the Ancre the unit did not again go into action till April of the following year, which allowed of a period for expansion, reorganization and training, and the incor- poration of improvements to machines. 1 The expansion of the Heavy Branch of the Machine-Gun Corps was to be on the follow- ing lines: there was to be a fighting headquarters in France and an administrative headquarters in England. 2 The six original com- panies were to be expanded to four battalions in France and the two companies at home to five battalions, or nine battalions in all. The unit therefore reverted to its original battalion organiza- tion. It was eventually to comprise three brigades, each of three battalions, each battalion of three companies and a workshop, each company consisting of four fighting sections of five tanks each and a headquarters section of four tanks, or 72 tanks to a battalion. The number of tanks per section was shortly after- wards reduced to four, making 20 per company or 60 per battal- ion. These brigades were formed at the beginning of 1917, and the organization continued unchanged until June, but though the personnel was being raised and trained as far as possible on this extended scale, the supply of tanks did not keep pace, so much so that on April i, when it was decided that the tanks should take part in the battle of Arras, only 60 Mark I. and Mark II. machines could be counted on for action.

In Feb. 1916, when the original Mark I. tank was still in its experimental stage, designs had been got out for a Mark II. machine and a Mark III. machine, both of which were slightly improved Mark I. tanks. After the Somme battle certain mod- ifications which were found necessary were incorporated, and in

1 The most important improvement was the improvised " un- ditching beam " which was introduced to assist a tank to extricate itself when stuck. In the later types a specially designed contrivance was part of the equipment of the machine.

2 Lt.-Col. (afterwards Maj.-Gen.) H. J. Elles, R.E., was appointed colonel commanding the unit in France, Bng.-Gen. F. Gore Anley being appointed administrative commander of the tank training centre in England on Nov. 9. In May 1917 Brig.-Gen. Anley was succeeded by Maj.-Gen. Sir J. E. Capper. The training centre was moved to Bovington in Dorset.

Oct., in order to keep up continuity of supply, orders were given for 50 machines of each type (making 250 tanks ordered in all) pending the decision on the design for the 1,000 asked for by the army, in Sept. The chief improvements consisted of the aban- donment of the tail, as already mentioned; the addition of " spuds," or fins, to the track plates, to give a better grip; and the provision of improved rollers. The Mark III. machines were also intended to have thicker armour to resist the " K " bullet. In regard to the 1,000 new tanks preliminary orders to collect material were given to the manufacturers in Sept. At the end of the month when it was learnt that these machines could not be ready by March i (partly owing to the manufac- ture of spare parts necessary for the existing tanks), the demand was cancelled, but was renewed two weeks later. This is men-

FIG. 3. Mark IV. Tank.

tioned to show that military opinion as to the advisability of pro- ceeding with the new weapon was not unanimously favourable. The 1,000 machines were to be of the type known as the Mark IV., which was a much improved Mark I. tank. It was then anticipated that this number could be delivered by the end of June. Owing to various difficulties this estimate was not ful- filled, but sufficient machines reached France in time to equip two battalions for the attack on Messines in May; and it was the standard British tank during 1917 and 1918.

FIG. 4. Mark IV. Tank.

The Mark IV. tank (see figs. 3 and 4). The first advance from the original weapon was the same in size and general design, with certain improvements. There was no tail. The track rollers were better. The sponsons could be housed within the tank for rail transport. The Lewis machine-gun was installed instead of the Hotchkiss machine-gun (this was not an improvement and was reversed later). A better radiator was fitted and also a silencer. The width of the driver's cab was increased to allow of wider track shoes. The petrol tanks were placed outside the tank at the stern. A short 6- pdr. gun was adopted. Detachable spuds were fitted to the tracks, and unditching gear provided. The entrances and exits were more accessible.

During the Verdun offensive early in 1916 it had occurred to those responsible for the production of the fighting tank that one reason why the Germans had been unable to keep up the initial pressure of their attack was their inability to bring up their artillery and ammunition over the shelled and entrenched area so as to keep pace with their advance; and that if they had been in possession of guns mounted on self-propelled carriages, or carriers pn caterpillar tracks, it would have assisted them greatly. A design was therefore prepared in July of a " gun- carrying " tank (see fig. 5), to carry a 6o-pdr. gun or 6-in. how- itzer which could be fired from the tank if necessary or con- veyed by the tank and fired from the ground. Of these machines,