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reserve of weapons available and the chief source of the great in- crease revealed in the strength of the defensive. The pre-war policy of the Germans was justified in the event. It was the combination of this weapon with barbed wire as initiated by them that suggested the need for the tank. And it was its inten- sive application and elaboration after the opposing armies had crystallized in two continuous closely opposing lines of care- fully entrenched positions extending from the sea to Switzer- land, that eventually brought the tank into being.

BRITISH TANKS

Early in Oct. 1914, it was borne in on the mind of a British officer who had special opportunities for ascertaining what was actually occurring, that the frontal assault of prepared positions, especially when adequate artillery cooperation was not available, had become impossible unless some more effective assistance could be rendered to the infantry than that previously con- templated and accepted as adequate; that this assistance in the absence of gun power and ammunition sufficient to blast a way through the whole enemy system of defences trenches, obsta- cles and machine-guns should consist of some protected power- driven machine which could force itself through barbed wire, climb across trenches and destroy by gunfire or crush by its weight the machine-guns of the defence. Knowing of the exist- ence and cross-country capabilities of the American Holt cater- pillar tractor, it occurred to him that a specially designed machine developed on similar lines would be the solution of the problem. This officer, Lt.-Col. (later Maj.-Gen.) E. D. Swinton, R.E., at that time acting as official military correspondent (" Eye- witness") with the British Expeditionary Force, was the first officially to put forward a scheme for a caterpillar machine-gun destroyer, in a communication to the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence in London on Oct. 20 1914.' Though the machine then contemplated and finally evolved was for the pur- pose of giving infantry protection when advancing, it was ex- pressly designed to do this indirectly, by its own offensive and destructive action. It was definitely intended, and designed, for the express purpose of forcing its way through wire and crossing trenches and hunting for machine-guns in order to destroy them by shell fire or to crush them by passing over them. The only "protection" using the word in its limited, and more usually accepted sense afforded by it was that of its bullet-proof sides to its own fighting crew. This point is accentuated because of the misconceptions which have existed as to the r61c of the tank, chiefly as to its being an armoured vehicle for transporting men, or a mobile shield to give cover to those moving up behind it. It did in fact perform this latter service, but only incidentally, in its quest for machine-guns. Machines for carrying up bodies of infantry and stores were not actually developed until three years later as an extension of the principle. As will be seen, the necessity for finding some mechanical method of carrying troops under cover across country had already occurred inde- pendently to a French officer. And in England similar sug- gestions were put forward, also independently, by Lt. R. F. Macfie, in Aug., and Lt. B. J. F. Bentley in Oct. 1914.

The history of the tank from Oct. 1914, until it took the field 23 months later, and even afterwards, is a record of prog- ress made often in the face of apathy, scepticism and even oppo- sition. This is typical of the history of the evolution of most inventions or new ideas, but is somewhat remarkable in this instance because the subject was one of vital urgency imme- diately concerning the lives of the British troops in the field. It is also remarkable for another reason. The idea of this land weapon not only received its first help toward realization from the minister responsible for the navy, but its realization was, indeed, only rendered possible by the financial support given by him from naval funds. The gist of the suggestion made to the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence in Oct. 1914 was put forward by him in a memorandum and reached the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, who was

1 For the origin of the tank see the Minutes of the Proceedings before the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, Oct. 1919.

predisposed towards experiments in the direction of some me- chanical armoured device for carrying troops across country, to take the place of the armoured motor car which could only operate on roads. A certain number of these cars, belonging to the armoured car section of the Royal Naval Air Service, organized by the Admiralty, had been operating in France and Belgium, and their utility had become seriously curtailed by the destruction of the roads and the state of trench warfare which had arisen. In Jan. 1915, the First Lord, to whom the employ- ment of mobile bullet-proof shields had already been suggested, took up the question of the urgent need for methods of meeting the deadlock reached on land, and his views were officially brought to the notice of the army authorities. He did not, how- ever, only place the matter before the military. He caused researches to be made in the direction of crossing trenches by means of tractors carrying portable bridges, and in Feb. sum- moned a special Admiralty expert committee under the chair- manship of Mr. (later Sir) E. H. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, the) Director of Naval Construction, to explore further the subject of mechanical cross-country transport generally. This commit- tee at once started work and continued its labour for some time, experimenting chiefly in the direction of "landships" with large wheels, coupled steam rollers, pcdrail and caterpillar tractors, single and articulated, for which suggestions had been put forward by different individuals. The underlying idea of all these investigations was the production of a machine for : the conveyance of troops, not a machine-gun destroyer.

Previous to the receipt of the First Lord's views, the need of a specific machine-gun destroyer had been urged on the War Office directly by Col. Swinton early in Jan. 1915, followed by repre- sentations fron Capt. Tulloch. The War Office took the matter up, but did not associate itself with outside technical experts to investigate possibilities, as had been recommended. After the trial and failure in Feb. of a Holt caterpillar tractor to cross obstacles which it was not designed to negotiate, and that of a wheeled tractor with the naval trench bridging device in May, it dropped the whole idea as impracticable. Meanwhile the Ad- miralty committee had continued its experiments, though with- out knowledge of the conditions of the military problems it was required to solve. In June, the War Office, then aware of the Admiralty's activities, became desirous of collaborating in them, and a joint naval and military committee was formed. The efforts of the Admiralty thus obtained the first official recogni- tion of the service for whose benefit it was really working. At the end of the month the committee was furnished by the War Office with a detailed specification of the requirements of the destroyer as prepared by Col. Swinton and forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief in France, and the Admiralty designers were for the first time in a position to apply their inventive fac- ulties to fulfilling certain definite conditions. The result of their efforts was the production in Jan. 1916 of an experimental machine paid for entirely from naval funds and produced almost entirely by naval agency, which was the prototype of all British machines. The chief point of its design, and on which it differed from other caterpillar machines, was its rhomboidal shape and all- round track, which were the invention of Lt. (later Lt.-Col.) W. G. Wilson, of the Admiralty landships committee, working in conjunction with Mr. (later Sir) W. Tritton. This machine, afterwards known as the Mark I. Tank, successfully underwent its official trials on Feb. 2. 2

As has been said, at the beginning of the war the solution of the problem of enabling a frontal attack on trenches to be car- ried out had been thought to lie very largely in bombardment by artillery. But the futility of the limited bombardment by field guns with shrapnel shell, which was all that was possible for some months even against such comparatively weak defences as the Germans at first held, became apparent. Then, in reply to

in Dec. 1915 to the experimental machine under construction, then known as a " landship," in a report by a sub-committee of the committee of Imperial Defence. It was suggested by two officers connected with that committee. The experimental machine was afterwards known as Big Willie, and, though a male, as " Mother.
 * For purposes of secrecy the name " Tank " had been applied