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battle-field. Meanwhile Germany introduced her heavy field howitzer and England her long-range field gun. The probable effect of these new factors in war were weighed, discussed and fairly accurately foreseen. But surprise came elsewhere, for the factor which was neglected was the power of the railways to maintain in the field such armies as the world had never beheld, with what we can now see was only the natural corollary field fortifications impregnable to the material which armies then possessed, and by their strength and extent rendering impossible both envelopment and penetration. The truth is that it is less difficult to find the correct answer to the questions which are asked by history, experience and such foresight as we possess, than to foretell and ask the really vital questions.

III. THE ART OF LEADERSHIP

So far we have dealt almost entirely with the mechanism of war, the tactics of 1914-8, and possible future developments. There remains the all-important subject of command, and the qualities which go to make a great commander the human element for without true leadership arms and equipment and even training will achieve but little. " With a great general no action is executed which is the fruit of chance or fortune; every- thing is the result of combination and talent " (Napoleon's War Maxims, No. 82). Such was the considered opinion of the great master of war, and it can be confidently asserted that nothing has happened since he fought his last, and perhaps his most wonderful, campaign in 1815 to shake it. Surely no com- mander ever took greater risks than did Napoleon in the series of operations which ended at Waterloo, but they were the result of careful study and calculation and they came near to victory over almost double his numbers. Even now who can say what might have happened but for failure of his physical power and energy at the most critical moments, for surely England and Europe were never in greater danger than during the forty-eight hours after the Prussians had been beaten on the field of Ligny. How curious to reflect that a little more than a hundred years later the descendants of those who stood at Waterloo should have fought out another campaign on a vastly greater scale but on very similar lines and on ground not very far distant. The combatants were differently grouped, it is true, but the German blow in March 1918 was directed at the junction of the Allied armies, this time the British and the French, just as in 1815 the French blow was struck at the junction between Wellington and Blucher. Once again the British army was based on north- ern ports, while her ally was based on inland territory; once more the allies were for a time in danger of retiring along diver- gent lines and perhaps of defeat in detail. Numbers and weap- ons were different from those of 1813, but the main features of the campaign and the principles upon which it was fought out were the same. So true it is that the principles of war are sim- ple and eternal, but the application of them varies in each par- ticular case. Never yet has there been a great commander who has not read and thought deeply about his art in order that, by training his instinct on the right lines, he may decide correctly when the supreme hour arrives. It is not in order .that we may master the principles of war that Napoleon has advised us to
 * " read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Gus-

tavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick," but in order that we May " obtain the secrets of the art of war," and those secrets lie in application.

How strange, too, that of the great names which will go down
 * o history in connexion with the campaign of 1918 two at least

ire those of men who had seen little or nothing of war before 1914 Foch and Ludendorff. For more than forty years Foch lad no experience of anything but peace soldiering; Ludendorff icard an enemy's rifles and saw his own men drop for the first
 * ime in his life near Vise on Aug. 4 1914. Both had mastered

)f the study. Each in his own way was an artist, but of the two t Was Foch who had the inspiration, " the fire in his belly," vhich is the sign of the true master. Yet it is not enough to ollow the movements even of these two, for all wars will not be
 * :very detail of their art, not in the open field but in the solitude

xxxn. 22

fought either with the numbers or the weapons of 1918 any more than with the weapons and over the extent of ground of 1815. Something between the two may be found to be nearer to the normal, but when due allowance is made for later inven- tion, surely no campaign is better worth studying than this of 1815. Fought out between two great captains in the space of a few days and over a few miles of country, it forms a very epit- ome of war in all its branches. The doubt up to the last moment as to Napoleon's intentions; the strategical surprise; a concentrated force with one line of communication operating between two forces with divergent lines; the handling of D'Erlon's force and the attempt to effect a concentration on the battle- field at Ligny; the British and Belgian rearguard action at Quatre Bras and the retreat to Waterloo; Wellington's masterly disposition of troops as contrasted with Blucher's two days earlier; his telling use of advance posts, Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, breaking up Napoleon's massed attacks; the con- centration of forces on the field and the great counter-stroke against Napoleon's right and rear, so largely the result of Blucher's loyalty and force of character; finally the stupendous defeat, the inevitable result of this most difficult manoeuvre when successfully accomplished, as it was here, at Koniggratz and on one or two other occasions in history; and the relentless pursuit. They were indeed crowded days of glory. And then Wellington's characteristic comment: "A damned serious busi- ness. Blucher and I have lost 30,000 men. It has been a damned nice thing, the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. ... By God! I don't think it would have done if I had not been there." 1

Since those days Moltke has perfected the art of marching to the battle-field, of concentration by many different roads upon a single objective, and we have seen the same manoeuvre devel- oped under more difficult circumstances at Liao-yang. Arising from Moltke's tactics, so closely followed by Oyama in Man- churia, there have been many fierce disputes upon the compara- tive virtues of envelopment and penetration on the battle-field. Yet all these theories, these varying systems and bitter discus- sions, are based upon one solid foundation, the development of fire; for from the days of the long-bow to those of the modern tank it is to the development of fire that all changes in tactics are directly due. To-day, more than ever before, the power of developing fire is in the hands of the commander who seizes and retains the initiative. This he may do either through superior readiness for war and quicker mobilization, through a better strategical plan, or through superior numbers. In any case he will require superiority in the air, and better, more numerous or more skilfully handled covering troops, cavalry and rapid tanks. Decisive battle will be the object, and the experience of the World War would appear to prove that quick decision can only be obtained through envelopment. Converging lines of com- munication drawn from widely separated bases may then be a positive advantage, especially since the rapid means of com- munication now available have overcome much of their danger. Moreover, so devastating is the effect of converging or enfilade fire from modern weapons that the troops exposed to it are in deadly danger. An attacking force, it is true, may conceal an exposed flank by the skilful use of smoke, but not so the defend- ing force, and the increased range and rapidity of modern arms are on the side of the attack rather than of the defence. Each commander will, therefore, strive with all his energy and will power to secure the initiative at the outset of a campaign; every artifice will be used and every engine will be employed. Sooner or later, however, one or other of the combatants will be forced to the defensive, but, if he is master of his art he will not resign himself to his fate any more than did Wellington and Blucher in 1815 or Joffre in 1914. He will devote all his skill and resource to recovering his freedom of action and to assuming that domination over events which will enable him, in his turn, to impose his will upon his adversary.

This change of fortune can only be brought about by a tactical counter-stroke, exactly as was done by the Entente armies in

1 The Creevy Papers, vol. i., chap. x.