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after Koniggratz was that the battle had been " exactly like the last manoeuvres." Something of the same kind might conceiv- ably have been said of Mons or Le Cateau, but certainly not of the Marne or of the first battle of Ypres; still less of the Somme, the German offensive of 1918 or of Aug. 8. For many reasons manoeuvres can only last for a strictly limited time, whereas modern battles are almost unlimited in length; for the same reasons troops can be employed only in limited, instead of un- limited, numbers; while for other reasons the convenience of the civil population outweighs the demand for military instruc- tion. To such an extent did civil requirements outweigh military that up to the outbreak of war British troops were not allowed to sleep even in barns or outhouses, although billeting is a most necessary, and by no means easy, military exercise, ignorance and inexperience of which subsequently caused the British army much suffering and fatigue. How infinitely more difficult will it now be to produce anything which shall in any way represent the conditions of a modern battle-field, with trenches, wire entanglements, smoke screens, gas attacks, barrages, aeroplanes and tanks! The thing simply cannot be done. Manoeuvres will still be a valuable means of training up to a certain stage; but that stage will be far short of the reality, and must be supplemented in the general staffs by imaginative thought.

That is the first difficulty to be overcome. In the second place invention, which has received so great a stimulus since 1914, will not now stand still. The vital importance of the general staff keeping in close touch with the best and most progressive scientific thought of the day, either through the inventions board, or through any other form of " liaison," can, therefore, require no emphasis. If anything is clear as to the course of future wars between civilized countries it is that suc- cess at the outset is half way to ultimate victory. If through more rapid mobilization, a better strategical plan, or both, one side can seize the initiative and drive it home by early tactical success it will be in a winning position from the start. It can- not be denied that, owing to the foundations laid by Moltke, the superstructure built by Schlieffen, and the attention which had for years been paid to the possibilities of machine-gun fire, Germany held an advantage in 1914 which was only wrested from her by " the miracle of the Marne " and by the fact that her ammunition supplies failed her just as did those of England and France. Had German leadership, equipment and tactics in 1914 been equal to those of 1918 it is difficult to believe that Paris would not have fallen in spite of the genius of French and British commanders. And so it seems probable that the next war will open with even greater suddenness and greater violence than the last, with more efficient engines of destruction and more rapid movement. The country that would have its tactical development keep pace with science must, therefore, be pre- pared to spend money upon experiment; its general staff should have its research department; tactical training and scientific research should together form the latest new Model Army. Indeed, just as during the war every army commander had on his staff his meteorological expert and his chemical adviser, so surely the general staff in peace should have its chemical depart- ment, for it is not impossible that the chemist may become as important in war as in every great industrial enterprise.

But there is yet a third reason why future wars will certainly produce unpleasant surprises which may even be revolutionary in their nature. By the Treaty of Versailles the German army was reduced to 100,000 men, but it could not alter the fact that Germany's central position in Europe placed her in a situation in which she believed that she must trust to arms for her exis- tence or go under in the struggle. She has also been trained in the belief that offence is the surest defence. Except that Poland had taken the place of Russia on Germany's eastern frontier, and that the Austrian Empire had disappeared, the military problems of Central Europe remained in 1921 much what they were before 1914. Germany was still an ambitious, industrious nation, with 60,000,000 well-educated and intelli- gent citizens. On the one frontier lies France, and on the other Poland, both with large armies, and neither of them particularly

friendly to Germany. In these circumstances it was only reasonable to assume that her policy would be to avoid war, at least for many years to come. At the same time it was clearly evident that her military problems must give rise to very anxious thought. This spectacle of a rich, densely populated country with an army regulated by treaty is, it is true, not en- ' tirely new. The same thing happened after Jena, but with the difference that Germany was not then either rich or densely populated. Nevertheless an answer was found to the restrictions imposed by Napoleon. It need not be the same answer this time, precautions against that having been taken, but there is the alternative that Germany's effort may be to compensate for the numerical weakness imposed upon her by scientific equip- ment and by bringing new forces into play. The World War showed beyond doubt that, given good leaders, a mass of un- trained human beings could quickly be converted into an efficient fighting force. Germany's military aim will, therefore, naturally be to train the 100,000 men she keeps in peace-time to become highly efficient leaders in war. Her war budget will be high per man, for the army must be recruited on a voluntary basis; yet the total sum will not be great compared to that of other countries, and money will be available exactly for those purposes of research and experiment which are seen to be so highly important. Many years must elapse before Europe can have recovered sufficiently from the results of the World War to reproduce the conditions of 1914; and perhaps by that time her peoples may have realized the futility of war as a solution for differences of opinion or interest; but in this respect history is far from encouraging, and all the time there will be in the cen- tre of Europe a nation whose soldiers are thinking out war problems on lines which must inevitably be quite different from those followed by their neighbours. Hitherto all the military nations have thought along similar lines. Sometimes one and sometimes another has thrown up a great genius, the product of whose mind had placed his own country at an advantage; but here we have an entirely new set of problems, the solution of which may lead to new and startling results.

In 1921 there were thus three important factors rendering it more than ordinarily difficult to penetrate the obscurity of the future. First, the impossibility of reproducing in peace-time the conditions of the battle-field as we actually know them; secondly, the effect of scientific research upon tactical evolution; thirdly, the peculiar position of Germany and its repercussion upon military thought. Other factors doubtless exist, for the opening stages of every war bring their own peculiar surprises. All that can be done is so to arrange plans that they may not be too rigid, and may if necessary be adapted to meet the unexpected, just as Joffre in 1914, surprised by the extent and weight of the German turning movement through Belgium, switched his own reserves to his extreme left and produced the counter-stroke of the Marne and the Ourcq. This is merely an example culled rather from strategy than tactics, but it serves to illustrate the fact that, in war, the great contest between brain and brain, it is the unforeseen which happens. The real difficulty is to antic- ipate the problem rather than to solve it. Never in the history of the world have tactical problems received such close attention and study as during the years just prior to 1914. With one great war just finished and the shadow of another hanging heavily over Europe, discussions on strategy and tactics filled the columns of newspapers and magazines not only of the pro- fessional but also of the general press. The general staffs of all nations worked out theories and doctrines of war, and the official handbooks gave the armies the considered opinions of the best military brains in each country. The conflicting sys- tems of envelopment and penetration were weighed and con- sidered, with the result that military training could be classified in two clearly defined systems, sometimes called for convenience the French and the German. The real value and capabilities of quick-firing artillery and the necessary infantry formations with which to meet it were thrashed out in theory, and so far as possible by experiment, for, although the French " 75 " was already an old gun, its effects had never really been tested on the