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artillery equipment, fast-moving tanks should give to cavalry or mounted infantry an invaluable reinforcement in fire power. It is the weakness of mounted troops that whenever they are called upon to use fire one-fourth of the personnel is out of action, merely taking care of their horses; and this at the critical moment of action. No such disability handicaps the tanks, whose fire power is great in proportion to the personnel employed. They will, therefore, supply exactly the factor in which mounted troops are necessarily weak, while their own peculiar drawback, vulnerability to fire from artillery or specially constructed rifles, will be of little account. Mechanical difficulties, from heat and other causes (for the strain upon the crew in a closely confined space is always great), they will certainly have, but these should not be insuperable and may be disregarded. A mixed force of tanks and mounted troops should therefore have just that combination of mobility and fire power which is neces- sary to allow civilized troops to make free use of space that is, to manoeuvre freely and confidently against an uncivilized or ill-equipped enemy before his -moral has been shaken.

Exactly the same arguments apply to tanks acting with infantry and artillery in a formal attack against an uncivilized enemy in position. The mere fact that such an enemy does not himself possess tanks will add enormously to the moral effect of their appearance, and should go far toward rendering an 1 artillery preparation or bombardment of any kind unnecessary. If this is so, surprise becomes much more simple; and surprise is, as always, the strongest weapon of the attack. It is evident, therefore, that at every stage the older arms will be wonderfully strengthened by new inventions, yet it cannot be claimed that even in second- or third-class warfare science has yet succeeded in producing anything entirely to take the place of the man and the horse; for the man and the horse are, after all, the only pieces of mechanism which are adaptable to varying circum- stances, yet perfect in themselves and directed by an individual intelligence. Science then does not as yet supersede the most prim- itive factors in war, but where one side has the monopoly of its products (or even only of some of them) there should be economy of effort, and consequently of life, which should enable the civilized army to be always on the offensive and to force a favourable decision with great rapidity.

Lessons of 1914-8. To sum up, then, the experiences of the past war and the effects of the latest discoveries, it would seem that at first the defensive proved to be a far stronger form of warfare than had been anticipated, because, owing to dense populations and good communications, armies could hold continuous lines, with no open flanks. Frontal attacks of the most pronounced kind became unavoidable, and months and even years passed before the attack regained its ascendency. In these conditions there was no scope for the mounted arm, and even the infantry returned to the most primitive form of war- fare. Rifle-fire was useless, for it could not kill, and fire which does not kill is wasted. It was then that the infantry had recourse to the bayonet and the bomb, and the long-range fighting of S. Africa ceased .to be. Instead, for three whole years infantry tactics were on a lower and less scientific plane than in the Manchurian War, which, in the opinion of many soldiers, was fought out on altogether a lower plane than the S. African War which preceded it. Meanwhile ever-growing demands were made upon the artillery, not only for increased weight of pro- jectile and volume of fire, but for a degree of accuracy which had never before been considered necessary or even possible. So far did the dependence of the infantryman upon artillery support extend that there were some who advocated the abolition of the rifle altogether, since it could no longer kill. Then came two vitally important inventions first, the instantaneous fuze, which deprived wire of much of its terror, and then tanks, with their combination of mobility and- fire. With tanks and artillery, infantry recovered its power of movement, and with movement the rifle recovered its position, for trenches had lost their protective value and once more it could kill in the open. In less civilized warfare we can see that on a narrow space like the Gallipoli peninsula continuous lines were possible, but elsewhere

space gave freedom for movement, fire was supreme, and the victor imposed his will by crushing the enemy's field armies. In both forms of warfare it was proved once more that in the end infantry is still the queen of battle, but requires ever more assistance from the other arms and from science.

Now, in this very question of the influence of scientific discovery upon tactics, the World War has taught us much. But need the experience have been quite so bitter? No doubt it is easy to be wise after the event, but we should learn little if we allowed ourselves to be convinced that we were perfectly wise before it. To take only one instance, the enormous expenditure of gun ammunition during the opening weeks of the war had the effect of entirely using up all reserves within a very short time after the opening of hostilities. It is now no secret that by the end of the first battle of Ypres the British artillery was practically without ammunition; guns were rare enough, but even the few there were had nothing to fire. And this was true of all armies. It was not only the weather which stopped the fighting in the middle of Nov.; it was, as well, largely the fact that infantry was almost deprived of artillery support. Moreover, it was just this period of respite which enabled the armies to dig themselves in, and to organize those systems of field fortification which for so long defied assault. Now, this deficiency was due to two causes. In the first place to a short-sighted economy, always in favour of running a risk in order to avoid unpleasant parliamen- tary criticism and this tendency exists in all countries; in the second place, it was due to a tendency, which is also universal, to devote too much attention to the past and too little to the future. It is so easy to follow Napoleon's advice, to read and reread the campaigns of the great commanders; it is so easy to store the mind with facts and figures; but it is so difficult to apply the knowledge acquired to the requirements of the future and to breathe life into Dryasdust. This is, perhaps, the most difficult task of the general staffs, which all nations had by iQ2r established more or less upon the Moltke model. Every great army has its inventions board, whose duty it is to sift the corn from a vast quantity of useless chaff; but the real trouble is to foresee what the tactical effect of any new discovery may be and how to turn it to advantage upon the field of battle. It is easy to learn by experience, but wonderfully difficult to prophesy. Some instances there have been, notably Wellington's confidence that, with the weapons he had, he could dare to go into battle in new formations giving him unprecedented fire power. By his penetrating insight he gained a very definite advantage over men whose experience in European warfare was infinitely greater than his own, and, by breaking away from the stereotyped lines rendered classic by Frederick the Great and even by Napoleon, British infantry gained a tactical advantage which they retained until Waterloo. It was exactly the same firm and traditional belief in the efficacy of rifle-fire which won the first battle of Ypres, for at least in this respect nothing approaching the training of the British Expeditionary Force had ever been seen in European armies. Similarly, it was Moltke's realization of the power of improved weapons and other developments of science that was the origin of his idea of envelopment, whereby he revolutionized German tactics and crushed the armies of Austria and France. Both commanders took risks which are now difficult to realize, but both were justified, not only by their own victories, but by subsequent history. Wellington and Moltke both had their critics, but there is no one who now doubts the wisdom of linear formations or enveloping tactics.

It is unfortunately impossible to produce a Wellington or a Moltke at will, but the application of the lessons of history to the requirements of the future is at least as important and needs at least as much study as the facts themselves. With each step forward and as science renders more and more services to the great art of war the future becomes more difficult to forecast. In the first place it is evident that, as war becomes more complex, peace manoeuvres must become less and less realistic. It is related that Frederick the Great regularly rehearsed the move- ments with which he intended to beat the Austrians. We are also told that the comment of the victorious Prussian soldiers