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Rh desirable or not to organize, train and equip modern armies with a view to it?

The only possible answer to these questions is that nobody knows. Similar conditions would no doubt produce similar results, but are we likely to find them? What we know beyond the possibility of doubt is that in 1914-8 highly developed industrial countries with dense populations were fighting on or near their own borders. It was these conditions which made possible a war on a front of hundreds of miles; and we may well ask if they can be found again, and, if so, where? Probably the answer would be that only nations possessing the greatest possible resources could support a war of this kind, and that those nations are extremely limited in number, even more limited in 1921 than they were in 1914. Trench warfare in its extreme form is the direct outcome of the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, and is not possible between such nations, for instance, as Russia and Poland.

But there is more than this. It must also be remembered that trench warfare came in 1914-5 as a surprise, and that all armies dropped into it quite unconsciously. It began with a few strands of ordinary wire laid out in front of simple old-fashioned fire trenches. It was indeed a strange phenomenon. In place of the rapid decision for which everyone trad looked, the largest armies the world had ever seen were peering at one another through their screens of metal. That was late in 1914, just at the moment when all the belligerents had practically run out of gun ammunition, when there was no means of dealing with such an unexpected obstacle, and neither side could get at the other. Nothing like this had ever been seen in war. As we now know, it took four years to find the way out of the impasse, but the important point to note is that after the war every nation possessed the antidote. With masses of artillery, instantaneous fuzes and tanks, is trench warfare of this type in any circum- stances conceivable? One thing at least seems to be certain, and that is that, having learnt their lesson, the armies of all nations will strain every nerve to render it impossible, and to avoid a repetition of the wearisome experience of 1914-8.

If this means anything at all it is that future wars between civilized nations will be opened with a suddenness and violence far in advance of 1914. In past wars there have always been a few days of grace between the declaration of war and the first serious collisions. In 1914 Germany issued orders for her gen- eral mobilization on Aug. i, France declared war on the 3rd, the Belgian frontier was crossed by Germans on the 4th and by France on the 6th; Liege was entered on the 7th, and the last forts were captured on the isth; finally the field armies came into collision on the I7th and i8th. Meanwhile on the southern front the French occupied Mulhausen on the 8th with covering troops, but failed to hold it, and it was not until the i4th that their I. and II. Armies and the Alsace group were mobilized and ready to advance into Alsace and Lorraine.

Now, in considering the strategy or the tactics of the opening phases of any future campaign, it was very difficult in 1921 to divest the mind of the picture of 1914, and to remember that there no longer existed in Europe two great military nations with armies magnificently led, fully organized and separated only by an almost imaginary line .called a frontier. Something of the sort, it is true, may be found in the borders of France and Italy, but a formidable mountain range only to be trav- ersed by troops at certain well-defined points introduces an important factor which was absent in 1914. Other open frontiers also remained in 1921, notably between Germany and Poland, between Poland and Russia, and still between France and Germany; but, for the time at all events, organized well-equipped armies no longer existed as we knew them in 1914, except in the cases of France and Italy. Nevertheless it is necessary to look forward. Germany, no doubt, had been forbidden by the Peace Treaty to maintain an army of more than 100,000 men, but it was by no means impossible that before many years had passed several of the more backward nations of Europe would become rich and prosperous, with great industries and extensive railway systems, and would be unable to deny themselves the

luxury of great standing armies and all the paraphernalia of war. History, at least, is not encouraging in this respect, and it would certainly be most unwise to assume that, because the necessary conditions of a first-class war were no longer visible in Europe in 1921, they would remain so for ever, or even for a very long time; moreover, it cannot be forgotten that the opening years of the twentieth century saw a first-class war far outside the confines of the European continent.

No excuse is, therefore, necessary for the assumption, in 1921, that coming generations would know war even as the present generation has known it, and that its opening phases would not be so very unlike those of 1914, always with such difference as is brought about by the scientific development of engines of destruction. If this assumption is justified and it is absolutely necessary to make some assumptions the prospect is that either there will be no declarations of war, or that by various means the period of mobilization will be very much shortened and the great collisions will take place much more rapidly than before. And this with two objects, partly to avoid trench warfare and to reach a rapid decision, partly to ensure that fighting shall take place on enemy territory and not in the homeland. These objects are in their essence strategical, but will naturally find themselves reflected in the tactical sphere. In the first place, with a view to protecting themselves from a sudden inrush, nations may have to spend vast sums upon the fortification of their frontiers, as France did after 1870, and as Germany did for ten years prior to 1914. The influence of these great fortifications and their ultimate fate are not, however, very encouraging, and it is more probable that money may be spent upon the equipment of field armies, and that very special attention may be paid to the success of the first inroad into enemy territory, to seizing the initiative, upsetting the enemy's plans and insuring that at least the opening battles are fought upon his soil.

Tanks and Aeroplanes. For these purposes great use will presumably be made of aeroplanes, and rapid-moving tanks acting in company with cavalry and horse artillery, and here we are at once upon highly speculative ground since the tactical value of these new services is still uncertain. There is a fascination in dreaming of possibilities, but experience shows that tactical development has always proceeded by the slow processes of evolution rather than by revolution, and notwith- standing the great successes achieved by tanks towards the end of the World War, it is difficult to believe that they will be able to act alone for any great length of time. In this connexion it must always be remembered that at the end of 1918 tanks had the enormous advantage of still being something of a surprise. They were constantly improving in efficiency and numbers, and through bitter experience correct tactical methods were gradually evolved. More important than all, even up to the end of the war anti-tank defence was ineffective, an advantage which the new arm cannot expect to enjoy even at the beginning of future campaigns. Even with this great advantage in their favour tanks were vulnerable, and at Hooge and even at Cambrai it was seen that boldly handled artillery could, on occasion, inflict great damage. Increased speed and improved mechanism will render tanks less vulnerable, but against them must be set such possible defence as light easily hidden artillery and anti-tank guns. Indeed, there is just a possibility that future years may see a competition, not unlike that at sea, between gunnery in its various branches on the one hand and speed coupled with armour on the other. The tank will endeavour to combine mobility for offensive action with its own protection, while the gunner and rifleman will try to force the tank to carry armour so heavy as to destroy its mobility. Something of this kind was actually seen in the case of the German tanks, which, in the effort to afford security to their crews, had been so solidly constructed as to be almost useless. Another difficulty from which tanks may suffer is inability to carry out their own reconnaissance in moving warfare. Tanks would also appear to be almost as defenceless at night as is artillery; they are indeed entirely an offensive weapon except for the actual protection which their armour affords to the crews. For these reasons tanks would