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622 tion the dividing line between the zone of advance and the zone of supplies was abolished; e.g. all motor transport and all light railways, wherever operating, were under a D.A. at G.H.Q. The French system of supply and distribution was fashioned for war in the home-country or near to it; when it was transplanted (for instance, to Salonika) it had to be modified somewhat on the lines of the British system. The American system put adminis- stration in the fighting line under an assistant chief-of-staff (6.4) at G.H.Q. ; and on the lines of communication under a general commanding S.O.S. (corresponding to the former British I.G.C.). Under the American system the chiefs of the supply services were not at G.H.Q. but at the H.Q. of S.O.S. With both the French and the American systems evacuation and hospitalization of casualties were purely " Q " services: in the British army they were under the adjutant-general assisted by the quartermaster-general. Some other differences came from geographical reasons. France itself was really the supply-base for the Americans, whereas the British had the United Kingdom for this purpose; so the Americans held great stocks in depots 1 5 days of supplies in advance depots, 30 days supplies in intermediate depots, 45 days supplies in base depots. The American army naturally relied more largely on local purchases (from the Allied armies and from European civilian sources) than did the armies with their home bases nearer at hand. General Pershing founded a general purchasing agency to control these purchases. In 1918, out of 17,600,000 ship- tons used by the American army only 7,600,000 tons came from the United States and 10,000,000 tons were purchased locally, and to the end of the campaign the American army drew largely upon British and French supplies.

The British administrative machine in one particular point was inferior to the American machine in 1918. Under the British system the navy had control of all supplies by ship until they left the transport. The navy could put a supply-ship into any port it pleased, and naturally was guided chiefly by shipping consider- ations. Thus supplies for the southern area might go to a northern port. The American system put the supply ships under army direction when they came within the three-mile coast limit, and they could be directed to the port of supply which was most convenient from the army point of view. The French and the Americans used the railway regulating stations as depots; the British used them as sorting stations only. The British used the base-ports for sorting goods to a great extent; the Americans did not. In the autumn of 1918 the Americans found their one great depot, and sorting and regulating station, at Is-sur-Tille insufficient for the needs of their growing army, and they were proceeding with the organization of another station when the Armistice came.

The general staffs of the various combatant nations were in 1921 still working out the lessons of administration as taught by the World War. One principle seems to be generally accepted, that it is wise to centralize as far as possible all administration under one staff officer over the whole war area, trusting to him to devolve and coordinate. That was the final principle of the organization of the administrative services in the British army in 1918. In the first phase of the war the French organization did a large portion of the work of transporting the British army and its supplies. As the British force grew in strength, and the problem of its administration grew in complexity, the experiment was tried of dividing responsibility between the quartermaster- general of the force and the G.O.C. lines of communication. " Q " tasks were under different control in battle areas and at the base. This did not work satisfactorily, and the next experi- ment was to divide responsibility between the quartermaster- general and the director-general of transportation (the latter having control of the broad-gauge railways, the former of all other transport). This arrangement broke down in the spring of 1918, when the British army was put into serious jeopardy through the transport situation; retirement south of the Somme had to be contemplated, at one stage as probable, and the details were actually arranged for the destruction of the ports of the Pas-de-Calais so as to deny their use to the Germans. In the


 * These figures indicate the volume an

summer of 1918 the British administrative services from the coast line to the trench-line were put under one head, the quarter- master-general, for experience suggested that the commander-m- chief should have one man to whom he could confide the responsi- bility of the administrative side of his army's operations: to divide the responsibility was not to simplify but to complicate the task. (F. F.)

SURVEYING (see 26.142*). The most striking feature to be recorded in connexion with surveying generally is the greatly increased importance which it acquired during 1910-20 from a military standpoint. This was chiefly due to the stationary character of the World War on the western front, but other factors contributed, notably the introduction of air-photography. The use of photographs, taken from aeroplanes, to determine the position of enemy trenches and other detail inside the enemy's lines, made a considerable difference in the technique of modern war and reacted upon the methods of peace-time surveys. But not only photographs from the air, but also photographs taken on land have been pressed into the service of surveying, and the applications of photography to surveys of mountainous regions such as the higher Himalayas have been greatly extended.

In exploratory surveying the conditions have been changed and simplified by the introduction of wireless telegraphy, for the determination of longitude ; the accurate fixing of his longitude, long the explorer's bugbear, is now no more difficult than taking a latitude. In the more regular branches of the subject the principal matter demanding attention is the development (in which many countries have taken part) of accurate methods of levelling, particularly of precise or geodetic levelling.

Surveying in War

Geographical and topographical surveys are well known adjuncts to military operations. The war of 1914-8 showed that all other classes of land surveying, i.e. geodetic triangulation, levelling, and large scale surveying may be called upon to assist in the development of scientific and mechanical warfare. It is not possible to forecast whether future developments may demand an enhanced accuracy of survey, or whether the increas- ing importance of aviation, amongst other factors, may not pre- vent a recurrence of the stationary operations which prevailed over the western front for four years. A description of the more important duties of the Survey battalions on the western front, offers the best record of an intensive large scale military survey.

The Trigonometrical Control. The extent of the line, liable to periods of intense activity throughout its length, and the constant changes of army and corps fronts made it necessary to provide a homogeneous and complete system of triangulation upon which to base the maps and the local surveys called for.

Five separate and distinct triangulations already covered this area before the outbreak of war, viz:

1. The French main arcs and subsidiary triangulations of 1800-50.

2. The new French Paris meridian and Amiens parallel and their subsidiary orders of 1890-1900.

3. The French Admiralty coastal triangulation.

4. The Belgian national triangulation.

5. The German national triangulation.

All these triangulations were eventually combined into a single coherent system, but not until just before the Armistice and too late to assist in operations. The surveyors of the various armies kept in the closest touch with each other, but discrepancies arose never- theless, and time was wasted in fresh observations and recomputa- tion. It was realized somewhat late that the adjustment of the discrepancies of local triangulations is the best preliminary to military surveys.

Many of the stations of the triangulations enumerated had been destroyed or built over before the war and many were destroyed during its progress. Numbers of new stations had, therefore, to be established and the trigonometrical observer was employed in intersection and interpolation, rather than new triangulations.

This patched and reconstructed triangulation stood then as a basis for all the military surveys of the western front.

Provision and Issue of Maps. The British Expeditionary Force took the field equipped with the 1/80,000 carte de I'etat major of France and the British 1/100,000 maps of Belgium. Topographical maps of this sort were accurate enough for mobile operations in which no heavy guns were employed. Directly the operations tended to become stationary first on the Aisne, and then in Flanders, staff, gunners, and infantrymen demanded a map of such accuracy and

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