Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/645

Rh other armies and to prior dates. For the feeding of the British iy, see FOOD SUPPLY. When the armies first took the field in 1914, Germany was at

clear advantage in administration. That was to have been lous care. The equipment of the German soldiers comprised
 * cted. It was her war, and she had prepared for it with me-

iveral novel ideas for greater comfort and efficiency. Examin- ing some of the German dead who had fallen in the early recon- naissance affairs in front of Tirlemont on Aug. 14, the writer had the first uneasiness that Germany might win, so strong was the evidence their equipment gave of a patient and thoughtful preparation. The impressive sweep of the German host through Belgium showed, too, that the German railway organization was superb, and the way the guns kept up proved that there had been a clear thinking out in advance of the new problems of ammunition-supply which the free use of heavy artillery as field pieces had brought to the fore. German staff documents published since the war by Gen. Ludendorff indicate that these matters of administration had been studied from 1910 onwards and that, the German staff were confident that their inferiority in numbers would be compensated by a superior organization in supply. The French administrative services in 1914 appeared much weaker if examination were confined to plans and matiriel. The troops were not as well provided for, the transport organiza- tion not so well planned. But if the human factor were taken into consideration much of the handicap was made up. The French showed a genius for improvisation on the actual battle field, and an astonishing faculty for " getting there " with infe- rior means. Their food scales for man and beast (to give an example) spelt scarcity in German or in English eyes; but they sufficed. In the battle the French soldier was never inferior in energy and endurance; and the French transport was generally up to time. The national elan overcame material deficiencies; and a genius for quick improvisation showed constantly, never more dramatically than in the mobilization of. Gen. Gallieni's " Taxi-cab Army " which moved out to the defence of the capital at a critical juncture. The British administrative services in 1914 were lavish both of supplies and transport. But the British force was a small one, and though its scale of transport was extravagant compared with the French, the total was only 250 motor cars, 950 motor lorries and 40,000 horses. With railway transport it then had no concern: the French managed its railway transport. Indeed the British force in France in 1914 did not completely " administer " its own affairs. Though it was a distinct army in command it was dependent on the French organization for essential services of transport.

The Trench War. A long period of trench warfare fol- lowed the battle of the Marne, and the administrative systems of the three armies were adapted to new conditions, the chief of which were an enormous increase of ammunition expendi- ture, the introduction of poison-gas as a weapon, calling for entirely new supplies of offensive and defensive material, and a simplification of the problems of transport, which in a stabil- ized warfare could follow almost a civilian routine, disturbed only by the chances of shell fire. The trench war was, of course, punctuated by heavy attacks on both sides, but the shift of ground was never great. Administration, whilst it had to cope with the enormous progressive increase in the scale and variety of supplies per division, was thus given ample time as a rule to increase its transport facilities. It could add to its broad-gauge railway tracks, supplement them by light railways and tram- ways as well as by motor-roads, and develop the canal systems as useful adjuncts.

In this period of trench warfare the Germans suffered from a steady deterioration as compared with the French and the British. The war had become a contest of materiel in which Germany could not keep up. The French were able to develop their supply on more generous lines with the help of British and American resources. The British transformed their system completely. The nation took the view that " money was no object " in securing for the troops the best possible chance of victory and the best possible comfort in the trenches. The

growth of supplies (and therefore in transport) was almost incredible. The British force in 1914-5 suffered from a shell and gun shortage as compared with its enemy, because it had been trained and equipped for a different type of warfare. It had very little H.E. shell, and what it had was not really " high explosive " owing to poor fuzes. The patient search for a " fool- proof " fuze had been so successful that what little H.E. shell they had spluttered off rather than shattered off. The pro- duction of high explosive in 1914 was almost negligible. The whole year's supply would not keep the guns of 1918 going for a day. In 1915 Britain began to produce high explosive on a large scale. In 1916 she had increased the 1915 amount seven- fold. In 1917 she had increased that 1916 amount fourfold. From March 1915 to March 1917 the increase was twenty- eight fold. With the increase in the production of high explo- sive went a corresponding increase in big guns and in field pieces. The expenditure of ammunition in time reached to huge figures. The following are the biggest day records in tons: Julyi 1916 (Somme) 12,776; April 9 1917 (Vimy) 24,706; June 3 1917 (Arras) 17,162; June 7 1917 (Messines) 20,638; July 31 1917 (Ypres) 22,193; Sept. 20 and 21 1917 (Polygon Wood) 42,156; Aug. 8 and 9 1918 (general attack) 15,598 and 23,706. Ordinarily the British depots in France kept a reserve of 258,000 tons of ammunition, and the issues in a normal month ran to about that figure, though it varied a good deal month by month. Thus the average daily expenditure during the last months of 1918 was: May, 5,478 tons; June, 4,748 tons; July, 5,683 tons; Aug., 9,046 tons; Sept., 8,576 tons; Oct., 4,748 tons; Nov., 3,158 tons. (See also MUNITIONS.)

Gas Warfare. The introduction of poison-gas was, after the growth of ammunition expenditure, the chief factor in the increase of supply. It was constantly presenting new problems for the administrative services. At first British and French work was solely defensive the provision of masks, the wearing of which would give immunity, the detection of new gases so as to provide new means of defence. But in time the Allies took the gas offensive, and then their gases were more potent and more plentiful than the enemy's, and for lack of material he could not give his men perfect gas protectors. The last form of gas warfare was the introduction of mustard-gas, a powerful corrosive discharged from shells, which infected the ground on which it fell for many hours. The use of mustard-gas by the enemy raised many problems of supply. The disinfection of contaminated ground with chloride of lime, a prompt change of clothing and bath treatment for men affected, proved efficacious in dealing with mustard-gas. There was, too, safety in protective overalls of oilskin. Mustard-gas affected the veterinary service heavily, there being many casualties to horses and mules through passing over ground infected with the gas.

Big-gun ammunition and gas-warfare munitions were, how- ever, only two items of supply. Rifle and machine-gun ammuni- tion, food for man and beast, trench stores, engineering stores, were other items, all of which had a tendency to grow. In the total during a spell of intense fighting, the British administrative services would carry up to the battle-line 1,934 tons of supplies of all kinds per day per mile of front. The intense battle-front might stretch over 10 miles or more, calling for some 20,000 tons of munitions, food and equipment per day for that 10 miles, much of it passing through furious shell fire before reach- ing its objective.

The French administrative services never reached the same scale of supply as the British. They expended less ammunition, issued a ration of less weight to man and beast, and dispensed with much of the " comforts " equipment of the British force. But in facing such a German effort as the Verdun attacks of 1916 they had a tremendous problem of transport, which was met by a motor lorry mobilization, the success of which was one of the great feats of the war.

British System Reorganized. From 1914 up to the date of the first battle of the Somme (July 1916) the British administrative services had had no very severe test (unless the battle of Loos could be so counted, and the organization then was not good).