Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/64

46

surrender should remain within the Hungarian customs regime for a period of years; that no territories should be transferred without a plebiscite, or, alternatively, that better safeguards should be provided for the rights of Magyar minorities. These requests came too late for serious consideration. All the am- bassadors would promise was that the League of Nations should be free to consider any minor rectifications of boundaries which the frontier commissions might recommend on ethnological or economic grounds. It is remarkable that this reply, which only involved small alterations in the draft treaty, was not trans- mitted until May 6. There was one Hungarian pretension with which the Allies dealt more promptly. The Huszar Government claimed that Hungary was still a monarchy, though the royal dignity was in suspense; it was no secret that many Hungarians still desired a Habsburg dynasty. But on Feb. 2 1920 Great Britain, France and Italy declared that a Habsburg restoration in Hungary would violate the fundamental principles of the peace settlement. The Hungarian royalists did not even then abandon all hope; the monarchical character of the constitution was reaffirmed by the Government on March 23. But since the signature of the Treaty of the Trianon the three states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania have combined in a " Little Entente " which avowedly exists to defeat any Hun- garian project for a Habsburg restoration.

The only parts of the Hungarian treaty which call for com- ment are those which fix the future boundaries of Hungary and the allocation of the transferred provinces. On the N. the new frontier gives to Czechoslovakia the southern slopes of the Car- pathians, mainly though not entirely populated by Slovaks. To provide Czechoslovakia with a frontage on the Danube and to secure the economic unity of the Carpathian territories, the frontier line has been so drawn as to place large Magyar popula- tions under Czechoslovak rule. Similarly Rumania receives not only Transylvania, in the E. of which there is a compact Magyar (Szekler) minority, but also a broad strip of the Hungarian plain to the W., in which the chief towns are Magyar, in order that Transylvania's railway communications with the Danube may be adequately secured. The Banat, which is divided between Rumania and Yugoslavia, has a mixed population, pre- dominantly Slav in the western and predominantly Rumanian in the eastern half of the province. The German element in the eastern Banat is considerable and would no doubt have pre- ferred to remain under Hungarian rule. But the chief difficulty which the Conference experienced in dealing with the Banat was the adjustment of the conflicting claims of Yugoslavia and Rumania. For the Allies, in their secret treaty of Aug. 1916 with Rumania, had promised her the whole of the Banat, without regard to the historic claims of Serbia. At the Con- ference M. Bratianu pressed for the fulfilment of the secret treaty. He was met with the reply that Rumania herself had cancelled it by making peace with the Central Powers in May 1918; but he continued to reiterate his demands until the terms of the partition of the Banat were irrevocably settled by the Conference and announced to the world (June 13 1919). To this incident were due the Rumanian occupation of Budapest, the intrigue with the Archduke Joseph (which seems to have included a plan for the union of the Rumanian and Hungarian crowns) and the delay of Rumania in signing her Minorities Treaty.

Like Austria, Hungary is precluded from alienating her in- dependence, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations (Art. 73). She is required to pay a reasonable sum, fixed by the Reparations Commission, before May i 1921; her total liability will be fixed by the same body (Arts. 163, 165) and the balance is to be paid in half-yearly instalments over a period of 30 years, unless payment is respited or remitted by the Allies. She is to surrender all her merchant shipping, up to 20% of her river fleet, and an indefinite quantity of live stock (at the discretion of the Reparations Commission) for devastated countries.

The Adriatic Question. When the Italian plenipotentiaries reappeared at Paris in May 1919 they were offered by the

American delegation the so-called Tardieu Compromise, under which Fiume and its hinterland would have constituted an inde- pendent state for 15 years, and a plebiscite would afterwards have been taken to ascertain the views of the inhabitants. To this compromise, it is alleged, Sig. Orlando gave his consent; but the Yugoslav delegates insisted on unacceptable amend- ments, and the American attempt at mediation was dropped at that time. Subsequently the Italian poet D'Annunzio, at the head of a band of volunteers, occupied Fiume (Sept. 12) while fresh negotiations were in progress (at Washington) between Mr. Wilson and the Italian Government. In spite of this coup d'etat, which was disavowed by Italy, the American negotiations con- tinued; by Oct. 27 Italy had agreed that Fiume should be a free state under the protection of the League of Nations and had resigned her claims on Dalmatia, while Mr. Wilson was pre- pared to recognize Italy's sovereignty over the Pelagosa group, Lissa, Lussin, Unie and the port of Valona. The Adriatic posi- tion was then examined more minutely at Paris by M. Clemen- ceau, Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Polk. These three proposed that Italy should be offered a protectorate over the Dalmatian city of Zara, but that she should be asked to abandon her demands upon the isle of Lagosta and the eastern part of Istria, and also her proposal that the city of Fiume should be made independent of the free state of Fiume. The offer did not satisfy Sig. Nitti, who intimated that Italy, in default of a more acceptable scheme for a compromise, would take her stand on the secret Treaty of London. To this Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau replied that they too were willing in the last resort to abide by that treaty, but on Jan. 14 1920 they offered new terms which were distinctly more favourable to Italy than those of Dec. 9 1919. The new terms were drafted after Mr. Polk had left Paris for Washington, and were presented to Sig. Nitti before the U.S. Government had been consulted regarding them. Accordingly Mr. Lansing intimated, on Jan. 20, that Mr. Wilson could not admit the right of France and England to modify, on their own responsibility, the only terms of compromise to which an American representative had subscribed. The French and British Prime Ministers argued, in reply, that their new pro- posals were actually more favourable to Yugoslavia than those of Dec. 9, and were intended to save France and England from the necessity of honouring the Treaty of London, to which, as was notorious, Mr. Wilson had always objected. But on Feb. 10 Mr. Wilson stated precisely his objections to the terms of Jan. 14. They gave to Italy the whole of Istria and the prospect of a future protectorate over Fiume. They also provided for the partition of Albania between Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece. Mr. Wilson stated that he could not cooperate with the European Allies if they allowed the admitted principles of justice to be overborne " by the country possessing most endurance in pressing its demands." The upshot of the controversy was that Italy and Yugoslavia were left to settle their differences, if they could, by separate negotiations, with the proviso that they must not come to terms at the expense of Albania. It took some time to reach this consummation. But on Nov. 12 1920 Italy and Yugoslavia concluded the Treaty of Rapallo, and on Jan. 2 1921 D'Annunzio's garrison at Fiume surrendered to the Italian Government. Albania, thanks to Mr. Wilson's intervention, has established an independent Government and has been ad- mitted (Dec. 17 1920) as a member of the League of Nations. The Adriatic question was thus provisionally settled, nearly a year after the close of the Conference, but still on lines which the Conference had suggested.

The Turkish Treaty. The Turkish question was discussed at Paris in May and June 1919, but the drafting of the Turkish treaty was not seriously taken in hand until the London Con- ference of Feb. 1920. This delay was due partly to the hope (unhappily falsified) that the United States would join in the treaty; but also to difficulties arising out of the allocation of mandates for the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire. The twelfth of the Fourteen Points provided that these ter- ritories should receive " unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles indicated