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clauses in each; and it was conceivable that it might remain in existence for the next 42 years, or even longer.

The financial clauses provide that Germany shall pay the costs of the armies of occupation (Art. 249). They safeguard the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of enemy assets and property within their respective jurisdictions (Art. 252) a clause of great importance since the German assets held by Great Britain exceeded 120,000,000 sterling, and those held by the United States exceeded $500,000,000. On the other hand, ceded German territories, other than Alsace-Lorraine and the German colonies, are to be burdened with a due proportion of the German pre-war debt (Arts. 254, 255, 257). Germany transfers to the Allies any claims she may have to payment or repayment by Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey (Art. 261).

The most striking feature of the commercial terms is that they impose on Germany a number of unilateral obligations for limited periods of time. For five years she must grant " most favoured nation " treatment to the Allies, in respect of both her imports and her exports (Arts. 264-7). F r fi ye years goods imported into Germany from Alsace-Lorraine, up to the average quanti- ties of the years 1011-3, are to be free from German import duties; and imports from the ex-German provinces of Poland are similarly privileged for three years (Art. 268). The Allies may impose a special customs regime on the occupied territories " to safeguard the economic interests of the population " (Art. 270). For three years Germany may not raise the import duties an certain commodities (chiefly produced by Belgium and Italy) above the lowest rates to which these commodities were liable before July 31 1914 (Art. 269).

Treaty of Versailles Military, Naval and Air Clauses. iermany is required to abolish universal compulsory military ervice (Art. 173) ; her army is to be reduced, by a fixed date which was originally March 31 1920, but subsequently altered to Jan. i 1921 to a maximum total of 100,000 officers and men (Art. 160). The great general staff and all similar organiza- tions are to be dissolved (ib.), and associations of all kinds are forbidden to instruct or exercise their members in the use of arms (Art. 177). The standing army is to be composed of volunteers recruited on a long-service system (Arts. 173-5). The stock of arms, munitions and military equipment which Germany may provide for this army is strictly limited; and the manufacture of such materials may only be carried out in factories approved by the Allies (Art. 168). All such materials

excess of Germany's legitimate requirements are to be sur- rendered within two months after the treaty comes into force (Art. 169). Germany is required to destroy all fortifications on the right bank of the Rhine within a distance of 50 km. from the river, and in the whole of her territory on the left bank (Art. 180). The size of her navy is defined; she may not keep more than 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo-boats; no submarines are allowed (Art. 181). She is to surrender 8 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 50 torpedo-boats (Art. 185), all her submarines (Art. 188), all military and naval aeroplanes and dirigibles (Art. 202). War- ships and submarines still under construction are to be broken up. Germany's air forces are to be entirely disbanded by Oct. i 1919 (Art. 199). The personnel of her navy, including officers, is not to exceed 15,000, and is to be recruited on a long-service system (Arts. 183, 194). The execution of these terms will be supervised by inter-Allied Commissions of Control armed with full powers of inspection and investigation (Arts. 203-210).

Criticisms of the Treaty. One of the earliest critics was Gen. Smuts, who signed the treaty on behalf of South Africa, and on the same day issued a statement in which he spoke of " terri- torial settlements that will need revision " and " indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe." He said that he had signed " because the real work of making peace will only begin after this Treaty has been signed." Mr. J. M. Keynes, till June 10 the chief finance expert of the British delegation, has argued (in his book on Economic Consequences of the Peace, published

in Nov. 1919) that the claims of the Allies to reparation have been unjustifiably inflated by claims for separation allowances and pensions to the families of combatants, and for pensions and for compensation money paid to the wounded and disabled ; and that the demands made on Germany are out of all relation to her capacity to pay. These points are naturally taken in the German counter-proposals of May 29, which accuse the Allies of desiring to fasten " a system of slave labour " upon Germany. " If," says this document, " they impose upon Germany a debt which robs her of every possibility of a future; if as a con- sequence every improvement of Germany's economic condition, which the German people might achieve by tireless diligence and Spartan thrift, would lead simply to this, that even greater payments for the discharge of this debt would be imposed upon us, then any delight in creative work, any spirit of initia- tive, would perish for all time in Germany." The experience of 1920 and 1921 showed that this prophecy was overdrawn, but it has suggested to more recent critics the reflection that the Allies might have obtained more, if they had demanded less. Experience has also shown the unreality of the terrifying picture which the Germans, and also Mr. Keynes, presented of the Reparations Commission as a despotic tribunal created " to exploit the labour of the German people for the benefit of the creditor states." Another subject which frequently recurs in the German note is that of the treatment accorded to German private property in the dominions of the Allies, in Alsace- Lorraine and in the German colonies. They objected to the general policy of liquidation and of referring the expropriated persons to the German Government for compensation. They argued that, by international law, private property ought to have been respected even during the war. They complained that the Allies reserved the right to liquidate German property in their own territories for an indefinite period after the war. They pointed out that Germany could only compensate the suf- ferers by printing more and more paper money, in which case " Germany with her currency constantly depreciating would be forced to flood the world market with goods at ridiculously low prices." But the greatest emphasis of all is laid on the com- plaint that the Allies, by the terms of their treaty, are violating the " innate rights of nation." The right of sovereignty is said to be infringed by the powers of the Reparations Commission and of the International Commission appointed to control the navigation of the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, the Rhine and the Upper Danube. The seizure of her colonies is represented as meaning that Germany is denied " the right and the duty to cooperate in the joint task which devolves upon civilized mankind of exploring the world scientifically and of educating the backward races." It is further alleged that the right of self- determination has been consistently overridden in the territorial settlement, inasmuch as the fate of the Saar valley (for 15 years), of Alsace-Lorraine, of Danzig and Memel, has been settled without a plebiscite, and Austria is virtually forbidden to throw in her lot with Germany, however greatly the popula- tions concerned desire this union. On the topic of self-deter- mination the Allies showed themselves particularly sensitive in their reply of June 16 1919. This principle, as we have seen; had already caused them some embarrassment; they had not all interpreted it alike; and Mr. Wilson himself had reluctantly waived its application in certain cases which were complicated by economic or strategical considerations. On the other hand the Allies absolutely declined to discuss the categories of damage for which they were demanding reparation, and merely asserted that this part of the treaty had been drafted " with scrupulous regard to the correspondence leading up to the Armistice of Nov. ii 1918."

The Austrian Treaty Negotiations. The drafting of the Austrian treaty was begun some time before the German treaty had been signed, and the Austrian delegates arrived at St. Germain-en-Laye on May 14 1919. But there were unexpected delays in completing the first draft, which could not be sub- mitted to the seventh plenary session until May 29. Even then the military, financial and reparation terms and part of the