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inspired among the burghers and in none more strongly than in De La Rey himself were cleverly worked upon by the con- spirators it was because of the visions that the Aug. and Sept. meetings were called for the isth of the month. But the rebellion rested on more solid foundations than visions. As has been stated the moving cause was the desire of the Boers to regain inde- pendence, while support for the rebellion was largely gained by the assertions of Beyers and others that there-would be no fight- ing and that Botha was secretly on their side.

News of Maritz's open revolt reached Beyers and Kemp on Oct. 12; two days later de Wet was in conference with Beyers at Pretoria and final plans prepared. But Maritz Th ait"' was crusne< i before the others could take effective P Mr. steyn. action. General Smuts, as Minister of Defence, had taken over the full direction of affairs from headquar- ters. Colonel Coen Brits was sent to deal with the traitor and did so effectively; in an engagement at Kakamas on Oct. 24 Maritz's force was broken into small and fugitive bands and he himself com- pelled to take refuge over the German border. Meanwhile both Botha and Smuts were urgent in their efforts to prevent bloodshed in the Free State and the Transvaal. They turned to ex-President Steyn as the one man whose word could deter the rebels from executing their purpose. On Oct. 1 1 Botha telegraphed to Steyn who, in poor health, was living at his farm Onze Rust, near Bloemfontein informing him of the treason of Maritz, and saying " A word from you will go far." Steyn refused to speak the word. Not that he approved the action of Maritz, but be- cause " I shall have to tell the people that I most strongly dis- approve of the policy of the Government respecting an attack upon German W. Africa . . . that as far back as three years ago I warned you against such a policy and that on the outbreak of the European war I had again repeated that warning to Gen. Smuts. . . . As a result of that policy a number of officers and men, who as far as I know were loyal, have become rebels." To this Botha replied that the Government's policy was " not only supported but demanded by the vast majority of the popula- tion of the Union," and that, moreover, he possessed proofs that Maritz's plot was formed long before the Government's decision was made. He ended with a moving appeal to Steyn to speak a word " to warn our people against treason, against the ever- lasting stain that anything of the kind would be upon our -national honour, and against the incalculably fatal consequences." No sign in reply came from Onze Rust. On Oct. 22 Botha again wrote to Steyn, informing him of the imminent revolt of de Wet, Beyers and Kemp. In this letter Botha referred feelingly to the outcome of an insurrection " headed by men who in the past have been our honoured leaders " and once more appealed to Steyn to turn those men " from the path of destruction where they now stand." Botha suggested that Steyn should summon de Wet, Beyers and Kemp to a conference at Onze Rust, and now at length Steyn acted. From Oct. 23 onward, and after hostilities had begun he used his efforts to bring the rebel leaders to reason. But only after he had been beaten did Beyers go to Onze Rust, nor was it until he, too, had been defeated that de Wet showed any desire to visit Steyn. The ex-President himself publicly uttered no word. It may here be added that two years later Steyn died and the restraining hand which he had laid upon the extreme manifestations of Dutch racialism was removed. Hertzog, who had not joined the rebels, and had indeed given Steyn some help in trying to induce de Wet and Beyers not to proceed to hostilities, was then free to develop his demand for separation from the Empire.

General Botha delayed operations against Beyers and de Wet as long as there was any possibility of avoiding bloodshed, indeed the Government was sharply criticized for allowing captured, de Wet undisturbed to overrun the northern part of the Free State on pretext of carrying on private negotiations. Rebel activity in the Transvaal at length com- pelled action and Gen. Botha himself took the field against his old colleagues. If that action finally destroyed his influence with part of the Boers, it won the support of many others and it was one of the disappointments of the rebels that so many

men of their own blood sided with the Government. On Oct. 27 Botha dispersed a rebel commando led by Beyers at Commissie Drift, S. of Rustenburg. Even after this encounter in which the casualties were two or three men wounded efforts were made to avoid further fighting, but unavailingly. Beyers crossed into the Free State and on Nov. 7 a fight took place at Gruis Drift, on the Vet river, in which some 400 rebels were taken prisoners. It was after this defeat that Beyers, under a safe conduct, sought a belated conference with Steyn, a conference which led to no result. Meanwhile de Wet had been active in the Free State, his burghers freely pillaging all whom they pleased. At Vrede on Oct. 29 he denounced " the ungodly policy of General Botha," the " miserable pestilent English " and de- scribed the S.W. expedition as " a dastardly act of robbery." On Nov. 9 he seized Winburg; he had refused to go to Onze Rust to see Steyn. Smuts rightly gauged the mentality of de Wet in stating that unless he were " convinced by force " he would not listen to reason. On Nov. 12 Botha defeated de Wet's main commando, some 2,000 strong, at Mushroom Valley, 18 m. S.E. of Winburg. After this de Wet was willing to go and see Steyn, but the Government was convinced that the time had gone by for the rebels to " extort peace terms " and on Nov. 17 Smuts informed Steyn that now unconditional surrender was required,. on the basis of very lenient terms already announced. Pressed by the Government troops de Wet doubled and redoubled and finally, with some 50 followers, turned due W. hoping to make German territory. But he was overtaken about 100 m. W. of Mafeking his tired horses being no match for the fleet armoured cars chasing him and surrendered, Dec. i (1914) to Col. Brits. A few days later the end came for Beyers. After his visit to Steyn he had rejoined his commando, and after an engagement at Bultfontein on Nov. 16 made N. intending to re- enter the Transvaal. On Dec. 8, in the Hoopstad district, he was once again defeated. With some 25 burghers Beyers reached the Vaal river near Zand Spruit closely pressed by a party under Field-Cornet P. H. de Necker. While the rebels put up a delaying fight, Beyers and one companion tried to cross the river on horseback. When fired upon they dismounted. Their horses managed to gain the further bank, but Beyers and his comrade, though they escaped the bullets, were carried away by the current and drowned. A week later (Dec. 16) the last of the rebel commanders, Fourie, was defeated and he surrendered. The re- bellion was over. 1

Altogether about 10,000 men had been in armed rebellion, while the number of their sympathizers was very considerable. In their ranks were three members of Parliament. The casualties on the Government side were 132 killed and 277 wounded. Of the rebels over 5,700 were either captured or surrendered their casualties are not known, and many returned home during hostilities under assurances that by so doing they would not be prosecuted. Only one man, Fourie, an officer of the Citizen Force who appears to have deserted while on active service, suffered the last penalty. He was tried by court-martial and shot on Dec. 20. The rest of the rebels were leniently treated. De Wet, in June 1915, was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a fine of 2,000; Kemp was sentenced to seven years' im- prisonment and a fine of 1,000. Others received lesser sentences and few, if any, served their full term; de Wet, for instance, and 118 others were released in Dec. 1915 in time to spend their Christmas at home.

During the insurrection Hertzog's name had been freely cou- pled with that of the rebels, and in the parliamentary session of 1915 he made himself their advocate. He was no rebel, neither,

1 Major Kemp had been sent, on Nov. 2, by Beyers on a mission to get arms and ammunition from Maritz. Kemp, who had with him some 800 men, appeared at Kuruman on Nov. 8 where he obtained supplies from the townsfolk. Followed up by loyal forces he made his way to German territory and joined Maritz at the end of Novem- ber. In Jan. 1915, in company with Maritz, he reappeared, attacked Upington and was defeated. At the same place on Feb. 3, with over 500 men he surrendered to Col. (later Maj.-Gen. Sir) J. L. Van Deventer, while 100 of Maritz's men surrendered at Kakamas. Maritz and his immediate following withdrew to German S.-Wes Africa. Not wanted there Maritz went to Angola and to Lisbon.