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tions with the Germans in S.W. Africa. The German Government counted with some confidence that S.A. would stand aloof from the contest. It was misled. The attitude of Gen. Botha and of his colleagues was never in doubt. Botha, Smuts and the other Dutch members of the Government represented all those Boers who were not only faithful to the new allegiance they had solemn- ly recognized in 1902, but who were sincerely convinced that by the subsequent grant of responsible government to the ex-Dutch republics and the establishment of the Union, S. Africa's interest, as a self-governing dominion, was to stand side by side with the other members of the British Commonwealth.

The test as to the part S.A. would play in the World War soon came. On Aug. 7 1914, the Imperial Government tele- graphed to the Union Government that " if they desired and felt themselves able " to do so, the seizure of such parts of German S.W. Africa as would give them the command of Liideritzbucht, Swakopmund and the wireless stations there, would be " a great and urgent imperial service." And two days later the British Cabinet suggested that another expedition might be sent later to Windhuk, where there was a long-distance wireless station. On Aug. 10 Gen. Botha replied that he and his colleagues cordially agreed to cooperate with the Imperial Government and that the military operations indicated would be undertaken by the Union Government. General Botha had already intimated on the day that war was declared that the country would undertake its own defence, thus setting free for duty elsewhere the imperial garrison in S. Africa. It was not how- ever until Sept. that Gen. Botha publicly announced the inten- tion of the Government to send an expedition against German S.W. Africa, though this intention was communicated to Gen. Beyers on Aug. 13 and discussed at a meeting of the principal officers of the defence force held on Aug. 21. On that occasion Beyers expressed approval of the measures proposed. While their intentions in regard to S.W. Africa were meanwhile regarded as confidential, the fact that the Government had ranged itself on the side of Britain had been known from the first day of the war and had greatly excited the Dutch Nationalists. Some of them saw in it the opportunity they had eagerly awaited of regaining the independence of the Boer republics; some were already aiding the Germans in S.W. Africa. The decision of the Government to take the offensive against the Germans precip- itated, but was not the originating cause of, the rebellion. German secret agents, too, had been busy, but their intrigues at most only served to fan smouldering fires of revolt. Botha sub- mitted the resolution authorizing an expedition to German S.W. Africa at a session of Parliament on Sept. 9. It was bitterly denounced by Hertzog and his followers, who declared that the Union should remain neutral, but it passed the House of Assembly by a large majority on Sept. 10 and by the I4th had received the approval of the Senate. On Sept. 15 Gen. Beyers made clear his true attitude. He re- signed his post of commandant-general of the Union Forces, affirming that " by far the great majority of the Dutch-speaking people of the Union " disapproved the expedition against German S.W. Africa. Botha's reply was that he himself would take com- mand of the Union forces and personally command the operations against the Germans. On Oct. 9 Lt.-Col. Solomon G. Maritz, the commander of the Union forces about 1,600 men on the German frontier, was in open rebellion; on Oct. 23 de Wet was in rebellion in the Free State, the next day Beyers and Maj. J. Kemp were in rebellion in the Transvaal. The movement was concerted, though the plans for concerted action failed. Of the four rebel leaders named, Maritz was the least important and the only one proved to have been in treasonable relations with the Germans before the World War began. The evidence against Beyers of collusion with the Germans through Maritz after the war had started was conclusive, but there is no evidence that he rose in revolt out of sympathy with them. As one of their ablest leaders in the Anglo-Boer War he enjoyed a great reputation with the Transvaal Boers. Kemp also was known to them as an ^fficient soldier who had been one of De La Key's chief lieutenants in the Anglo-Boer War. Kemp was now an officer of the Defence

Rebellion of 1914.

Force. De Wet was the most famous fighting general of the Free State Boers. All the men named desired to translate into action the policy which Hertzog advocated, and which they be- lieved Steyn approved. In the opinion of a judicial commission 1 which later enquired into the rebellion (whose report was issued in Dec. 1916) Gen. De La Rey plotted a rising as soon as the war broke out. The chief aim was to restore the Dutch republics if not to establish a completely independent S.A. Republic. At the time it looked as if De La Rey was being dragged into rebellion by Beyers and Kemp. It is certain that they depended upon De La Rey to give the word to the Transvaal burghers to rise. Whether or not through infirmity of purpose when De La Rey was brought to Treurfontein (Aug. 15) to address a meeting of burghers which had been called, in his name, with the inten- tion of immediately starting a revolt instead of the expected words he advised his hearers to remain calm and wait events. De La Rey two days previously had been called to Pretoria by Botha and there had had a prolonged interview with Botha and Smuts who had exhorted him to use his unrivalled influence in the western Transvaal in the interest of peace. 2 And without question the burghers, though mystified, obeyed De La Rey and dispersed quietly to their homes. Then came the public announcement of the expedition against German S.W. Africa and De La Rey went to Cape Town to attend the session of Parlia- ment, of which he was a senator. Meanwhile the Citizen Force of the western Transvaal was gathered at Potchefstroom and Beyers and Kemp arranged with De La Rey that he should return N. and address the burghers in camp on Sept. 15. On the evening of that day, at Pretoria, Beyers announced his resigna- tion. In the morning of the same day he had received a messen- ger from Maritz who brought word that "all was ready" on the border. De La Rey had reached Johannesburg from the Cape; Maritz's messenger was sent by Beyers to bring him to Pretoria and late in the evening the three set out to go by motor to Potchefstroom. The revolt was to be started the next morning. The way led through Johannesburg and the car was ordered to stop by armed police, who were looking out for a gang of crimi- nals who had escaped in a motor. Beyer's driver disregarded the summons to stop and drove on. The police patrol fired and De La Rey was shot dead. The dramatic death of DeLa Rey disorgan- ized the conspirators' plans. It deprived them of the one man who could have raised the whole of the western Transvaal against Botha and the one man whose military talents might have matched those of Botha and Smuts. It accounted for the delay in the rebellion, for the interim protestations of loyalty made by Beyers and de Wet's declaration that he wanted to act constitutionally. In de Wet's case there was no evidence that he had been mixed up with Maritz's intrigues with the Germans until after the World War had begun; his was pure discontent with the existing regime.

An illuminating light on the mentality of the rebels was the profound belief that many of them entertained for the " visions " of a certain Nicholas Van Rensburg, a farmer of Lichtenburg, who had served in the Anglo-Boer War under De La Rey, at which time his reputation as a seer was established. Van Rens- burg's sincerity was doubted by few and he seldom professed to understand his own visions, which were of a true Delphic character. One of them was held to foretell the struggle in Europe and to indicate the victory of Germany " the grey bull " which defeated a red bull (England) in bloody combat. Another concerned Gen. De La Rey and with this vision was associated the number 15, which Van Rensburg beheld on a dark cloud from which issued blood. This man's visions and the faith they

1 Composed of three judges of the Supreme Court, namely J. H. Lange (chairman), M. W. Searle, and F. A. Hutton.

2 From Gen. Botha's account of the conversation De La Rey appears to have been in a distracted frame of mind. That he wished S. A. to break away from the British Empire and proclaim its independence is beyond question, and he saw in the World War an opportunity to achieve this object. He was very much under the influence of the " prophet " Van Rensburg (see later). By several observers of his conduct at this time De La Rey was believed to be mentally deranged.