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Rh special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all." These, and other similar rules, were valuable as a statement of the spirit in which the wiser heads of the Conference would approach their work. But the Conference could hardly do more for the propa- gation of Mr. Wilson's ideals than it did in approving the Anglo-American scheme of a League of Nations " formed under specific covenants " to ensure that " the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right." When it pro- vided that the Covenant of the League should form an integral part of each of the new treaties, and when it made the League responsible for supervising and revising many parts of the peace settlement, the Conference loyally accepted the conception of the League which Mr. Wilson had explained in his address of Sept. 27 and in several speeches of his European tour (Dec. igiS-Jan. 1919). The League was planned to be, as he had said at the Guildhall in London on Dec. 28, a permanent con- cert of Powers for the maintenance of the peace terms. It is easy now to blame the Allies for assuming that the Covenant, drafted by Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts in consultation with Mr. Wilson and Col. House, would be accepted without demur by the U.S. Senate. But their attitude towards the proj- ect of the League, when it was under discussion at the Con- ference, at least proves them honestly desirous of realizing Mr. Wilson's aspirations.

The territorial terms which Mr. Wilson had formulated were comparatively simple, though not always easy to reconcile with his principle of self-determination, which required that " every question whether of territory or of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship " should be settled on the basis of " the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned." Mr. Wilson himself subsequently confessed that, when he put self-determination on his programme (in spite of Mr. Lansing's fruitless objections, since revealed), he did so in ignorance of the very existence of some of the nationalities which afterwards invoked his aid. Literally and unconditionally applied, the principle of self- determination would have reduced eastern Europe to a chaos of privileged enclaves and economically helpless states; nor was it easy to see how it could be applied with any useful results to the German colonies or to the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire. The first of these two difficult cases was hardly met by Mr. Wilson's demand (in the Fourteen Points) that colonial questions should be settled with equal regard to the interests of the populations concerned and to the equitable claims of the Government whose title was to be determined. The solution eventually applied to both cases was that of mandates, a device first suggested by Gen. Smuts in Dec. 1918, and readily endorsed by Mr. Wilson when it was brought to his notice. As for the minor European nationalities, Mr. Wilson himself had already, before the Conference, in- dicated that their aspirations could not in every case be satisfied " without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of dis- cord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world." This at least made it clear that a plebiscite would not be assumed to be in every case the one unfailing criterion of the justice of national claims.

The following is a brief summary of the territorial terms to which the Allied and Associated Powers were committed by the pre-Armistice negotiations: (i) Germany was to evacuate all Russian territory, and (2) to recognize the independence of all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations. (3) Belgium and the occupied territories of France, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro were to be evacuated. (4) Belgium was to be left in the position of a sovereign state. (5) Alsace and Lorraine were to be returned to France. (6) Poland and Serbia were to be given free and secure access to the sea. (7) The in- dependence and territorial integrity of Poland and the Balkan states were to be assured by international guarantees. (8) The Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire were to be allowed

to form a sovereign state; but the Straits were to be placed under international control, and the non-Turkish nationalities were to be allowed " an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." (9) The Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were to deter- mine their own political destiny. We may further mention Mr. Wilson's Ninth Point, demanding a readjustment of the fron- tiers of Italy along " clearly recognizable lines of nationality." To this limitation of Italy's ambitions Sig. Orlando had never agreed. But his protest was not, unluckily, made public till May 1919.

Opening of the Conference. The invitations to the Conference were issued by the five principal and associated Powers, whose chief plenipotentiaries held consultations in Dec. and the early days of Jan. 1919, before they formally assembled at Paris. Mr. Wilson was in Paris from Dec. 13 to Dec. 25, in England from Dec. 26 to Dec. 31, in Italy from Jan. 3 to Jan. 6. M. Clemenceau, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino visited London early in December. Finally, on Jan. 12, there took place at the Qua! d'Orsai a meeting of the Supreme War Council (a body constituted in Nov. 1917) which was attended by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing, M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino. On this occasion it was decided that only the representatives of the five chief Allied and Associated Powers (the fifth being Japan) should be entitled to attend all meetings of the Con- ference, and that other members should be summoned only when their special interests were involved in the discussion. The decision was taken without the other Allied and Associated Powers being consulted, but was in harmony with the practice of the Congress of Vienna (1815), and was defended on the ground that the five were "Powers with general interests." Membership of the Conference was accorded to 32 Powers in all. Enemy Powers were not admitted, and neutral Powers were only to attend, when specially summoned by the five, at sessions specially appropriated to the discussion of their claims. But all belligerents, and all Powers who had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, were entitled to. appear at every plenary session. It had been originally proposed to put all " new states in process of formation " on the same footing as the neutrals with special interests. But the right of Poland and of Czechoslovakia to be represented in the Conference was con- ceded before the rst plenary session. Croatians and Slovenians were in fact represented by the Serbians, but the enlarged kingdom of Serbia, owing to the opposition of Italy, was not officially recognized until the end of May. The five principal Powers settled the number of plenipotentiaries by whom each state might be represented, with special regard to the military importance of each Power and to the part which it had played in the war. The number of plenipotentiaries was a question of sentiment only, since no Power exercised more than one vote; but the question was not settled without some bickering. Finally five plenipotentiaries were assigned to each of the principal Powers; three apiece to Belgium, Brazil and Serbia; two apiece to Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam; one apiece to New Zealand, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay. All the Powers were allowed to make use of the panel system in choosing their plenipotentiaries, and the representatives of the British Dominions did important work on more than one occasion by virtue of their position on the panel of the British Empire. These arrangements were complete before the first plenary session (Jan. 18), which was merely asked to transact some formal business, on lines settled in ad- vance by the Five. It elected M. Clemenceau as president of the Conference; it sanctioned the appointment of a secretariat, and also of a drafting committee on which the Five alone were represented. At the second plenary session (Jan. 25) certain of the minor Powers, Belgium and Canada amongst them, pro- tested against the degree of control which the Five had assumed over the proceedings of the Conference. These protests were