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518 er-attacks assisted by tanks. Not until the afternoon did they succeed, with considerable losses, in taking Croiselles, Vaulx Vrancourt and Morchies, and entering Hermies. To do this they had to be assisted by large portions of the third line. In the evening the army found itself once more up against another strongly held British position on the line Behagnies, Beugnatre- Beugny.

. The II. Army had also had more hard battles to win. It took Epehy and pushed forward as far as Fins-Longavesnes-Mar- quaix-Coulaincourt, capturing considerable booty. It was not able to interfere with the British evacuation of the Cambrai bend, owing to the slow progress made by the XVII. Army. - The XVIII. Army made a good advance encountering only slight resistance. It stormed Feuquieres and forced a crossing over the Crozat Canal between Jussy and Tergnier. For March 23 General Ludendorff ordered an attack by the XVII. Army in the direction of Bapaume, to supplement the success of the II. Army, and an advance on both sides of the Somme by the II. and XVIII. Armies.

This day at last brought the reward of their heavy labour. The XVII. Army met with sharp opposition even now from newly put in divisions, but was able to take Monchy, Drien- court, St. Leger, Beaumetz, Lebucquiere and Havrincourt.

The II. Army encountered heavy resistance on the right wing only, and was able to reach the line Neuville-Etricourt-E. of Bouchavesnes-E. of Peronne-the Somme at Brie, with only slight opposition. The XVIII. Army took the Somme crossing at Bethencourt by fighting, stormed Ham and crossed the Crozat Canal. Its left wing corps (the IV. Reserve) repelled the counter-attacks of 3 French divisions that were being hurried up as reinforcements in a bloody battle.

For the next two days the scene remained unchanged. The XVII. and II. Armies advanced towards the Ancre, fighting violently, the II. being more and more hindered by the shelled area of the Somme battle. But gradually a new front arose on the Ancre in front of these armies, stretching southward to the Somme. In the region of Albert the British executed one counter-attack after another, though with heavy losses.

The centre and right wing of the II. Army had, by March 26, reached Thiepval, Beaumont-Hamel, Mametz, Cornoy, Albert and Braye sur Somme. Certain portions veering in from the N. opened a way of advance for the lagging left wing, which was thus able to come up with the rest of the army on March 27 on arriving at Ville sur Ancre-Sailly. Meanwhile the resistance was visibly growing, and it was possible to calculate the point at which it would be equal to the decreasing pressure of the attacking forces.

The XVII. Army had been steadily fighting its way forwards through village after village. In proportion as the opponent's fighting power waned new forces were put in. He seemed de- termined that there should be no question of rolling up or break- ing through his front at Arras under any circumstances. In spite of this the army managed to take Bapaume on March 24, Behzgnies, Sapignies, Grevillers and Irles on the 2Sth, and to reach Boiry, Becquerelle, Hamelincourt, Achiet le Grand and Achiet le Petit on the 26th. The attacking power of the army was now exhausted. On the 27th it did no more than capture the village of Ablainzeville and repel the counter-attacks of new British forces with powerful artillery. . The II. Army progressed in much the same way. The XVIII. Army maintained its almost unbroken advance throughout the days from March 23 to 27. By the evening of the 2Sth it had reached Nyencourt, Curchy, Nesle, Hattencourt-Beaulieu- Bussy, and on the 27th was in possession of Pierrepont, Mont- didier, Boulogne la Grosse and Lassigny.

. At this point the great battle came temporarily to a close. General Ludendorff had, on the evening of March 26, shaped his plans with the view of dividing the British and French by a gradual left-wheel advance of the II. and XVIII. Armies against the French. To this end the Somme at Amiens, and the Avre had to be reached, and the operation continued towards the S.W. The original plans had thus undergone a complete change

in the course of its execution. It would now very soon be shown whether the tactical break-through could still be brought off in spite of the waning of the Germans' strength and the increase of the Allied resistance.

The course of events on March 27 did not come up to Luden- dorff's arrogant expectations. It was impossible for the attack- ing force to know that in the direction of Amiens the decisive point the Allies had only very weak forces at their disposal on that day. In this case, as in every break-through, the difficulty of accurately estimating the exact effect presented itself. The difficulties of provisioning, too, made themselves increasingly felt in the shelled area of the Somme battlefield. The supply of munitions ceased, and the establishment of rearward communi- cations had not kept pace with the advance of the attack. From certain signs it was evident that the German troops were not everywhere at their highest level of achievement and endurance. The losses, particularly those of the XVII. Army, exceeded what under the circumstances was the legitimate number.

Ludendorff therefore changed his intention once more on March 27; The XVII. Army was ordered to close down the attack. The XVIII. and the left wing of the II. were to renew their attack on the now isolated French on March 30 between the Somme and the Oise. This attack resulted in the filling out of the German line where it curved in S. of the Somme, and the taking of the localities Aubercourt, Demuin, Moreuil, Sauvillers, Hargicourt, Contigny, Anainvillers, and Rollot the so-called bridgehead of the Avre. But while the break-through at Amiens failed, the Germans were able to repulse the violent, though dis- connected, French counter-attacks in every case. By April 4 the right wing of the XVIII. Army had still been able to take the heights W. of Moreuil. The II. Army reached the western border of Hamel and pushed forward almost to Villers Breton- neux and Hangard. The battle then ceased.

Later repetitions of the attack in the direction of Amiens had no better results. An assault on April 24 by the II. Army in the neighbourhood of Villers Bretonneux, in which tanks were used, made good progress at first but could not hold the ground gained. The battle ended therefore without any clear decision. Cer- tainly the Germans had achieved an initial success such as had been denied to the Entente during the preceding 3^ years of hard struggle in spite of the masses of men and material put in; they had more than made good the ground lost in 1916, and had captured apart from enormous booty 90,000 prisoners and 1,200 guns. The British army was heavily shaken; 20 French divisions had been drawn into the battle; but the war had not been won, and neither the transition to a war of move- ment, nor the separation of the French and British had been achieved. In the course of the battle 90 German divisions almost half of the western army had suffered more or less heavy losses. New and great efforts would be required for the fulfilment of Ludendorff's great aim.

Battles of Arras and the Oise. An attempt was next made to extend the front of the attack on both sides. To this end Rupprecht's group of armies had been preparing since March 22 to carry out the Mars N. attack at an early date, and had allotted to the XVII. Army three divisions standing behind the VI. Army in view of this. To replace them four divisions of the IV. Army were sent to the VI. The group of armies hoped at last to break the British lines by delivering two attacks on their front this one and the Walkiirenritt by the VI. Army while the II. and XVIII. Armies profited by their early success on the British right wing. But this plan had for the moment to be pushed aside as the Supreme Command placed all the pressure on the left wing of the Michael operation. Not until March 25 did Ludendorff revert to the extension of the attack on the British. He settled that the Mars attack should take place between the Loretto height and the Scarpe on March 28, to- gether with a secondary attack south of that stream. The Walkiirenritt attack on the Loretto height was to follow closely. For this attack 7 German divisions were placed N. of the Scarpe, under the general command of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, and 4 S. of it under the general command of the III.